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5/13/74

Appeal filed.

HOLD
FOR

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMENT

CERT.

lMERITS

MOTION

AB-

NOT

r--.---r---.--~--~~~~r--+---r~SENT VOTG

N

D

POST

DIS

AFF/

REV

AFF

G

D

ING

.!. ....... .
....... .

Rehnquist, J ...... . .......... .

. ......'\

Powell, J .................... .

············/
·
. ...... ( ... : . .. .

Blackmun, J . ................ .

/

.,

Marshall, J . ................. .
White, J ..................... .
Stewart, J ................... .
Brennan, J................... .
Douglas, J .......... ......... .
Burger, Ch. J . ............... .

0

•••

0

0

/

••

0

0

0

0

•••

0

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM

N'ofe-.·
~t,..

Summer List 9, Sheet 1

0p:0

from USDCcD. C · c =:

No. 73-1701

(Corcoran, ? , ? )

UNITED STATES

Federal/Civil (Antitrust)

Ct) )

~ ':J

v.
NATIONAL ASSOC. OF
SECURITY DEALERS

Titnely

Sumr:;ary: Appellant brought suit against NASD, an organization of brokerdealers whose rules are approved by the SEC under the Maloney Act (15 U.S. C.
__ 78o-3), and 15 large mutual ful].ds, underwriters, - and· b-roker·a g e Hfms;- a-ss e rting-·
~~.,_...,='--'-'-'~'-·=-==· '"'"- ._,; ..,..~..··-..,..-.:..

----::-=-_- --·

........... ~ .. - ... ·"·-···..

. ... ··- ·- ..

..c.

-·

---·---

----

-- ---··· -

----------

·-·

that they violated Sherman §1 through a conspiracy to elim.inate the "secondary
---~

fund shares (trading in fund shares after they have been sold to the
public other than redemptions by the fund) so as to extend their legitimate monopoly
in the primary distribution of fund shares granted by §22(d) of the Inv e stn.J.ent Company

_....

- 2 Act of 1940 (15 U.S. C. §80a-22(d) into a

monopo~y

on the total trade in such shares.

Before discovery, the USDC granted summary judgment against appellant with.... the
~

~

thrust of its opinion being that since the sale of fund shares is subject to pervasive

I

-

S. E. C. regulation it is immune from the antitrust laws.

-- -

Appellant now appeals

---~

arguing that while §22(d), (f) of the Investm.e nt Act of 1940 and SEC regulation of
NASD through approval of its rules do confer antitrust immunity vertically in the
"primary" distribution process [fund shares sold by the Funds to the public through

underwriting groups], they do not confer antitrust imrnunity for horizontal activities
designed to eliminate the secondary market.
Facts:

The complaint generally alleges that the appellees conspired to fix

prices on the sale of open-end mutual fund shares ::_nd to restrict sales of such
shares in transactions between dealers ("the inter -dealer market") and in trans------~---- -----------~

actions between investors made through a broker ( 11 the brokerage market") in vio lation of Sherman § 1.

The means alleged were the development of NASD rules

inhibiting the secondary market, restrictive broker-dealer agreernents, the dis.___

tribution of false information about the legality of such market and the suppression
of secondary market quotations.

The USDC assurned that the allegations of the com-

plaint were true in granting summary judgment.
The mutual funds are investment companies regulated under the 1940 Investment
Company Act and in the "open end" con1panies involved in the instant case the owner
of such fund shares is entitled on demand to have his shares redeerned for its pro
rata share of fund assets by the fund.

Fund shares -are sold in their .! 1p.timax_y _____ _

distribution" from the Fund through a broker-dealer group to the public at a current
offering price which represents the prorated net value of the share plus a sales
commission, con1monly called the load.

§22(d) of the Investment Company Act of

1940 [15 U.S. C. §80a-22(d)] makes sale at only the current offering price mandatory

in primary distribution.

- 3 -

-

The secondary market in fund sh,9-res, which the appellee s

are accused of conspiring to suppress, essentially consists of all transactions in th e

--- -

fund shares other than "primary dl.stribu_tion 11 or redemption by the fund. A pur---------~
chaser in the secondary market to some extent avoids the load while a seller in

~

the secondary market normally receives some part of the money equivalent of the
load back which he would not get if he tendered his shares for redemption.
Appellee NASD is the only national securities association registered with the
SEC pursuant to the Maloney Act (15 U.S. C. §78o -3 ), is expressly given some
powers to regulate the distribution and redemption of fund shares [15 U.S. C.
§80a-22(a), (b)(1 )], may have its rules changed by the SEC's unilateral action
[15 U.S. C. §80a-22(b)(4)], and has a membership consisting of a majority of the
broker-dealers in the United States.
§22(d) of the Investment Company Act provides in part that:

11

No registered

investment company shall sell any redeemable security issued by it to any person
except either to or through a principal underwriter for distribution or at a current
public offering price described in the prospectus and, if such class of security is
being offered to the public by or through an underwriter, no principal underwriter
of such security and no dealer shall sell any such security to any person except a
dealer, a principal underwriter or the is suer, except at a current public offering
price described in the prospectus.

11

§22(f) of the Investment Company Act provides:
11

==='",......,"""'"'~u-...-..___ - ~"_,.,

No registered op_e_n _end .corr1papy_ E>b~!Lt _~st_ris:J

t}~e _1:;:_~~§ .: _________

_
fe-ra.b1lit'f-O~~g_.Qt~ility_ Q£ .~lioy: _ p _(j!C_\,l,);"ity 0_~ ViLhi_
£h _it _i& __th,e. ______ ----- ____
issuer except in conformity with the statements with respect
thereto contained in its registration staternent nor in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe in the interests of the holders of all of the outstanding securities of such investment company. 11

t

·•'

- 4 -

Contentions: Appellant's contention is that the summary judgrnent

aga ins t~

below, which rested on the antitrust immunity of the resps impliedly confer re d by
§22(d), (f) and the pervasive regulation of broker-dealers by the SEC through NASD,
was erroneous since such immunity is limited to the primary distributio:-1 o f fund
shar~s

and does not include collective action to control prices in and to limit or

F

destroy the secondary market in fund shares.

Appellant argues that in extending

the limited antitrust immunity implied by §22 for primary distribution of newly
issued shares by the Fund through its broker-dealer group to all sales in fund
shares, the court below violated the rule that exemptions from the antitrust laws
will be narrowly construed.
321 (1963).

cf. United States v. Philadelphia Nat 11 Bank, 374

U.S~

!r~ argues that since the literal wording of §22(d) requiring resale price

maintenance does not cover brokers nor inter-dealer transactions, it cannot confer
any exernption in the · secondary market which consists solely of such transactions.

L"': argues that the legislative history of §22(d)

shows that the provision was never

considered with reference to the secondary market and that early SEC rulings show
that it was interpreted to have no effect on the secondary market.
Appellant argues that §22(f) merely restricts and does not affirmatively allow
Fund restrictions on share transferability and hence provides no exemption.

Further,

§22(f) applies only to restrictions imposed by the Fund and appellant argues that it
does not exempt the broad range of activities alleged in the instant complaint.
Finally, even if §22(f) could be read to exempt unilateral restrictions, appellant
argues that it does not exempt the collective action alleged-in the instant- complaint.
Appellant argues that ''the pervasive regulatory scheme 11 of the Investrnent
Company and Maloney Acts confers no implied im--rmnity since in the immediate
case the actions challenged do not meet the criteria for immunity from a regulatory
scheme as the SEC has no power to imm.unize the conduct in question and is not

- 5 concerned with competitive con s id e rations.

E·

,Pan American Airways Inc. v.

United State s, 371 U.S. 296, 305-309; Hugh e s Tool Co. v. Trans World Airline s ,
Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 384-389.

He argues that Silv er v. New York Stock E xchange,

373 U.S. 341 governs the imme diate case since appellant challenges not th e NASD
rules which are subject to SEC review but rather NASD 1 s interpretations of those
rules which are not subject to SEC reviewo
The

l.[Sl2..C--~d ~at

while §22(d) by its terms applied only to primary distribu-

tion of Fund shares, the legislative history of this section showed that it was intended to preclude the development of a competitiv·e
---......___._

-

second~ry

E

-

"bootleg")
<

~ark~t.

-

It pointed out that the development of a secondary market was incompatible with
regulated resale prices in the primary distribution of Fund shares, that numerous
proposals bad been made to repeal §22(d) so as to allow a free market in Fund
shares but all bad been defeated, and that the objective of the Investment Company
Act of preventing price discrimination among share purchasers could not be achieve d
if there was a secondary market.

It characterized §22(f), allowing the Funds to

impose restrictions on transferability, as impliedly approving private restrictio:J.
agreements, and pointed out that such agreements had been made and filed under
NASD Rule 26 since 1940.

It concluded that immunity was provided by these two

sections.
The USDC also found an implied immunity from the pervasive regulation of the

'----~----------------~---------~-------------------------------

Inv_:stment q_g_m1?2::J :;:rea.

The court said that Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,

··- supra, recognized that antitrust immxmitywas
.....,.,=,..,...,--=
- ""'-~"'-"-·'· '··~·= <·. - ~""""' '""' =--

confer~cd - whcre

the- seH-regulat.i:on

was directly pursuant to statutory authority as in the case of the NASD.
358, n. 12.

373 U.S.

It reviewed the extensive SEC and NASD regulation of this area and

distinguished cases such as Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366
(1973) on the grounds that here Congress' regulatory scheme was clearly designed

t

- 6 to preclude competition.

cf. Unite d Sta t e s v. C9-rtwright, 411 U.S. 546, 549 (19 73 ).

The court concluded tha t there was a limi t e d impli e d im1nunity from th e a n t i trust
laws in the fixing of fund prices in the secondary market.
The

s~
appell~ts reiterate

the court's holding and point out this suit came about

only after the antitrust division £ailed to secure changes in NASD rules and a pplicable statutes .

-

the

suit~

They point out that the Chairman of the SEC has publically opposed

labeling this area an SEC regulatory matter.

They conclude afte r an

extensive review of the legislative history of the 1940 Act that the purpose of the
Act was in the main to eliminate the secondary market in fund shares.
NASD in a separate brief points out that the complaint seeks the relief of an
injunction against any NASD rules injuring the secondary market but has been
amended to exclude the allegation that the NASD' s rules are violations.

It points

out that the only specific alleged violation by the NASD is a letter sent out 15 years
ago with the concurrence of the SEC.
Discussion:

Probable jurisdiction should be noted since the case involves

...____

important issues of interpretation of the effect of the Investment Cornpany and

-------------------------------------------------------------------------

Maloney Acts on the antitrust laws and since the ultimate outcome in the case is
~

of major economic importance.

A literal reading of the applicable statutes and

the inherent weaknesses of any implied antitrust immunity argument support
appellant's position.

The history o£ these acts, the repeated unsuccessful atten1pts

of appellant to change them, the probable effect of a secondary market on the

--

----------------------------------------~

_ statutorily required controlled prim:t:ry m a rket, . and the interference with -the SE-G' s
____:--_:::::·-~---:;;:.~
_ -"'"'·:.:._-_~_,-,.,~-::~::::
...-::_,:;
...1'-:
. . :::.,.~.:~-:--:._=;_!._::-•_!,.-:-·-·.::;!!_";:-:',_-:::;._.,__,.=:=:.""'?.-s. ~
--=--::!':=:--!:':=~=~="'!=====,....-,-.c::-,..,....,....-,,.--,__~_":"'.-=-=- .

~-:.-:.!'~"!:"~.~·~-~~-=--

---=-

regulatory system involved in this suit support the decis i on below.

I am inclined to

agree with the decision below but the question is close enough and significant enough
that this court should hear it.

7 / 30/74
PJN

O ' Neill

Op in Appellant's Br.
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SUPREME COURT, U.S.
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1974

Mr. Gordon s.·Macklin
President
National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc.
1735 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20006
Dear Mr. Macklin:
On November 4, 1974, the Commi ssion transmitted to
Senator John Sparkman, Chairman of the Sen ate Commi·ttee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 1 a staff report entitled
~~utual Fund Distribution and Section 22(d) of the Investment
Company Act of 1940" ("Staff Report") •

G

That report:, among othe r t.hings 1 recom.rnended th at the
Commission r 'e que"St. the NAS D to amend its "RU!eS- of Fair Practice
to prohibit its member-5 from being parties to agreements which
restrict broker-dealers, acting as ag:ents, from matching orders
to buy and sell fund shares in a secondary market at competi-tively determined prices and commission rates.

\

Tl1__e_ S22.._~~~<2n has con sidered that reconunenda tion and,
although the- Rules ( ) f Fair Practice do not require that agreements betv·reen fund undenrri ters and broker-dealers contain such
res ·trictions, it b§lieves that s ound regulatory policy diet· tes
the elimination of a r such restrlctions. As - e s a f s report
suggests, hoVTever , action ln ·1fSarea should also includ e steps
to help to neutralize any adverse impact on the funds' primary
distribution systems and to ensure that transactions in a
brokered market are in the interest of all of the holders of the
funds ' outstanding shares .
For example , funds would be permitted
to impose re!asonable service fees w~1en mvnership of their shores
is transferred in this manner.
In the absence of any und erwriters '
spread on the sale , such fees couJ.d include the cost of recording
the trans fer as \·lell as an amount. to compensat r:~ 1:he unden·;ri ter ,
to some extent , for promotional services .
To ensure that
broker-dealers engage only in the g e nuine matching of orders,
they should not he permitted to fill orders to buy or sel.l fund

'.-,'

Mr. Gordon S. Macklin
Page TV!O
shares more than one full business~ d~v after such orders
are received. ~. Nor -s11ou'!cf brok er- deal~; ;'13"Er required to
set up special procedures to match orders for fund shares.
Accordj.ngly, in order to impleme nt the foregoing, we
ask your assistance and re~es t the NASD to amend its Rules of
Fair Practice as suggested above and as outlined in detail in
the Staff Report.
Sincerely,

di7

Q~/

Ray Garrett, Jr.
Chairman

..

,.·

~ ''

,jnvum.t <IJ'curl of tlte 2flitiUlt .:§tnhs

2]lliaS:frittghm. If:l. <!f. 2l16l'-1~
CHAMBERS OF

c.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, c.JR .

No. 73-1701

March 5, 1975

U.S. v. National Association
of Securities Dealers, et al

Dear Chief:
The Clerk's Office circulated yesterday a copy of a
letter dated November 22, 1974, from the Chairman of the
SEC to Gordon S. Macklin, President of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), a respondent in the above
case.
This letter is a request by the Commission that the
NASD amend its Rules of Fair Practice to prohibit its members
from making agreements with broker-dealers which restrict
them in making a secondary market for mutual fund shares.
Although I have taken only a preliminary look at some
of the briefs in this case, it seems to me that this action
of the SEC may be highly relevant to this case. Indeed, if
the NASD acquiesces in the request (and no doubt the SEC is
in a position to encourage acquiescence), we may have before
us a different case from that presented in the courts below
and briefed in this Court by the parties.
In view of this possibility, it occurs to me that it
may be desirable to have the Clerk request the parties to
file supplemental briefs, before argument, commenting on
the effect of this action on the pending litigation. If this
is to be done, we should act promptly as the case is now
set for Monday, March 17.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc: The Conference
P.S. The Clerk did not receive the letter until March 3.
.

·~

.

'

.$)u:punu cq~url cf tqt~tlt .§taUS'
~Mfringion, ~. <!}. Zll&fJ!~
CHAMBERS OF'

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

March 5, 1975

No. 73-1701

U.S. v. National Association of
Securities Dealers, et al.

Dear Chief,
In light of the information contained in
Lewis' letter to you of today's date, I agree that the
issues in this case seem to have taken a new turn.
I think we should ask the parties to file supplemental
briefs in typewritten form before argument. If,
however, it is thought that this would be an unreasonable request to the parties in view of the limited time
available, · I would at least specifically ask the parties
to address the effect of the SEC Chairman's letter on
this litigation at oral argument, with the thought that
supplemental briefs might thereafter be filed at our
request.
Sincerely yours,

/)~

1

\/

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

I

.itt.prttttt

Clfltltri of t4t J'nittlt ,itaftg

Jfa.gftinght~ ~.

<!f.

2ll~'!.;l

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

March 5, 1975

Re:

73-1701 - U. S. v. National Association of
Securities Dealers

Dear Lewis:
Re your memorandum of March 5, my tentative
disposition is to leave this problem with the litigants.
They have known of the matter since the November 22, 1974
letter and I would wait on them.

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

)

<qottrl !1{ tlrt ~ttittb j)fa.ttg
~~slthtgfon:. !9. <q. ,2!1.?>!~

j;eyrttttt

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

March 7, 1975

Re:

No. 73-1701

-

U. S. v. National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc.

Dear Chief:
I note that the letter of November 22, 1974 from
the Chairman of the SEC to the President of the NASD is
re roduce
d n um a e 18 of the brief · ed by eight
appellee dealers (the red brief) an t at, in addition, a
number of the briefs cull out pertinent passages from the
1974 study. I mention this in connection with the recent
correspondence among us about this case. I am inclined
to feel that we should let this matter simmer until the
oral argument on March 17, and take it from there.
Sincerely,

;~

~

The Chief Justice

cc:

The Conference

No. 73-1701

U.S. v. NASD

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES
I.

Complaint
In sum, government charges conspiracy to inhibit a

"market" for "brokerage transactions" (brokers acting as
agents -not principals), and thereby to suppress a
"secondary market" in mutual fund shares.

The alleged result

is that public pays noncompetitive"sales loads".
Government charges both horizontal and vertical price
fixing agreements.
II.

Government position "clarified" (Reply Brief)
Concedes that 22(d) requires resale price maintenance

("current public offering price") in the "primary distribution"
of mutual fund shares, and in sales by dealers to investors
"if the shares are currently being offered to the public
by or through an underwriter".
Also says that 22(d) does not require price maintenance
as to sales (i) by dealers to other dealers, (ii) to the
issuing fund itself, or (iii) to its underwriters.
Regardless of how a dealer acquires shares, if he sells
for his own account (i.e. as dealer rather than broker) to
an investor, 22(d) requires that sale be at current public

2.
offering price.
But argues that "brokerage transactions" and "interdealer" transation should be in free market.
III.

Defendants' (Respondents) Motion to Dismiss*
Three grounds:
(a)

22(d) establishes a retail price maintenance

system inconsistent with antitrust concepts, and creates an
antitrust exemption and immunity for dealers' conduct in
maintaining the fixed public offering price.
(b)

22(f) sanctions contractual restrictions on

transferability or negotiability of mutual fund shares, subject
to regulation by SEC.

These restrictions - incorporated in

dealers' publicly filed investment company sales

agreements -

are exempt from antitrust.
(c)

By virtue of the pervasive regulation by SEC of

investment companies, and marketing of mutual funds, the
SEC has''exclusive jurisdiction" to regulate this market free
from antitrust interference.

*see Op. D.C.- Jurisdictional Statement, 32.

No. 73-1701

U.S. v • .NASD

THE STATUTES
(Incomplete notes)
I.

Section 22(d)
". . . no principal under writer . . .
and no dealer* shall sell any such security
to any person except a dealer, a principal
underwriter or the issuer, except at the
current public offering price . . . . "
1.

Government contends:

Since 22(d) does not mention the term "broker" or
"broker-dealer", transactions by dealers acting as
brokers (agents) are not restricted to the public offering
price - i.e. a free secondary market should exist in which
investors may trade through brokers at competitive prices.
2.

The Uniform Sales Agreement

The underwriter (wholesaler) sells shares to retail
dealers who sell to public.

~~-r

The ~ dealers

agree not to sell

at other than the public offering price, thus assuring
absence of price competition among sellers of same fund.
As mutual fund shares are sold continuously under a
prospectus kept current, the uni form sales agreement maintains
price uniformi ty.
The focus of governments attack is on this agreement.
*Note that this provision applies to all dealers - not
merely those who have a dealer contract with an underwriter
of shares of a particular fund. Thus if an outside dealer
buys from another dealer, he can sell to public only at
current offering price.

2.
3.

DC's holding (JS 46-56)

Government ignores fact that a free secondary market
would be inconsistent with - and destroy
marketing system prescribed by 22(b).
could not co-exist.

the primary

The two markets

This will defeat congressional purpose

of making mutual fund shares available at a fixed, regulated
price, thereby preventing price discrimination between
similarly situated investors.
DC relies on consistent interpretation of 22(d) to
this effect.

See, e.g., JS 48.

Congress has repeatedly declined to amend 22(d).
II.

Sec. 22(f)

(JS 56)

It provides, in substance that:
(i)

if restrictions on transferability are

included in the Registration Statement, and (ii) if
such restrictions are not in contravention of such
Rules and Regulations as Commission may prescribe,
then such restrictions are permissible.
1.
(a)

Government contends:
that 22(f) can't be read as authorizing under-

writers and contract dealers to agree to restrict the
terms under which they will conduct transactions with noncontract dealers ("inter-dealer transactions"); nor as
authorizing the prohibiting of dealers (both contract

3.
and noncontract) from trading as "brokers" at less than
public offering price.
Government reads 22(f) narrowly as refering to
restrictions on transfer by shareowner which must be printed
on face of certificates.
(b)

If 22(f) may be read as SEC and DC interpret it

(authorizing such restrictions which have been in effect for
35 years))

Government says it would not immunize collusive

action.
2.

View of DC, SEC and Respondents.

DC says 22(f) a "necessary companion to 22(b)" if
disruptive price competition is to be avoided.

(JS 56).

SEC agrees with DC, but says it will soon prescribe
Rules which, in a limited and experimental way, will allow
some competition in the "brokerage market" - SEC's Brief - 46.
As to Respondents, see:
(i)

Brief of Dealers (Lee Loewingar) p. 33.

(ii) Brief of Wellington Fund, p. 7, 56.

No. 73-1701

_

U.S. v. NATL. ASSN. OF SECURITIES
DEALERS , INC.

Argued 3/17/75
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SECONDARY MEMORANDUM

David Boyd

FROM:

Mr. Justice Powell

TO:

DATE:

No. 73-1701

March 18, 1975

United States v. NASD, et al.

This memorandum begins where the initial one concluded:
assuming that the preferable ruling would be one that reverses
the District Court's determination that an antitrust immunity
could be predicated on Section 22(d) of the Act but upholds
the dismissal in major part on the alternative Section 22(f)
ruling.

In this memorandum I will attempt to outline the

basic arguments that will have to be made in justification
of that result, as well as to identify what I presently view
to be the most significant weaknesses in the position.
I will begin by indicating the basis from which I
speak.

I have by no means managed to read all of what I

consider to be the relevant legislative history of this case.
Nor have I gone beyond the sources cited by the parties.

What

I have done to date, however, is to dip into and sample each
of the major areas in an attempt to get a feel for the tenor
of the strength of support of each of the positions.

And in

view of the thoroughness with which the positions are briefed,
I suspect that there will prove to be no real surprises lurking

r

.

2.

r
in the history of the Act t hat the parties have not found
and brought to our attention.
Tension Between Approach in 22(d) and (f):
In overgeneralized terms, it can be said that the
position I have outlined can only be supported by doing in
one instance what you will refuse to do in another.

To

reverse the District Court on its 22(d) determination you
must follow the Justice Department's basic suggestion and read
that section to confer no immunity beyond its precise terms.
To affirm on the basis of 22(f), however, it is necessary to
apply greater liberality of interpretation and hold, in effect,
that the immunity conferred by that section extends slightly
beyond the literal terms of the statute.

Moreover, this

"extension" would be done in the face of an existing but as
yet dormant regulatory SEC authority.
As I stated before, it would seem that some legal
argument can legitmately be made for a slightly more liberal
view of section 22(f) t han 22(d).

The basic reason for the

distinction derives from the differe nce in consequence that
would obtain from a liberal interpretation of each subsection.
An expansive reading of subsection (d) results in a complete
ouster of antitrust principles; that subsection represents a
legislative judgment that price protectiveness is too important

r

to allow antitrust principles to operate at all.

Given the

3.
f

begrudging nature that should attend any attempt to repeal the
antitrust laws by implication, that section should be very
narrowly construed.

A liberal interpretation of subsection (f),

by contrast, results in a substitution of the "regulatory"
control of the various enforcement mechanisms of the antitrust
laws for another regulatory control, that of the Securities
and Exchange Commission.

And while the SEC apparently is not

specifically charged to take antitrust principles into
consideration, it can, to some extent, be chargea to honor
some of the concerns of the antitrust laws when it exercises
its responsibility to act in the interests of the shareholders
and the investing public.
r

And one can in fact point to some of

the regulatory actions taken by the SEC for the proposition
that the Commission has occasionally taken into consideration
manners in which price competition or cost savings might be
effected consistent with the basic needs of the securities
industry.
Thus, as an analytic matter an argument can be made
for receiving with less sympathy any argument for an "implied
innnunity" in 22(d) than in 22(f).

The question remains whether

the legislative history will allow any real progress to be made
) from this starting point.
Contemporary History of the Investment Act of 1940.

r

Discerning the proper meaning from the legislative

/

4.
history of the Investment Act is by no means an easy task,
as witnessed by the fact that many authorities disagree even
over the basic question whether discernible legislative history
exists, much less what it means.

And the difficulty of

determining the contemporary legislative history is compounded
by the fact that a considerable amount of post-1940's legislative
history reflects the mutuals industry that evolved from the
original Act without recognizing that fact.

An equally

difficult problem is caused by the fact that, as is generally
the case, much of the legislative history is too generalized in
nature to be related to one subsection as opposed to another.
My readings from the Investment Trust Study that
provided much of the impetus and a great deal of the foundation
for the original enactment indicate that the mutuals industry's
problems were aggravated by a number of factors that no longer
exist today.

For example, one of the factors that made the

secondary market so attractive in the 1920's and 30's was the
pricing practice that allowed dealers and other insiders to
buy mutual funds without significant risk of loss.

The timing

of the daily evaluations of net assets in relation to market
closing permitted dealers to know the net asset value at the
close of one day and to purchase securities on the basis of
price established by the value set a day prior to that time.
Thus, it was possible to buy at Tuesday's price with knowledge
{'.

5.
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of what Wednesday's price would be.

Not only did this cause

the dilution of shareholder's interests, which was a major
factor for congressional concern, but it generally made any
unauthorized trading more attractive.
Section 22(c) authorizes the Commission to deal with
this phenomenon.

Apparently the industry itself was the first

to undertake t o ameliorate these problems instituting a "two
price" system that at least decreased the advantage one might
obtain from the previous regime.

Thereaft er the SEC instituted

the system of "forward pricing" which seems to eliminate those
practices entirely.

.---

The alteration of the pricing practices significantly
changed the context in which the "bootleg market" operated.
Of course no one can know how significant that alteration was
in decreasing the attractiveness of that market, and I am not
sufficiently conversant with the timing of the pricing changes or
the disappearance of the secondary market even to begin to
speculate.

But it does seem that this is a factor that should

be taken into account in assessing subsequent claims in the
legislative history of the 60's that credit Section 22(d) for
eradicating that market.

In the same manner, this makes it

difficult to assert that 22(d) rather than 22(f) was designed
to meet this problem.

To the extent that one might believe

that control of the pricing practices would make the secondary

r

market less attractive, one might assert that the congressional

,--

6.

conc e rn with the "bootleg market" is a more ambivalent factor
than appellees portray it to be.

To the extent that one can

point to other subsections of Section 22 that might be used
to discourage the "bootleg market" appellees' arguments
regarding subsection (d) are diminished in force.
A second relevant consideration stems from the nature
of the secondary market that existed in the 1930's.

Appellees'

basic argument that this was primarily a dealers market is
correct.

However, t hat factor might be thought to operate to

their detriment rather than to their benefit.

The major

"disruptive" effect that concerned Congress in 1940 was that
~

caused by non-contract dealers who dealt in sufficiently large
volumes of mutual fund shares to effectively compete with the
contract dealers.
Appellees seem to argue from this ini tial beginning that
the term "dealers" in 22(d) was a generic term encompassing
both statutory dealers and dealers acting in the capacity a s
brokers in the statutory sense.

However, if one begins with the

proposition that any implied repeal of the antitrust laws s hould
only be found where that was clearly contemplated
~ ele~~4AP£eeeea) ,

one can assert with some justification

that it was not contemplated in this instance for the simple
r eason that the brokerage market was not a sufficiently disruptive
\

factor in the 1930's to attract congressional attention.

The

----

7.

argument thus would be that Congress did not extend the
Section 22(d) mandatory price maintenance scheme to brokers
for the simple reason that brokers were not then a cause of
congressional concern.
This same basic approach might be brought to bear to
rebut one factor in the 1940 legislative history that appellees
have used rather effectively in their behalf.

They point out

(red bri ef at 55) that the industry opponents of 22(d)
realized and called to Congress' attention the fact that the
purpose of that subsection was to
the secondary market.

el~inate

competition in

It would seem that you can argue,

consistent with the preceding argument, that the "street
trading" that opponents of 22(d) sought to protect was secondary
dealer activities, not non-cont ract brokerage tiansactions.
Thus, the thrust of that argument seems to be effectively blunted.
Summary of 22(d) Argument in Relation to 1940 History
With these preliminary considerations in mind, the
following is what I presently consider to be the best argument
for reversal of the District Court's holding on 22(d).
you point out the unusual nature of that subsection:

First,
it

affirmatively requires an exc eption to antitrust principles
rather than a·u thorizing an exemption that arises in view of the
regulatory supervision of some other federal body.
disfavor against

~plied

Thus, the

repeal of the antitrust laws operates

8.
,.--.

with more force than in other cases.

You might draw a contrast

to previous implied repeal cases such as Pan American World
Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963) and Hughes Tool
Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973), where the
Court relied on another federal agency's responsibility to
regulate in the public interest as a justification for finding
an implied repeal of the antitrust laws.
You might also assert that the argument you make in this
context is somewhat similar to that recognized by the Court in
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963).

There

one of the considerations militating against an implied repeal
of the antitrust laws was the fact that the SEC lacked jurisdiction
over the particular Securities and Exchange practice at issue,
a group boycott effectuated by Exchange Rules controlling the
use of direct-wire telephone connections which were essential
to effective trading.

The Court relied in part on the absence

of Commission jurisdiction and pointed out that a different
case would be presented if the Commission had jurisdiction over
the practice at issue.

Id., at 358.

Significantly, it cited

Commission regulation under the Maloney Act as one possible
instance in which the existence of SEC jurisdiction might call
for a different antitrust result.

Id., n. 12.

The problem presented by Section 22(d) is similar
to that in Silver to the extent that any finding of implied anti-

r ...

trust immunity does not correspondingly repose a substitute

,r

regulatory authority in the SEC.

9.

To the contrary, a deter-

mination that a particular practice is required by 22(d) makes
SEC regulation somewhat more difficult under 22(f).

That

regulation could only be effected, it would seem, by first
exercising the power to grant exemptions from the Act and thereafter reimposing some lesser command through rules and regulations.
It seems questionable whether the SEC could properly exempt on
a sufficiently broad-scale basis to reinstitute the kinds of
controls it presently visualizes through 22(f) if the District
1
Court is affirmed on 22(d).

Having thus established the conceptual framework for
the argument, you must conclude that the 1940's legislative history
is not a sufficiently strong indication of congressiona concern
with the bootleg market to justify extension of 22(d) beyond its
terms.

The bootleg market was one of a number of topics discussed

in the Investment Trust Study, and some of the contributing factors

1. I may be a bit out of bounds in saying this. The
parties have pointed to no case in which the scope of the SEC's
exemptive power has been challenged. But it does appear that the
Commission has in the past exercised that power in a rather broadbrush fashion o For example, the SEC rule allowing quantity discounts
for fund purchases of large amounts of funds arguably amounts to an
exemption of a generic category of transactions from 22(d).
At some point it would seem that SEC exercise of its
power of exemption would begin to approach an "administrative r epeal"
of 22(d) which, especially in light of repeated congressional
refusal to take that action, would be improper.
f

'

vr

10.
to the success of that market can be dealt with by other
subsections of Section 22 as well as by 22(d).

You could

argue that, wha tever its ultimate use, the primary purpose of
22(d) was to provide a check for preferential price treatment
of insiders.

There appears to be some support for that

pesition, although it is by no means clear.
Subsequent Legislative History:
The subsequent legislative history of 22(d) is
troublesome.

Although I doubt that I could ever establish

this fact, it appears that 22(d) has come to be regarded as
more than it might have originally been intended to be.

r

(

During hearings held in relation to consideration
of repeal of 22(d) during the 60's and 70's that section is
repeatedly attributed with eliminating all secondary trading

--

of mutual funds.

.

Indeed, in a few instances the Commissioner

of the SEC even refers to 22(d) eliminating broker-dealer
transactions.

That history is sprinkled with references to

22(d) that appear to support appellees' characterization of its
role.
I have r ead certain portions of the hearings, and I
presently can think of no way to deal with that segment of
the legislative history other than to assert that it is not
sufficiently clear on the critical points to warrant implying
1

a broader scope as a result of the reenactments of 22(d).

I

r

'

11 •
.........

Perhaps more convincing arguments will occur at a later point
in time.
Argument for Exemption Through 22(f).
I do not now contemplate that the argument on 22(f) will
differ in any material respect from those set forth by the
parties.

In this _instance, the force of the argument is supported

significantly by the long period of continued practice of restrictions
in the secondary market.

The only problem is in relating those

restrictions to subsection (f) rather than (d).
The result of finding that the practices are sheltered
from antitrust immunity through 22(f) is to hold that such

I

practices are immunized to the extent that the SEC acquiesces in (
them.
What to Do With Count I
It presently appears that an affirmance on the rationale
I have outlined would require reversal and remand for further
consideration of Count I.

The immunity that this solution

contemplates derives from 22(f) and depends on the conditions
of that Section.

Count I seems to allege practices that do

not benefit from potential Commission oversight.

In order to

immunize those practices you would have to find that SEC
regulatory authority under 22 displaces antitrust laws entirely.

r

At the minimum, it would seem that a remand and further

,.--.,.

12.

consideration would be necessary to determine whether the
~

powers of the SECAreach these alleged practices, if they
exist, should import a corresponding immunity.
David

/""
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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
To: Justice Powell
From: David

Re: No. 73-1701 United States v.
National Assoc1at1on of Securities
Dealers, et. al
--

I am continuing to wind my way through the arguments
and counterarguments in this complicated case, as well as
some of the rather massive legislative history.

Rather than

wait until I finish, I thought it best to provide an initial
memorandum that outlines the issues as I presently see them
and identifies what I view to be the more difficult of the
decisions that you will have to make.

I hope to supplement

this before the Wednesday conference.
I presently retain an inclination to affirm the decision of
,.-...

the District Court, albeit on a more circumscribed basis than
those that that court offered on its own behalf.

As I now

view the case, I think that the District Court's determination
that the challenged activities are required by section 22(d)
is probably erroneous.

I consider the District Court's second

and third grounds for dismissal to be essentially the same point,
ahd my present feeling is that the court was correct on that
score.
This position generally corresponds with that taken by
the Securities and Exchange Commission.

I note that the SEC

only takes a stand with reference to counts II-VIII of the
complaint, and that it seems to remain silent as to the validity
of count I.

That remains a matter for resolution; before voting

I will have to determine how the legal conclusions and the pleadings in the complaint correspond.

r--..

.--....

2.

~

I have now read or examined enough of the legislative
history and secondary materials to be able to predict with
some degree of confidence that nothing in the history of the
Act will provide any more than the sketchiest notion of · the
proper solution to the precise questions presented by this
appeal.

For example, the most prevalent view of the contemporary

history of section

22~d)

is that there really is none. This

view has been expressed by commentators,

~.g.,

Greene, The

Uniform Offering Price of Mutual Fund Shares Under the Investment Company Act ef 1940,37 U. Det.L.J., 369, 371 (1960).

The

SEC has, at various times, itself adopted this theory .
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Report of the
SEC on the Public Policy Implications of Investment Company

/

Growth, H.R . Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 219 (1966).
Even the one commentators who a s ser t that there is in fact
discernible contemporary legislative history are, in the final
analysis, somewhat speculative as to what the history clearly
reveals.

Heffernan & Jorden, Section 22(d) of the Investment

Company Act of 1940 - Its Original Purpose and Present Function,
1973 Duke L.J. 975.
In practical terms, this means that the Court's decision
is likely to be a more heavily weighted "policy decision" than
most efforts at legislative interpretation.

With this in mind,

it seems that the general operation of the Investment Company
Act and the expectations that that operation have engendered

r

are i mportant considerations.
in which the SEC has

~egun

Equally important is the manner

to exercise increasing regulatory

authority over certain trading practices, and the manner in which

~

3.

~

the Court's decision might affect those developments.

With

these considerations in mind, my approach is to favor a ruling
that allows the SEC a maximum of regulatory flexibility in
this area . Regulatory supervision is the general theme of
the totality of Section 22, and to the extent that an interpretation of the subsections at issue here dilutes that general
pattern, I view it with some distrust.
Relationship of Section 22(d) and 22(f):
It first should be recognized that sections 22(d) and 22(f)
do significantly different things.

Section 22(d), as all

parties admit, requires price maintenance; the issue in this
case is how much price maintenance it requires. Section 22(f),
r--.

by contrast, only authorizes price maintenance subject to the
Act's discJ.osure requirement and to the Commission's supervisory
authority; trre issue in this re@ard is how much and what kinds
of price restraints can the Commission authorize.
If the Court were to affirm the District Court on both the
section 22(d) and (f) rulings, a certain tension would be
established.

For if section 22(d) requires

retail price

\ maintenance throughout all of the secondary market the Commission's

~ oversight

function under section 22(f) is correspondingly diluted.

To the extent that subsection d commands retail price maintenance,
the Commission's supervisory function is rather unimportant.
lndeed, if 22(d) is read to cover the waterfront, the only way

r

( the Commission might exercise significant regulatory authority
) in the direction of introducing certain price competition would
I

-----

be to exercise its power to grant exemptions from the require~

4.
~

ments of the Act to free brokers and

deale~s

from the strictures

of 22(d) and thereafter reimpose some more limited control
through ·the exercise of the power of approval under

22(~).

The Antitrust Division apparently has argued before Congress
that the SEC might exercise its power in' this fashion, and
certain SEC exemptions do appear to represent almost _.as broad
an approach as that

~uld

entail.

following 1941 the SEC granted

For example, in the years

certain exemptions that generally

permitted "quantity discounts" from the specified sales loads.
Thus, by purchasing a sufficient quantity of mutuals one might
obtain a more favorable load rate and, to that extent, break
free from the apparent uniformi t yi of the retail price maintenance
scheme seemingly required by 22(d). But the kinds of price

)

competition that the SEC now appears to contemplate would seem

m require even broader exemptions than this.

If indeed section

22(d) requires price maintenance in all the transactions
encompassed in this action, the Commission might be forced either
to exercise its power of exemption in a manner similar to
administrative repeal of the section, an opti6n:,that would
seem to be particularly inappropriate in view of the numerous
times Congress itself has refused to repeal the section, or to
abandon its restricted price competition entirely.
Thus, to some extent the District Court's interpretation
of section 22(d) might pose a threat to the Commission's recent
decision to experiment with some forms of price competition

("-

1

in tbesecondary market.

I would think that that result should

{ be avoided, if possible.

...---..

5.

I

Justice Department's Approach to the Litigation:
The Justice Department's attitude in this litigation
is rather simple and can be broadly summarized in relatively
few words.

Essentially the Department relies on the general

disfavor for implied repealers of the antitrust laws as an
essential basis for its argument that the antitrust immunity
conferred by sections 22(d) and (f).

It argues, in effect,

that the legislative history of the Act provides no justification for expanding antitrust immunity beyond the precise terms
of the statute.

The Department bolsters this argument by

pointing to the care with which the securities laws are drafted,
asserting that the Court should not find antitrust shelter
~

where not is explicitly provided.
As a preliminary matter, it appears to me that much of
the Justice Department's argument has persuasive validity.

The

initial focus of that argument appears correct, and it does
seem appropriate to approach with some

health~

skepticism the

notion of expanding the shelters of sections 22(d) and (f)
much beyond their terms.

That same notion is expressed in

the Court's opinion in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,

373 U.S. 341, 361 (1963), where it was said that , absent
repealing or exclusivity provisions, conflicting law should be
pre-empted by exchange self-regulation "only to the extent
necessary to protect the achievement of the aims of the Securities
1

r

Act."

1. Silver is not precisely analogous on the facts, because there
the Commiss1on lacked the kind of regulatory authority over the practice
in question that it has in this case under 22(f).

6.
~

While the Justice

Department~s

argument has general

validity for all of the issues considered in this appeal, it
would appear to have more force with reference to 22(d) than
to 22(f).

I

For a finding in appellees' favor under 22(d) would

I

appear to mandate price maintenance throughout the entirety
I

of the secondary market, subject only to the Commission's

I

ill-defined power of exemption ~ubject to that power of

\

exemption, a finding for appellees "under 22(d) would essentially
a: ount - to a

tot~ repealer

of antitrust

les~A find~ng

for appellees under 22(f), by contrast, amounts to a
...

-------:=-

-----

--

substitution of the SEC's· oversight function for the antitrust

----

~

~---------------------------

laws. Clearly the SEC should be expected to be less sensitive

·---

to the concerns of the antitrust laws than the Antitrust Division,

and to that extent antitrust principles are sacrificed by
affinning under 22(f) as well.

But the "sacrifice" is more

in the nature of a substitution of one regulatory body's judgment
for · the legislative judgments expressed in treantitrust laws.
As an abstract matter, it would seem to me that this "sacrifice"
should more readily be implied.
Section 22(d)
The essence of the ~ustice Department's argument
on this score is that 22(d) speaks only to dealers and not to
brokers, and that the price maintenance accordingly should not
be read to encompass brokered transactions.

r

On this point the

SEC agrees, and indeed has expressed similar views on occasion
in the past, most recently in the Staff Report issued in 1974.

,.-...._

7.
~

Although I am not entirely certain of this, it would appear
that the Commission's recent attempts to encourage limited
price conpetition in the secondary market is premised on
this conclusion.
The Justice Department further argues that section 22(d)
expressly exempts from the retail price maintenance scheme
sales from one dealer to another.

On the face of the statute

they are correct. The SEC does not specifically dispute this
contention, but instead argues that the policy of section 22(d)
manifests an intention to protect the primary distrubution process
from possible disruptive effects caused by the secondary
r

, dealer market.

The difference between the SEC and the appellees

is that the SEC asserts that the mechanism for protection of
the primary market from this evil ) is its own supervisory power

I

of 22(f).
The conclusion that I draw from all of this, taking into

account the legislative history that I have managed to read, is
that the Justice Department is correct on this score.

I have

found nothing that would warrant extending section 22(d) as far
as the District Court did, especially in view of the more

attrac~ive

alternative posed by section 22(f). Thus, if 22(d) were the sole
issue, this case probably would have to be reversed.
Section 22(f)
The Department.! s argument on this point, which is nicely

r

summarized in its reply brief, is similar to the 22(d) argument

..............

8.
..---.,.

insofar as it asserts that the statute's reach should be
restricted to its literal terms.

The Justice Department

therefore would limit restrictions on transfer and negotiability
2

to those that are imposed by the fund.

The Department further

asserts that the SEC would have to . affirmatively

orde ~

the

kinds of restrictions here at issue in order ·to confer antitrust
immunity under 22(f).
I think that the Department's second argument is
clearly incorrect.

In view of the close regulatory relation-

ship established between the SEC and the industry, I would
consider knowing SEC acquiescence sufficient to confer antitrust
immunity.

The question therefore seems to focus down to

whether the SEC can through 22(f) confer antitrust immunity on

,..

transfer restrictions that are not imposed by the fund
itself but rather are imposed by the principal underwriter upon
the contract dealers who are to sell the fund's shares.
My present inclination is to side with the SEC on this
matter.

It would seem that so long as the principal underwriter

imposes conditions on the contract dealers that are similar to
those imposed on him from the fund the policy of 22(f) is
not abused.

The result admittedly requires reading a bit

more into the statute than is contained in its precise words,
but my present view is that the history of the statute and the
long subsequent practice would justify this action.

2. The SEC points out, without apparent rejoinder by Justice,
that even under this restrictive reading counts III, V, and VII
would have to be dismissed. I have not checked this, but I assume
it to be correct.

.....-........

---.,
9•

.r-'

Questions:
In the course of preparing this memorandum a few
possible questions have occurred to me that you might wish
to explore at oral argument.
First, it might be helpful to pin the SEC down on the
question of section 22(d) and interdealer transactions.

As

I understand their position, they agree with the Justice
Department that !2(d) should not be interpreted to require
price maintenance in interdealer transactions. They would l
instead seem to feel that the Commission can authorize
price control at this level through 22(f).
Second, you

m~t

seek to elicit the views of either

the SEC or the Justice Department on the relationship between

{

22(d) and 22(f).

You might do this by asking whether, if the
v

Court affirms ' the District Court on the 22(d) point, the SEC
would be forced to resort to exercising its power to grant
statutory exemptions in order to pursue its recent policy of
encouraging limited price competition in the secondary market.
You might also ask whether the parties view the power to grant
exemptions as one that can be exercised in a bread manner with
reference to generic categories.
Finally, you might ask the Justice Department whether
counts III, V, and V!I a

charge fund-imposed restrictions that

should be dismissed even under the theories advanced by them.
The SEC makes this contention at page 52, n. 10 of its
0

amicus brief, and the Justice Department does not seem to respond
to that in its

respon~e.

You might also seek some clarification of

count I, which I cannot understand.

I
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MEMORANDUM

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

FROM:

Mr. David Boyd

TO:

No. 73-1701

DATE:

April 27, 1975

U.S. v. NASD

This confirms - and to some extent supplements - our
conversation Saturday afternoon about your fine first draft.
I am impressed by the mountain of work which you have
accomplished and your marshaling of the background, history
and purpose of the Investment Company Act.

It has been

educational for me to read the draft and the accompanying
notes.
I have done some editing in pencil, although I did not
read the draft primarily in an editorial role.

Rather, I

sought to obtain an overall view of the opinion and your
proposed analysis.
We are in agreement that we must find sound ways to
reduce the length.

If we add another 15 pages to the present

37 pages, the printed opinion - especially with the full
footnotes - would be

oppressiv~ly

long.

It has been helpful,

initially, however, for me to see the full story.
One specific suggestion for cutting back relates to
pages 15-20.

Rather than explain the "two-price system"

in detail, with its resulting evils, I suggest that you

•

2.
summarize in conclusory terms the abuses which prompted enactment of

§

22.

Readers of our opinion will accept our conclusory

characterization of these abuses •

w

I also suggest that you look for opportunities to reduce
or summarize in subparts A and B of Part IV.

My

first impres-

sion (which may not be my final one) is that suboart· •B
(commencing p. 32) is not tightly written.

Some of the

arguments advanced as refuting appellees reliance on legislative
history are not entirely persuasive.

Putting it differently,

some of this appears to be a bit "labored" •. The strength of
our position, with respect to the meaning of

§

22(d), derives

from the statutory language itself, and especially from the
definition of "dealer".

It seems to me we come close to having

a "plain language" position.

When this is combined with the

strong presumption against inferring antitrust immunity, I
find our position as to 22(d) quite convincing.

Some of the

subsidiary arguments advanced in the draft may detract, rather
than support, the basic strength of our position.
Moreover, since we end up deciding this case against
the government, our opinion may be "unbalanced" if we devote
the greater part of it supporting the government's position
as to 22(d), and finally knocking it out under 22(f).
don't want the 22 (d) "tail" to wag the 22 (f) "dog".
Now for a

coupl:~e

We .
.J1

of minor points:

~f~·'' :...

1"-

3.

I mentioned the possible confusion arising from the
use throughout the draft of the terms "broker", "dealer",
"broker-dealer", "contract dealer", and "statutory dealer".
Perhaps definition of these terms up front would be helpful.
Also, I do not believe the draft contains (unless I
overlooked it) a clear exposition of the difference between
the "generic" and the "statutory" definition of "dealer".
As I recall, one of the briefs is quite helpful on this point.
On page 4, you properly note the government's position

as to secondary interdealer transactions and brokerage
transactions.

As I recall, however, the discussion in

subsequent parts of the draft is confined to the brokerage
'

transactions, with little or nothing being said further about
interdealer transactions.

I

realize that the latter are

relatively unimportant.

*****
When one has worked asrrbard aad as effectively as you
have on this draft, I am sure that an exhortation to reduce
its length - without specific guidance - may be a bit discouraging (although I have observed that you do not discourage
easily).

I

think we must

~ke

this effort, however, and I

will try to be a bit more constructive when I am able to devote
more time to a second draft.

L.F.P., Jr.
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MEMORANDUM

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

FROM:

Mr. David Boyd

TO:

No. 73-1701

DATE:

May 10, 1975

United States v. NASD

This will confirm that I have reviewed (i) our first chambers
draft , which includes Part I•III; and (i) the typewritten of 5/8/75
of Part IV.

I am pleased with Parts I-III, as printed - indeed,

I think it reads very well.

Although I was not reviewing the

chambers draft primarily for pr inter's errors, I have noted a
few of these - in addition to a couple of minor changes - on my
copy attached hereto.
I also think the typewritten draft of Part IV is fairly close
to being ready for a chambers draft.

Apart from some editorial

changes, my only substantive change is in subpart B.

I see no

need to repeat the reference to Silver and its doctrine.

Also,

I would like to 'lean" a bit on the SEC's view as to repugnancy.
I am not entirely content with the first paragraph of Part
IV.

It must be read in context with the concluding sentences

of Part III.

You might take another look at this.

I am dictating this memorandum Saturday afternoon, and under•
stand that before the day is out you will give me a draft of Part

v.

I will review this, and have it back in your hands Monday

morning.

My hope is that we can send Parts IV and V to the printer

early next week; have the chambers draft reviewed promptly by
one of your co-clerks; and, with luck, circulate by Friday, the

16t~

·2.

especially as I will be away from the afternoon of the 16th until
the morning of the 20th.

*****
I now record random thoughts and questions to be kept in mind
as we go through the final reviewing and editing process:
1.

I am not sure the draft is clear as to "inter-dealer"

transactions.

The SG's reply brief, for example, states:

"The secondary dealer market that we contend is
permitted by f 22(d) extends no further than to
sales by dealers to other dealers, to the issuing
fund itself, or to the underwriters".
The government recognizes that a dealer who sells to an
investor is bound by 22(d), but contends that appellees are
"suppressing the secondary inter-dealer market".

The SEC's brief,

p. 3, states as one of the questions whether restrictions may be
imposed upon the terms under which the underwriter and contractdealers will conduct transaction with non-contract dealers in
the fund's shares.
You have added a sentence tn note 20 (p. 15 of chambers draft)
to the effect that the express language of

§

22(d) does not require

resale price maintenance with respect to inter-dealer transactions.
I suppose that the restrictive agreements that we sustain under
§

22(f) include price maintenance provisions with respect to

inter-dealer sales.

My question is whether we have been sufficientl:.

explicity with respect to the inter-dealer restriction challenged
by the government.

•''"'

>

,

3.
2. In part IV we rely primarily on legislative history tn
our interpretation of the language of 22 (f).

We say little, 'l il

anything, as to the literal meaning of the language itself
is usually the starting point of statutory construction.

~

which

I suppose

the truth is that the literal meaning of restrictions on "the
transferability or negotiability of any security" is ambiguous in
the sense that it could conceivably mean either what the government claims or what we think it means.

Thus, we properly rely

on the history of this section and the purpose of the entire act.
Perhaps we have said enough about this.
3.

What do you think?

Throughout our draft opinion we refer to the restrictive

agreements or contracts without ever having designated them as
"defined terms".

Compare page 6 of the chambers draft with page

8 of the jurisdictional statement.

The latter makes clear that

there are two specific types of contractual agreements that are
challenged.

I also states, perhaps more clearly than we do, the

government's complaint with respect to prohibiting participation
by broker-deiJlers in inter-dealer markets.

My concern is that

a reader, after passing lightly over page 6, may be confused in
subsequent portions of the opinion as to exactly what sort of
agreements we are talking about.
avoid this.

There is probably no way to

I would like your thtnking as to whether should

attempt a "defined terms" approach, such as that used by the
government.
4.

We have agreed that we do not want to read 1 22(d) out

of this case entirely.

I would like to incorporate in our opinion

'•

4.
something along the lines of what the SEC says in its amicus brief,
beginning at the bottom of page 45 and going to the middle of page
47.

As the SEC puts it:
"It is necessary to view the conduct at issue in this
lawsuit in the context of the retail price maintenance
scheme established by § 22(d)." (p. 46)

If we only had § 22(f), I would be far less certain of our position.
But 22(f) in light of the retail price maintenance scheme of
22(d) and more generally of the pervasiveness of the

enti~e

regulatory scheme, is correctly interpreted by us.

S.

The SEC's brief, p. 12, contains a rather good summary

from the DC's opinion of the extent to which the SEC has actively
regulated the pricing and distribution of mutual fund sharea. cl
I believe we have the essence of this already in our draft, and
I do not wish unduly to increase the footnotes - which I have been
urging you to limit.

But there may possibly be a place for this

awmna.ry.
6.

The SEC emphasizes that the regulatory scheme cannot

work if the secondary market is free.
S6 and 57.

See SEC's brief pp. 27, 46,

We have said this in somewhat different terms.

Possibly

it would be helpful to quote the SEC.

*

****

The foregoing questions and suggestions are not important
enough to justify delaying completing our chambers draft, and
circulating a first draft by next Friday .

Once we circulate,

'·

'

s.
it will be two or three weeks before a dissent circulates,

Thus,

we will have time after May 31 to do some polishing and editing
on this and other opinions.
L.F.P., Jr.
as

lfp/ss
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73-1701 U.S. v. National Association
of Securi til . . . . . , Dealers

~~~~---------------

This is an antitrust action, instituted by the United
States against the National Association of Securities
Dealers and certain other parties connected with the mutual
fund business.

The complaint charged Sherman Act violations

as the result of various vertical and horizontal restrictions
on the market for mutual fund shares.
The District Court dismissed the complaint, and we
affirm - although on somewhat different grounds.
We conclude, for the reasons set forth in the Court's
opinion filed today, that the challenged restrictions are
immunized from antitrust liability under § 22(f) of the
Investment Company Act, and the pervasive regulatory
scheme established by Congress in the Maloney and Investment Company Acts.
Mr. Justice White has filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan and

Mr. Justice Marshall have joined.

...

lfp/ss

6/24/75

73-1701 U.S. v. National Association
of Secur~ - 1.es Dealers

The United States brought this antitrust action
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act to challenge certain
sales and distribution practices commonly used in the
sales of securities of mutual fund companies.

The

complaint alleged that the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) and certain mutual funds,
underwriters and broker-dealers had conspired to restrict
trading in mutual fund shares.

The United States charged

that various agreements had imposed vertical and horizontal
restrictions on the market for mutual fund shares, with
the result that secondary market trading was discouraged
to a greater extent than contemplated by Congress when
it enacted the Investment Company Act of 1940.
The District Court dismissed the complaint, finding
that the challenged activities were immunized from antitrust liability by Sections 22(d) and 22(f) of the
Investment Company Act.

It further found that, apart

from this specific immunity, the pervasive regulatory
scheme established by the Investment Company Act and
the Maloney Act displaced the antitrust laws in the
field of the sales and distribution of mutual fund shares.

2.
We affirm, although on somewhat different grounds.
We agree with the United States that the challenged
practices are not immunized by Section 22(d) of the
Investment Company Act.

That section, which requires

that dealers maintain an established price in most mutual
fund shares, does not extend to sales in which the dealer
acts in the capacity of broker rather than as a
statutorily-defined dealer.

The statute defines its

terms carefully, and we find no justification for expanding
the mandate of Section 22(d).
We further conclude, however, that the challenges
to the alleged vertical restrictions on the marketing
practices are immunized by Section 22(f) of the Act.
That section authorizes the funds to impose restrictions
on the transferability and negotiability of mutual fund
shares, provided they are properly disclosed and do not
contravene SEC regulations.

Our examination of the

history of the Investment Company Act persuades us,
moreover, that Congress intended to authorize the
imposition of limitations on the distribution system
as well as on the actual shares themselves.

The primary

~

3.
evils to which the Act was addressed were problems of
that distribution system, and it would be artificial
indeed to prevent the SEC and industry from addressing
those problems at their source.

Moreover, our determina-

tion that these limitations are authorized by the
Investment Company Act necessarily requires that they
be immunized from antitrust liability, for we can see
no way to reconcile SEC approval of these practices
with Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Finally, we conclude that the alleged horizontal
restrictions on the marketing of mutual fund shares are
immunized by pervasive regulatory schemes of the Maloney
and Investment Company Acts.

The activities here

challenged are related to, and are supportive of, those
immunized by Section 22(f) of the Investment Company Act.
Subjecting them to antitrust liability would lead to
possibly inconsistent and conflicting judgments between
the courts and the SEC that would limit the Commission's
flexible mandate to regulate the mutual fund industry.

Mr. Justice White filed a dissenting opinion, which
Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall joined.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

May 21, 1975

No. 73-1701 - United States v. National
Association of Securities Dealers
Dear Lewis,
Although I knew that this was no easy
case, I did not realize at the time of oral
argument and at our subsequent Conference
discussion what a massive and complicated
job the opinion would entail. I think you have
done that job most admirably, and I am glad
to join your opinion for the Court.
Sincerely yours,

() £j'

/
Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

May 21, 1975

Re:

No. 73-1701 - U.S. v. National Association
of Securities Dealers Inc.

Dear Lewis:
I hope to circulate a partial dissent in
this case.
\

Sincerely,

~~
Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to Conference

~nut
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE H ARRY A . BLACKMUN

May 26, 1975

Re: No. 73-1701 -United States v. National Association of
Securities Dealers
Dear Lewis:
Please Join me.

Sincerely,

I~
Mr. Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

~u:p-rttttt ~cud

of tqt ~nittb .itaftg

2JlTztGltinghttt, ~. ~· 20,?'1-~
CHAMBERS OF

-JU ST ICE W'M . -.J . BRE NNAN . -JR.

RE: No. 73-1701

June 10, 1975

!

United States v. National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc.

Dear Byron:
Please join me in your dissenting opinion in the
above.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White
cc: The Conference

.§u:punu Qf01trt ltf tltt 'Jllnittb .§tafts
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CHAMBERS OF"

June 11, 197 5

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL

Re: No. 7 3-1701 -- United States v. National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc • .

Dear Byron:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

.J 1 fr
T. M.

Mr. Justice White
cc: The Conference

.
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C HAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 11, 1975

Re:

No. 73-1701 -United States v. NASD

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAM eERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

/

June 16, 1975

Re:

73-1701

- U. S. v. Nationa 1 Association of Securities Dealers

Dear Lewis:
I join your May 20 ci.,rculation.

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

.§ttpuntt ~ourl ltf tqt ~ttitt~ .§falts
~as!ringfon,

l!l. <!J.

20,?~~

CHAMBERS OF"

June 19, 1975

JUSTICEWILLIAMO. DOUGLAS

Re:

No. 73-1701 - U.S. v. Nat. Asso. Securities
Dealers

Dear Byron:
Please join me, though I may be influenced
by the fact that I drafted the Maloney Act.

Sincerely,

William 0. Douglas

Mr. Justice White
cc:

.

The Conference

'

•

June 24, 1975

No. 73-1701

u.s.

v. National Association
of Securities Dealers

Dear Harry:
I would be most grateful if you would deliver my
NASD case on 'lburaday, when you bring dOWD Gordon.

After the Chief Justice decided not to attend the
Fourth Circuit Conference, and after the progress we have
made this week, I decided that I would adhere to -.y previous
plan. I am on the program at the Executive Session of the
Circuit and District Judges on Thursday morning. I will
return to Washington on Saturday and be here for our final
session on MOnday.
I enclose a brief statement which I think will suffice
for purposes of your oral presentation. In addition, in the
event you prefer a somewhat more detailed summary, I also
enclose a statement prepared by David Boyd - who worked with
me on this case. David will be happy to assist you ..

With my thanks.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Blackam
lfp/ss
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 73-1701

United States, Appellant,

v.
National Association of
Securities Dealers,
Inco 1 et aL

On Appeal from the United
States District Court for
the District of Columbia,

[May -

1

1975]

MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This appeal requires the Court to determine the extent
to which the regulatory authority conferred upon the
Securities and Exchange Commission by the Maloney Act
and the Investment Company Act of 1940 displaces the
strong antitrust policy embodied in § 1 of the Sherman
Act. At issue is whether certain sales and distribution
practices employed in the marketing of open-end management companies, popularly referred to as "mutual
funds," are immune from antitrust liability. We conclude that they are, and accordingly affirm the judgment
of the District Court.
I
An "investment company 1' invests in the securities of
other corporations and issues securities of its own, 1
1 The Investment Company Act of 1940 defines "investment com··
pany" to mclude any issuer of securities which
" (1) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposed to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting,
or trading in securities;
"(2) is engaged or propo.<res to engage in the business of issuing
face-amount certificates of the installment type, or has been
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Shares in an investment company thus represent proportionate interests in its investment portfolio, and their
value fluctuates in relation to the changes in the value
of the securities it owns. The most common form of
investment company, the "open end" company or mutual
fund, is required by law to redeem its securities on demand
at a price approximating their proportionate share of the
fund's net asset value at the time of redemption.2 In
order to avoid liquidation through redemption, mutual
funds continuously issue and sell new shares, These
features-continuous and unlimited distribution and compulsory redemption-are, as the Court recently recognized, "unique characteristic[s]" of this form of investment. United States v, Cartwright, 411 U. S, 546, 547
{1973).
The initial distribution of mutual-fund shares is conducted by a principal underwriter, often an affiliate of
the fund, and by broker-dealers 3 who contract with that
engaged in such business and has any such certificate outstanding or
"(3) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing,
reinvesting, owning, boWing, or trading in securities, and owns or
proposes to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding
40 per centum of the value of such issuer's total assets (exclusive of
Government securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis!'
15 U.S. C.§ 80a-3 (a).
This broad definition is qualified, however, by a series of specific
exemptions. See id., §§ 80a-3 (b) and (c) .
2 See 15 U. S. C. § 80a-2 (d) (32); id., § 80a-22 (e).
Management investment companies whose securities lack this·
redeemability feature are defined as "closed-end" companies, id.,
§ 80a-5 (b), and their sales and distribution practices are regulated
under § 23 of the Act. /d., § 80a-23. Section 22, the provision
under considerat.ion in this appeal, goveros the sales and distribution practices of "open-end" companies only.
8 In this opinion we will use the term "broker-dealer" to refer
generally to persons registered under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78o et seq., and authorized to effect transa,ctions or induce the purchase or sale of securities pursuant to the
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,underwriter to sell the securities to the public. The
sales price commonly consists of two components, a sum
calculated from the net asset value of the fund at the
time of purchase, and a "load," a sales charge representing a fixed percentage of the net asset value. The load
is divided between the principal underwriter and the
broker-dealers, co.>:npensating them for their sales efforts.4
The distribution-redemption system constitutes the
primary market in mutual-fund shares, the operation of
which is not questioned in this litigation. The parties
agree that § 22 (d) of the Investment Company Act
requires broker-dealers to maintain a uniform price in
sales in this primary market to all purchasers except the
fund, its underwriters, and other dealers. And in view
of this express requirement no question exists that antitrust immunity must be afforded these sales. This case
focuses, rather, on the potential secondary market in
mutual-fund shares.
Although a significant secondary market existed prior
to enactment of the Investment Company Act, little
presently remains. The United States agrees that the
authorization of that Act. We also will refer separately to "brok~rs''
and "dealers" as defined by the Investment Company Act, see 15
U. 8. C. §§ 80a-22 (6) and (11), to describe the capacity in which
a broker-dealer acts in a particular transaction.
' The Act defines "sales load" to be the difference between the
public offering price and the portion of the sales proceeds that is
invested or held for investment purposes by the issuer. !d., § 80a2 (a){19). Most mutual funds charge this sales load in order to
encourage vigorous sales efforts on the part of underwriters and
broker-dealers. There are some fundR that do not charge this additional sales fee These "no load" funds generally sell dirE>ctly to the
investor without relying on the promotional and sales efforts of
underwriter::. and broker-dealers. See SEC Report of the Divh;ion
of Investment Management Regulation, Mutual Fund Distribution
and § 22 (d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 112 (Augullt
1974) (heremafter 1974 Staff Ht>port).
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Act was designE::d to restrict most of secondary marl<et
trading, but nonetheless contends that certain industry
practices have extended the statutory limitation beyond
its proper boundaries. The complaint in this action
alleges that the defendants, appellees herein, combined
and agreed to restrict the sale and fix the resale prices
of mutual-fund shares in ser-ondary market transactions
between dealers, from an investor to a dealer, and between investors through brokered transactions.r, Named
as defendants are the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) ,u and certain mutual funds, 7 mutual-·
fund underwriters, 8 and securities broker-dealers.9
5

Two additional private antitrust actions premised on similar
theories were filed in the District Court and subsequently dismissed,
Haddad v. Crosby Corp. and Gross v. National Assn. of Securities
Dealers, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 95. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 8tayed those appeals to await the resolution of
this case. The petition of onf' of the parties for certiorari before
jHdgment was denied, Gross v. Natianal Assn. of Securities Dealers,
lnc., 41!} U: S. 843 (1!}74).
Subsequent to the filing of the United States' complaint some 50
prlvate suits purporting to be class actions under Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 23 were filed in various district courts around the country.
These cases were transferred to the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation, In re Mutual Fund Sales Antitrust Litigatian, Civil Action No. Mise. 103:..73: See 374 F . Supp., at 97 n. 4. The District
Court deferred determination whether the actions could be maintained · as class actions under Rule 23 and additionally postponed
discovery and other activity pending disposition of the motion to
dismiss in this case. 374 F. Supp., at 114.
6 The National AHsociation of Securities Dealers is ~egistered under
§ 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78o-3 et
seq., the so-called Maloney Act of 1!}38. The Maloney Act SU}Jplements the Securities and Exchange Commisswn's regulation of the·
over-the-counter markets by providmg a system of eooperative "elfregulation through voluntary associations of brokers and dealers.
The Act, prov1des that, associa1wn:> may register with the Commission1

[Footnotes 7, b, and 9 are on p. 5]
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The United States charges that these agreements violate ~ 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1/0 and prays
that they be enjoined under § 4 of that Act. /d., § 4.
Count I charges a horizontal combination and con~
spiracy among the members of appellee N ASD to pr~
vent the growth of a secondary dealer market in the
purchase and sale of mutual-fund shares. See n. 42,
pursuant to specified terms and conditions, see generally id., § 78o-3,
and authorizes them to promulgate rules designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative practices; to promote equitable principles
of trade; to safeguard against unreasonable profits and charges; and
generally to protect investors and the public interest. /d., §§ 78o3 (b) (8) . The Act also authorizes the SEC to exercise a significant
oversight function over the rules and activities of the registered
associations. See, e. g., id., §§ 78o-3 (b), (e), (h), (j), and (k).
The N ASD is presently the only association registered under this ·
Act.
1 The mutual fund:;: named as defendants in this action are
Massachusetts Investors Growth Stock Fund, Inc., Fidelity Fund,
Inc., and Wellington Fund, Inc.
8 The defendant underwriters include the Crosby Corporation;
Vance Sanders & Co., Inc., and the Wellington Management Com.
pany, Inc.
9 Named as defendant broker-dealers are the following : Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Bache & Company, Inc.,
Reynolds Securities Corp., F. I. duPont, Glore Forgan, Inc., E. F.
Hutt.on, Inc., Walston & Company, Inc., Dean Witter & Company,
Inc., Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc , and Hornblower &
Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, Inc.
10 Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part:
"Every contract, combination m the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the sev=
eral States, or with fore1gc nations, is declared to be illegal. . • •
"Every person who shall make any contraJt or engage in any combination or conspiracy declared by sections 1 to 7 of this title to be
illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be pumshed by fine not exceeding fifty thousand
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court."
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infra, Counts II-VIII, by contrast, allege various ver~
tical restrictions on secondary market activities. In
Counts II, IV, and VI the United States charges that the
principal underwrHers and broker-dealers entered into
a.greements that compel the mllintenance of the public
offering price in brokerage transactions of specified
mutual-fund shares and th&t prohibit interdealer trans..
a.ctions by allowing etlch broker-dealer to sell and purcha.se shares only to or from investors.u Count VIII
alleges that the broker-dealers entered into other, similar
contracts and combinations with numerous principal
underwriters. Counts III, V, and VII allege violations
on the part of the pripcipal underwriters and the funds
themselves. In Counts III and VII the various defendants are charged with entering into contracts requiring
thf restrictive underwriter-dealer agreements challenged
11 The violations alleged in Count II are typical of those charged
in Counts IV and VI. In Count II, appellee Crosby, a principal
underwriter of appellee Fidelity Fund, Inc., is charged with entering
into contracts and combinations with appellee broker-dealers, the
substantial terms of which are that
"(a) each brokerjdealer must maintain the public offering price in
any brokerage transactiOn in which it. participates involving the
purcbase or sale of shares of the Fidelity Funds; and
"(1-) each broker jdealer must sell sharrs of the Fidelity Funds only
to investors or the fund and puH•hase such shares only from investorS'
or the fund . " App. 10.
Count VI, in addition to charging restrictive agreements similar to
the above, alleged that appellee Wellington, a principal1mderwriter,
agreed to act only as an agent of the appropriate mutual fund in all
transactions with the broker-dealers ld., at 15.
The alleged effect of tht> 1estrietive agreement charged in , (a}
was to mhibit the growth and development of a brokerage market
in mutual fund sharC::l The alleged effect of t.he rC::ltr!Ction identified in ~ (b); by contrast, was to inhibit interdealer transactions and
thus to restrict the growth aml development of a Reeondary dealer
market,, ld~ at H.
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in Counts II and VI. Count V charges that the agreement between one fund and its underwriter restricted the
latter to serving as a principal for its own account in all
transactions with the public, thereby prohibiting brokerage transactions in the fund's shares. App. 14.
After carefully examining the structure, purpose and
history of the Investment Company Act, 15 U. S. C,
§ 80a-1 et seq., and the Maloney Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78o-3
et seq., the District Court held that this statutory scheme
was "incompatible with the maintenance of [an] anti..
trust action," 347 F. Supp., at 109, quoting Silver v. New
York Stock Exchange, 373 U. S. 341, 358 (1963). The
court concluded that§§ 22 (d) and (f) of the Investment
Company Act, when read in conjunction with the Ma-loney Act, afford antitrust immunity for all of the prac~
tices here challenged. The court further held that
apart from this explicit statutory immunity, the pervasive regulatory scheme established by these statutes
confers an implied immunity from antitrust sanction in
the "narrow area of distribution and sale of mutual
fund shares." 374 F. Supp., at 114. The court accordingly dismissed the complaint, and the United States
appealed to this Court.12
'l'he position of the United States in this appeal can
be summarized briefly. Noting that implied repeals of
the antitrust laws are not favored, see, e. g., United States
v, Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 350-351
(1963), the United States urges that the antitrust immunity conferred by § 22 of the Investment Company
Act should not extend beyond its precise terms, none of
which, it maintains, requires or s.uthorizes the practices
The Court noted probable jurisdiction on October 15, 1974,
419 U. S, 822. Accordingly, the recent amendments to the Expediting Act, 15 U. S. C, § 29, as amended by 88 Stat, 1709, do not
affect our jurisdiction.
12
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here challenged. The United States maintains, moreover,
that the District Court expanded the parameters of the
implied immunity doctrine beyond those recognized by
decisions of this Court. In response, appellees advance
all of the positions relied on by the District Court. They
are joined by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), which asserts as amicus curiae, azce£ ts that the
regulatory authority conferred upon it by § 22 (f) of the
Investment Company Act displaces § 1 of the Sherman
Act. The SEC contends, therefore, that the District
Court properly dismissed Counts II-VIII but takes no·
position with respect to Count I.

II
A
The Investment Company Act of 1940 originated in
congressional concern that the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U. S. C. § 77a et seq., and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78a et seq., were inadequate to protect
the purchasers of investment company securities. Thus,
in § 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 15
U. S. C. § 79z-4, Congress directed the SEC to study
the structures, practices and problems of investment
companies With a view toward proposing further legislati..m. Four years of mtensive scrutiny of the industry
culminated in the publication of the Investment Trust.
Study and the recommendation of legislation to rectify
the problems and abuses it identified. After extensive:'
congressional consideration, the Investment Company
Act of 1940 was adopted.
The Act vests in the SEC broad regulatory authority
over the business practices of investment companies. 13'
For example, the Act requires companies to register with the·
S.E0; 15 U" S. C. § 80a--8, see also, id., § 80a-7. Companies also
must register all securities they issue, see Securities Exchange Act of
1"
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We are concerned on this appeal with § 22 of the Act,
id., § SOa-22, which controls the sales and distribution of
mutual-fund shares. The questions presented require
us to determine whether § 22 (d) obligates appellees
to engage in the practices challenged in CountR II-VIII
and thus necessarily confers antitrust immunity for them.
If not, we must determine whether such practices
are authorized by § 22 (f) and, if so, whether they
are immune from antitrust sanction. Resolution of
these issues will be facilitated by examining the nature of
the problems and abuses to which § 22 is addressed, a
matter to which we now turn,

B
The most thorough description of the sales and distribution practices of mutual funds prior to passage of the
Investment Company AcL may be found in Part III of
the Investment Trust Study.14 That study, as Congress
1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77a; Investment Company Act, 15 U. S, C.
§ 80a-24 (a), and must submit for SEC inspection copies of the
sales literature they send to prospective investors. /d.,§ 80a-24 (b).
The Investment Company Act requires the submission and periodic
updating of detailed financial reports and documentation and the
semiannual transmission of reports containing similar information
to the shareholders. /d., § 80a-29. It also imposes controls and
restrictions on the internal management of investment companies:
establishing minimum capital requirements, id., §§ 80a-14 and 80a17; limiting pem1issible methods for selecting directors, id., § 80a-16;
and er,'tablishing cm·tain qualifications for persons seeking to affiliate
with the companies, id., § 80a-9. Finally, the Act imposes a num~
ber of controls on the internal practices of investment companies.
For example, it requires a majority shareholder vote for certain
fundamental business decisions, id., § SOa-11, and limits certain
dividen.i distributions, id., § SOa-19 See generally, the Mutual Fund
Industry: A I,egal Survey, 44 Notre Dame Law, 732 (1969).
l 4 SEC Report on Investment Trusts and Investment Companies,
H. R. Doc, No. 279, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1940) (The Investment
Trust Study). In this opinion we will refer primarily to Part III of
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has recognized, see 15 U. S. C. § SOa-1, forms the initial
basis for any evaluation of the Act.
Prior to 1940 the basic framework for the primary dis..
tribution of mutual-fund shares was similar to that existing today. The fund normally retained a principal
underwriter to serve as a wholesaler of its shares. The
principal underwriter in turn contracted with a number
of broker-dealers to sell the fund's shares to the investing public. 15 The price of the shares was based on the
fund's net asset value at the approximate time of sale,
and a sales commission or load was added to that price.
Although prior to 1940 the primary distribution system for mutual-fund shares was similar to the present
one, a number of conditions then existed that largely
disappeared following passage of the Act. The most
prominently discussed characteristic was the "twoprice system," which encouraged an active secondary
market under conditions that tolerated disruptive
and discriminatory trading practices. The two-price
he price for the following day was established. The nef1
ystem reflected the relationship between the comnonly used method of computing the daily net asset
alue of mutual-fund shares and the manner in which

I

i.

!J

the Study, and all citations will be to that part unless otherwise
designated. For addit~onal discussion of the operations of open-end
management investment companies, see 1974 Staff Report; SEC
Report of the Staff on the Potential Economic Impact, of a Repeal
of § 22 (d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (November
1972); SEC Report on Public PoUcy Implications of Investment
Company Growth, H. R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966)
(hereinafter the 1966 SEC Report); SEC Report of the Special
Study of Securities Markets, c. XI, Open.. End Investment Com~
panies (Mutual Funds), H. R. Doc. No . 9.1, pt. 4, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. ( 1963) (hereinafter 1963 Special Study) .
15 The broker-dealers operating within the primary distribution
-system are denominated "contract dealers" in the Study and will be
so identified in this opinion .
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asset value of mutual funds, which depends on the mar~
ket quotations of the stocks in their investment portfolios, fluctuates const~ntly, Most funds computed their
net asset values daily on the basis of the fund's portfolio
value at the close of exchange trading, and that figure
established the sales price that would go into effect at a
specified hour on the following day. During this interim
period two prices were known : the present day's trading
price based on the portfolio value established the previous day; and the following day's price, which was based
on the net asset value computed at the close of exchange
trading on the present day. One aware of both prices
could engage in "riskless trading" during this interim
period. See Investmer1t Trust Study, at 851-852.
The two-price system did not benefit the investing
public generally. Some of the mutual funds did not
explain the system thoroughly, and unsophisticated in~
vestors probably were unaware of its existence. See id.,
at 867. Even investors who knew of the two-price
system and understood Its operation were rarely in a
position to exploit it fully. It was possible, however,
for a knowledgeable investor to purchase shares in a rising market at the current price with the advance information that the next, day's price would be higher. He
thus could be guaranteed an immediate appreciation in
the market value of his investment/6 although this ad~
vantage was obtained at the expense of the existing share~
16 The Study indicates that mutual funds increasingly began to
disclose more information about the existence and operation of the
two-price &'Ystem. See Investment Tmst Study, at 867-868. And
in some instances the funds encouraged broker-dealers to explain
to potential incoming investors the immediate appreciation in investment value that could be obtained from the pricing system in
the hope of encouraging the purchase of shares, !d., at 854. Sefl
194.0 Senate Hearin~s . pt. :t, at. 13R

-,

.. r ,·

73- 1701-0PINION
12

UNITED STATES v. NATIONAL ASSN. SEC. DEALERS

holders whose equity interests were diluted by a cor~
responding amount. 17 The load fee that was charged
in the sale of mutual funds to the investing public made
it difficult for these investors to realize the "paper gain"
obtained in such trading. Because the daily fluctuation
in net asset value rarely exceeded the load, public investors generally were unable to realize immediate profits
from the two-price system by engaging in rapid in-andout trading. But insiders, who often were able to purchase shares without paying the load, did not operate
under this constraint. Thus insiders could, and sometimes did, purchase shares for immediate redemption at
the appreciated value. See n . 24, infra, and sources
cited therein,
The two-price system often afforded other advantages
to underwriters and broker-dealers. In a falling market
they could enhance profits by waiting to fill orders from
shares purchased from the fund at the next day's anticipated lower price. In a similar fashion, in a rising market they could take a "long position" in mutual-fund
shares by establishing an mventory m order to satisfy
•anticipated purchases w1th securities previously obtained
at a lower price. ld., at 854-855. In each case the
investment company would receive the lower of the two
prevailing prices for 1ts shares, id., at 854, and the equity
interests of shareholders would suffer a corresponding
dilution. As a result, an active secondary market in
mutual-fund shares ex1sted. Id., at 865-867. Principal
underwriters and contract broker-dealers often main11

The existing shareholders' equity interests were diluted because
the incoming investors bought into the fund at less than the actual
value of the shares at the time Of vurchase. See ul., pt. 1, at 138.
SEC testimony indicated that. tins dilution could be substantial. In
one instance the CommtsHion calculated that the two-price system
resulted in ~;~, loss to exiHtmg shareholders of one tru:;;t of some:
$133,000 in a single day. I I, at 1~9-141.
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tained inventory positions established by purchasing
shares through the primary distribution system and by
buying from other dealers and retiring shareholders.18
Additionally, a "bootleg market" sprang up, comprised
of broker-dealers having no contractual relationship with
the fund or its principal underwriter. These bootleg
dealers purchased shares aCi a discount from contract
dealers or bought them from retiring shareholders at a
price slightly higher ~han the redP.mption price. Bootleg
dealers would then offer the shares at a price slightly
lower than that required in the primary distribution system, thus "initiating a small scale price war between retailers and tend [ ing] generally to disrupt the established
offering price." I d., at 865.
Section 22 of the Investme:r.t Company Act of 1940
was enacted with these abuses in mind. Sections 22 (a)
and (c) were designed to "eliminat[e] or reduc[e] as
far as reasonably practicable any dilution of the value
of other outstanding securities ... or any other result of
[the] purchase, redemption or sale [of mutual fund
securities] which is unfair to holders of such other outstanding securities,'' 15 U.S. C. § 80a-22 (a) . They authorize the NASD and the SEC to regulate certain pricing and trading practices in order to effectuate that
goa.l.19 Section 22 (b) authorizes registered securities
1s Contract dealers trading from an inventory position often could
obtain an additional profit from the sales load. When the draler
acted as an agent for the fund and traded from the primary distribution system, the dealer and the underwriter divided the load
charge in accordance with the sales agreement . But the dealer
could retain the full load when he filled the purcha:;e order from an
inventory position in shares purchased from retiring 11hareholders
or other dealers. ld., at 858-859.
1o Sections 22 (a) and (c) reflect the same basic relationship between
the SEC and the NASD that ts established by the Mayoney Act.
See n. 5, supra. Section 22 (a) authorizes regh;tered ~>ecurities a&ociatiom~, in this case the NASD, to pre8cnbe mle~;: for the regulation of
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associations and the SEC to prescribe the maximum
sales commissions or loads that can be charged in connection with a pnmary distribution; and § 22 (e) protects the right of redemption by restricting mutual funds'
power to suspend redemption or postpone the date of
payment.
The issues presented in this litigation revolve around
subsections (d) and (f) of § 22. Bearing in mind the
history and purposes of the Investment Company Act,
we now consider the effect of these subsections on the
question of potential antitrust liability for the practices
here challenged,

III
Section 22 (d) prohibits mutual funds from selling
shares at other than the currant public offering price
to any person except to or through a principal underwriter for distribution. It further commands that "no
these matters. 15 U. S. C. § 80a-22 (a). The industry thus is
afforded the initial opportunity to police its own practices. If, however, industry self-regulatwn proves insufficient, § 22 (c) authorizes
the Commission to make rules and regulations "covering the same
subject, matter, and for the accomplishment of the same ends as are
prescribed in subsection (a)," and proclaims that the SEC rules and
regulations supersede any inconsistent rules o'f the registered securities association. ld., § 80a-22 (c) .
Shortly after enactment of the Investment Company Act the
NASD proposed, and the SEC approved, a rule establishing twicedaily pricing. See Proposed Amendment to the Rules of Fait
Practice of the NASD, Inc., 9 S. E. C, 38 (1941). Twice-daily
pricing reduced the time period in which persons could engage in
riskless trading and eorrespondingly decreased tl:.e potential for
dilution. The Commission subsequently provided full protection
against the dilutive effects of riskless tradmg. In late 1968 it exercised itR authority under § 22 (c) to adopt Rule 22c-1, which requires all funds to establish "forward pricing." Forward pricing
eliminates the potential for riskless trading altogether. See Adoption
of Rule 22c-1, Inv. Co. Act Rei. No. 5519 (1968) , CCH Fed, Sec, L.
Rep. ~ 77,616; 17 CFR § 270.22c-1..

··.,
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dealer shall sell [mutual funq shares] to a.ny person except a dealer, a principal underwriter, or the issuer,
except at a current public offering price described in the
prospectus." 15 U. S. S. § 80a-22 (d). 20 By its terms,
§ 22 (d) excepts interd~aler s~.Jes from its price maintenance requirement. Accordiflgly, this section cannot be
relied upon by appellees as justification for the restrictions imposed upon interdealer transactions. At issue,
rather, is the narrower questior. wheth¢r the § 22 (d)
price maintenance mandate for sales by 11dealers" applies to transactions in which a broker-dealer acts
as a statutory 11 broker" rather than a statutory 11 dealer."
The District Court concluded that it does, and thus that
§ 22 (d) governs transft,ctions in which the broker-dealer
acts as an agent for a.n investor as well as those in which
he acts as a principal selling shares for his own account.

A
The District Court's decision reflects an expansive
view of § 22 (d). The Investment Company Act specifically defines "broker'' and "dealer" 21 and uses the
This section provides in pertinent part:
"No registered investment company shall sell any redeemable
security issued by it to any person except either to or through a.
principal underwriter for. distribution or at a current public offering price described in the prospectus, and, if such class of security
is being currently offered to the public by or through an underwriter, no principal underwriter of such security and no dealer
shall sell any such secunty to any person except a dealer, a principal underwriter, or the issuer, except at a. current public offering·
price described in the prospectus." 15 U. S. C. § 80a-22 (d) ..
n The Investment Company Act defin~ a "dealer" to be :
"Any person regularly engaged in the business of buying and
selling securities for his own account, through a broker or otherwise,.
but does not include a bank, insurance company, or investment company, or any pero:Jon insofar as he is engaged in investing, reinvesting,.
Cll!' tralll1n~ in securities, or iilm ow.niimg or hoiJiling securities for his
2o
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terms distinctively throughout. 22 Appellees maintain,
however, that the defintion of "dealer" is sufficiently
broad to require price maintenance in brokerage transac...
tions. In support of this position appellees assert that
the critical elements of the dealer definition .are that
the term relates to a "person" rather th~tn to a transaction and that the person must engage "regularly" in
the sale and purchase of securities to qualify as a dealer.
It is argued, therefore, that any person who purchases
and sells securities with sufficient regularity to qualify as
a statutory dealer is thereafter bound by all dealer restrictions, regardless of the nature of the particular
transaction in question. We do not find this argument
persuasive.
Appellees' reliance on the statutory reference to "person" in defining dealer adds little to the analysis, for the
Act defines "broker' " "investment banker '" "issuer' "
"underwriter," and others to be "persons as wen.• See
id., §§ SOa-2 (21) (2) & ( 40). ln each instance, the

,,

own account, either individually or in some fiduciary capacity, but
not as a part of a regular business." 15 U. S. C. § 80a-2 (a)(ll).
A "broker," by contrast., is defined to be:
"Any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in
securities for the account of others, but does not include a bank or
any person solely by reason of the fact that such person is an
underwriter for one or more investme:p.t companies." /d., § 80a-Z
(a)(6).

Congress employed the term "broker" without reference t.o
"dealer" in various sections of the Act. See id., §§ 80a-3 (c) (2);
SOa-10 (b) (1); 80a-17 (e) (1) and (2) . In other instances, the Act
refers to "dealer" without reference to "broker," see id., §§ 80a-2 (a)
(4D); 83a-22 (c) and (d). And in some cases, including the very
definition of the term "dealer" itself, see n 21, supra, the Act refers
to both "broker" and "dealer" in the same provision, see id., §§ 80a-1
(b) (2); 80a-9 (a)(l) and (a), 80a-12 (a){3); and 80a-30 (a).
Finally, the Act in some cases refers to the more general term
~'broker-dealer/' see id., §§ 80a-·22 (b) (1) and (2),
22

:·'
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critical distinction relates to their transactional capacity.
Moreover, we think that appellees reliance on the regularity requirement m the dealer defi~ition places undue
emphasis on that el'3ment at the expense of the remainder
of the provision. On the face of the statute the most
apparent distinction between a broker and a dealer is that
the former effects transa<:tiohs for the account of others
and the latter buys and sells securities for his own account.
We therefore cannot agree that the terms of the Act
compel the conclusion that a broker-dealer acting in a
brokerage capacity would be bound by the § 22 (d)
dealer mandate. Indeed, the language of the Act suggests the opposite result.
Even if we assume, arguendo, that the statutory definition is ambiguous, we find nothing in the extensive
contemporaneous legislative history of the Investment
Company Act to justify interpreting § 22 (d) to encompass brokered transactions. That history is sparse, 23 and
23 The original Commission-sponsored bill considered in the initial
hearings before the Senate Banking and Commerce Subcommittee,
S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. ( 1940), contained no provision resembling this subsection. Section 22 (d) first emerged in a compromise
proposal advanced after a period of mtensive consultation betwtlen
the SEC and industry representatives that followed initial Senate
hearings, see 1940 Senate Hearings, pt. 4, at 1105-1107, and the
Commission subsequently has mdiCated that this provision was sug~
gested by the industry. See Mtdr..merica Mutual Fund, 41 S. E. C.
328, 331 (1963); 1966 Public Policy Study, at 219. Revised legislation reflecting this compromise was submitted, and further hearings
were conducted in the Senate and the House. Both bills were
reported favorably by their respective committees, S. Rep. No. 1775,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940), H. R. Rep. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d
s~ss. (1940), and the House bill, with minor amendments not rel~
vant to this appeal, was Bccepted by the Senate. 86 Cong. Rec.
10069-10071.
This history perhaps Pxplain,. the dearth of discus!>ion relating
to § 22 (d). The m11jority of the Senate hearings were completE'<!
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suggests only that § 22 (d) was considered necessary to
curb abuses that had arisen in the sales of securities to
insiders.24
The prohibition against insider trading would seem
adequately served by the first clause of § 22 (d), which
prevents mutual funds from selling shares at other than
the public offering price to any person except a principal
underwriter or dealer. See n. 20, supra.~5 The further
restriction on dealer sales bears little relation to insider
trading, however, and logically would be thought to serve
some other purpose. The obvious effect of the dealer
prohibition is to shield the primary distribution system
from the competitive impact of unrestricted dealer trading in the secondary markets, a concern that was reflected
before this provision was advanced, and both the Senate and House
hearings that followed provide relatively little illumination as to
the intended purpose or scope of this subsection.
24 Insider trading abuses were identified as a problem during the
Senate hearings that preceded submission of the compromise bill
containing §22 (d), see 1940 Senate Hearings, pt. 2, at 526-5p7 and
660-661, and at the close of the initial Senate hearings an industry
representative suggested that the Act should contain a provision
prohibiting sales at preferential terms to insiders and others. !d.,
at 1057. The Commission and industry representatives thereafter
met to seek a compromise on the various differences that had
been identified in the Senate hearings, and the industry memorandum outlining the nature of the resultant agreement indicates that ·
a provision should be addrd to the Act to prohibit insider trading.
See Framework of Proposed Investment Company Bill (Title I),
Memorandum Embodying Suggestions Resulting from Conference
Between Securities and Exchange Commission and Representatives
of Investment Companies fMay 13, 1940), printed in HMO House
Hearings, at 99.
See also S. Rep. No. 1775, supra, at 16; H. R. Rep. No. 2639, supra,

at 20.
25 The insider trading prohibition is complimented by §'22 (g),
which precludes the issuance of mutual fund shares for services or
property other than cash or securities. 15 U. S. C. § 80a-22 (g).
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in the Study, see lnvestment Trust Study, at 865. The
SEC perceives this to be one of the purposes of this
provision 26
But concluding that protection of the primary distribution system is a purpose of § 22 (d) does little to resolve
the question whether Congress intended tc require strict
price maintenance in all broker-dealer transactions with
the investing public. By its terms, § 22 (d) protects ohly
against the possibly disruptive effects of secondary dealer
sales which, as statutorily defined, constituted the most
active secondary market existing prior to the Act's passage. Nothing in the contemporary history suggests that
Congress was equally concemed with possible disruption
from investor transactions in outstanding shares conducted through statutory brokers.
Nor do we think that the history attending subsequent
congressional consideration of the Act provides adequate
support for appellees' contention that § 22 (d) requires
strict price maintenance in all broker-dealer transactions
in mutual-fund shares. To be sure, portions of the testi28 See Adoption of Rule N-22-D-1, Inv. Co. Act Rei. No. 2798,
p. 1 (1958), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 176,625, p. 80,393; Investors
Diversified Services Inc., Inv. Co. Act Rei. No. 3095 (1960), CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 'P6,699, p. 80,620; In re Sideris, Exch Act Rei.
N.:>. 8816, p. 2 (1970); Mutual Funds Advisory, Inc ., Inv. Co. Act
Rei. No. 6932, p 4 (1972) .
The SEC also has suggestad that preventing discrimination
among investors was one of the purposes of this provision. See,
e. g., In re Sidem, supra, Midamerica Mutual Fund, Inc., 41 S. E. C.
328, 331 (1963) ; Adoption of Rule N22-D-t, supra. We do not
think, however, that brokerage transactions inevitably would foster
the kmd of investor discnminatlon sought to be remedied by this
statute. All investors would be equally free to seek to engage in
brokered transactions, and the possibility that the more sophisticated or fortuitous investor would profit from this market do~
not, of itself, bring this c11tegory of transactions within the purview
of ~ '22 (d).
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mony of Chairman Cohen of the SEC before the House
Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance in 1967 suggested that the price maintenance requirement of § 22
(d) encompassed all broker-dealers, irrespective of how
they obtained the traded shares, 27 and on other occasions
the Chairman referred to sales by brokers when discuss. ing mutual fund transactions.'28 Appellees also can point
·to congressiona.I characterizations of § 22 (d) that suggest
that some members of Congress understood the reach of
that provision to be as broad as the District Court
thought.29
Appellees maintain that this history indicates that.
Congn~ss always intended § 22 (d) to control broker as
well as dealer transactions, and that it re-enacted the
Responding to inquiries concerning the relationship of § 22 (d)
and the operation of state law, Chairman Cohen stated:
"The statute is unequivocal. No person, no matter where he gets
it, from the issuer, from another dealer, or even from a private per~
son, no broker-dealer may sell a share of a particular fund at a
price less than that fixed by the issuer:" 1967 House Hearings, pt.
2, at 711.
28 !d., at 53.
·~Senator Sparkman, Chairman of the Senate Banking and Cur~
rency Committee which reported the 1970 amendments to the full
Senate, stated on the floor of the Senate that § 22 (d) "now makes
it a crime for anyone to sell mutual fund shares at a price lower
than that fixed by the fund's distributor." 115 Cong. Rec. 838
'(1969) (emphasis added) . Senator Magnuson reflected perhaps a
similar view, stating that, as a result of§ 22 (d) "mutual fund shares
are totally insulated from price competition." 113 Cong. Rec. 23057
1(1968) (emphasis added).
The testimony of some witnesses suggests that they shared this
expansive view. See, e. g., Hearings on S. 1659 before the Senate
'Committee on 'Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2,
at 741 (1967) (hereinafter 1967 Senate Hearings) (testimony of
Mr. Funston, President of the New York Stock Exchange); id.,
pt. 1, at 348, 356, 366 (testimony of Professor Samnelson); id., p. 2.
at 1064 (testimony of Professor Wallich).
27
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amended § 22 with that purpose in mind. The District Court accepted this position, and it is not without
some support in this historical record. 30 But impressive
evidence to the contrary is found in the position consistently maintained by t.he SEC. Responding to an inquiry
in 1941, the SEC General Counsel stateq that § 22 (d)
did not bar brokerage transactions in mutual fund shares:
uin my opinion the term 'dealer,' as used in Section 22 (d), refers to the capacity in which a brokerdealer is acting in a particular transaction. It
follows, therefore, that if a broker-dealer in a particular transaction is acting solely in the capacity
of agent for a selling investor, or for both a selling
investor and a purchasing investor, the sale may be
made at a price other than the current offering price
described in the prospectus,
0n the other hand, if a broker-dealer is acting
for his own account in a transaction and as principal
sells a redeemable security to an investor, the public
offering price must be maintained, even though the
sale is made through another broker who acts as
agent for the seller, the investor, or both,
"As Section 22 (d) itself states, the offering price
is not required to be maintained in the case of sales
11

80

We conclude, however, that the context of the post-enactment

history of § 22 (d) limits the force of the statements relied upon by
appellees. A broker-dealer can serve in either a broker or a dealer's
capacity, and the distinction bet.ween the two functions IS rather
technical and precise. Thf' parties are in general agreement that
no significant number of brokered transactions, as statutorily defined, existed prior or subsequent to pas.<>age of the Act. In view of
the care with which the o;tatute defines these functions and the
absence of focus on these distinctions m t he statements in the subsequent comnderation of § 22 (d), we think that the broader character-·
izations of that section must be viewed with some skepticism.

~-II' ....

;' ...
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in which both the buyer and the seller are dealers
acting as principals in the transactions. Inv. Co.
Aot Rel. No. 78, March 4, 1941, fed. Reg. 10992."
This substantially contemporaneous interpretation of the
Act has consistently been maintained in subseqUfmt SEC
opinions, see Oxford, Co., Inc., 21 S. E. C. 681, 690
(1946); Mutual Funds Advisory, Inc., Inv. Co. Act. ReL
No. 69·32, at 3 (1972). The same position was asserted in a
recent Staff Report, see 1974 Staff Report, at 105 n. 2, 107
n. 2, and 109 (1974), was relied on by the SEC in its subsequent decision to encourage limited price competition
in brokered transactions,<~ 1 and is advanced by it as amicus
curiae in this Court. This consistent and longstanding
interpretation by the agency charged with administration
of the Act, while not controlling, is entitled considerable weight. See, e. g., Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U. S. 65
(1974); Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401
U. S. 617, 626-627 (1971); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S.
1, 16 (1965).
81 Acting in accordance with the recommendations of the Staff
Report, the SEC Chairman recently requested that the NASD
amend its Rules of Fair Practice to prohibit agreements between
underwriters and broker-dealers that preclude broker-dealers, act~ng
as agents, "from matching orders to buy and sell fund shares in a
secondary market at competitively determined prices and commission rates." Letter from Mr. Ray Garrett, Jr., Chairman of the
SEC to Mr. Gordon S. Macklin, President of the NASD, November 22, 1974, printed in addendum to brief of appellees Bache &
Co., et al., at 17. The Chairman further revealed the SEC's intention to exercise its regulatory authonty under § 22 (f) to neutralize any adverse effects this market. might have on the
ft1nd's primary distribution systems. Id., at 18. As the Staff
Report indicates, the Commission's exerch;e of regulatory authority
is premised on its view that § 22 (d) does not require strict price
maintenance in brokered transactions. See 1974 Staff Report, at
104. If § 22 (d) did control these transactions as well as "dealer,.
sales, the Commission's ability to encourage controlled competition
in thi-, market would be subject to question.

•,,
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B
The substance of appellees' position is that the dealer
prohibition of § 22 (d) should be interpreted in generic
rather than statutory terms. The price maintenance requirement of that section accordingly would encompas~
all broker-dealer transactions with the investing public
and would shelter them from antitrust sanction. But
such an expansion of § 22 (d) beyond its terms would
not only displace the antitrust laws py implication; it
also would impinge seriously on the SEC's more flexible
regulatory authority under§ 22 (f). 82
Implied antitrust immunity is not favored, and can be
justified only by a convincing showing of clear repugnancy between the antitrust laws and the regulatory system. See, e. g., United States v. Philadelphia National
Bank, 371 U.S. 321,350-351 (1963); California v. Federral
Power Comm'n, 369 U. S. 452, 456--457 (1945); United
States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 197-206 (1939).
We think no such showing has been made. Moreover,
in addition to satisfymg our responsibility to reconcile
the antitrust and regulatory statutes where feasible, Silver
v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U. S. 341, 356-357
(1963), we must interpret the Investment Company Act
~2

The Department of Justice previously suggested a manner in
which its interpretation of § 22 (d) could be reconciled with the
Commission's exercise of regulatory authority over brokered transactions. Addressing the question of possible repeal of § 22 (d), the
Justice Department suggf'-sted that rather than continue to wait
for congressional repeal, the Commission should eliminate the adverse
effects of price maintenance by freeing all transactions from the
§ 22 (d) mandate through the exercise of its § 6 (c) power of exemption, 15 U. S, C. § 80a-6 (c) . !d., at '70. This presumably would
leave the SEC free to regulate transactions through the exercise of
the powers conferred to it by other provisions of the Act. We need
not consider the validity of the Justice Department's broad inter•·
pretation of the SEC's power of exemption, for even assuming it:
ttl be co:rrect our analysis would not be affected.

i'
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in a manner most conductive to the effectuation of its
goals. We conclude that appellee's interpretation of § 22
(d) serves neither purpose. and cannot be justified by the
language or history of that sectwn.
We therefore hold that the price maintenance mandate
of § 22 (d) cannot be stretched beyond its literal terms
to encompass transactions by broker-dealers acting as
statutory "brokers." Congress defined the limitations
for the mandatory price maintenance requirement of the
Investment Company Act. "We are not only bound by
those limitations, but we are bound to construe them
strictly, since resale price maintenance is a privilege restrictive of a free economy." United States v. McKesson
& Robbins, 351 U. S. 305, 316 (1956). Accordingly, we
hold that the District Court erred in relying on § 22 (d)
in determining that the activities here questioned are
immune from antitrust liability.

IV
Our determination that the restrictions on the secondary market are not immunized by § 22 (d) does not end
the inqmry, for the District Court also found them
sheltered from antitrust liability by § 22 (f). Appellees,
joined by the SEC, defend this ruling and urge that it
requires dismissal of the challenge to the vertical restrictions sought to be enjomed in Counts II-VIII.
Section 22 (f) au.thorm~s mutual funds to impose
restrictions on the negotiability and transferability of their·
shares, provided they conform with the fund's registration statement and do not contravene any rules and
regulations that the CommissiOn may prescribe in the
interests of the holders of all of the outstanding securi-·
ties.8 " Appellant does not contend that the vertical
Section 22 (f) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-22 (f), provides·
" No registered open-end company ;;hall restrict th£> transferability
Q! negotiability of any serurit.y of which i.t JS the 1s.~uer except in1
38
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restrictions are not disclosed in the registration statements of the funds in question. Nor does it assert that
the agreements imposing such restrictions violate Commission rules and regulations. Indeed, it could not do so
because to date the SEC has prescribed no such standards. Instead appellant maintains that the contractual
restrictions do not comfl within the meaning of the Act,
asserting that § 22 (f) does not authorize the imposition
of restraints on the distribution system rather than on
the shares themselves. Appellant apparently urges that
the only limitations contemplated by this section are
those that appear on the face of the certificate itself.
Appellant also urges th11t the SEC's unexercised power
to prescribe rules and regulations is insufficient to create
repugnancy between its regulabry authority and the
anti trust laws.
Our examination of the language and history of§ 22 (f)
persuades us, however, that the agreements challenged
in Counts II-VIII are among the kind8 of restrictions
Congress contemplated when it enacted that section. And
this conclusion necessarily leads to a determination that
they are immune from liability under the Sherman Act,
for we see no way to reconcile the Commission's power
to authorize these restrictions with the competing mandate of the antitrust laws.
A

Unlike§ 22 (d),§ 22 (f) originated in the Commissionsponsored bill considered in the Senate subcommittee
hearings that preceded introduction of the compromise
proposal that was enacted into law. The Comrnisconformity with the statements with respect thereto contained in
its registration etatement nor in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe in the interests of
the holders of all of the outstanding securities of such investment
!Company/ '

·· '
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sian-sponsored provision authorized the SEC to promulgate rules, regulations or orders prohibiting restrictions
on the transferability or negotiability of mutual fund
shares, S. 3580, § 2~ (dJ(2), 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940)!1i
Commission testimony indicates that it considflred this
authority necessary to allow regulatory control of industry measures designed to deal with the disruptive effects
of 11bootleg market" trading and with other detrimental
trading practices identified in the Investment Trust
Study.35
84 Section 22 (d) of the original bill, S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.
(·1940), provided, in pertinent part;
"The Commission is authonzed, by rules and regulations or order
il:J. the public interest or for the protection of investors, to prohibit---

" (2) restrictions upon the transferability of negotiability of any
redeemable security of which any registered investment company ir1
t~e issuer "
30 Teshfying before the Senate Subcommittee, an SEC spokesman
tated:
"Now coming to subparagraph (2) of (d), it just says that the
Commission shall have the right to make rules and regulations with
respect to any restrictions upon the transferability or negotiability
of any redeemable security of which any registered investment
cpmpany is the issuer.
"There are some companies that have a provision in their certifi~
Cll.tes to the effect that you cannot sell that certificate to anybody
else, and the only way you can salt it is to sell it back to the com..
pany. That is a technical problem. It presents a whole problem
which they call the bootleg market. What happens is that dealers
keep switching people from one company to another. In order to
prevent these switches, some provisions require that you cannot
make these !!witches but must sell t.he certificate back to the
cpmpany.
"If the committee wants the provision, we shall recommend what,
on the basis of our experience up to the present time, it ought to be;
but we thmk subjects like that ought to be a matter of rules ancl
regulations." 1940 SenAte Hearings, pt. 1, at 292-293.
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The Study indicates, moreover, that a number of funds
had begun to deal with phese problems prior to passage
of the Act. And while their methods may h~ve included
the imposition of restrictive legends on the face of the
certificate, see n. 3~supra, they were by no mean.s confined to such narrow limits. A number of funds imposed
controls on the activities of their principal underwriters,
see Investment Trust Study, at 867-869; and in some
instances the funds required the underwriters to impose
similar restrictions on the dealers, see id., at 869, or entered
into these restrictive agreements with the dealers themselves, id., at 870-871.
In view of the history of the Investment Company
Act, we find no justification for limiting the range of
possible transfer restrictions to those that appear on the
face of the certificate. The bootleg market was pri-:
marily a problem of the distribution system, and bootleg
dealers found a source of supply in the contract-dealers
as well as in retiring shareholders. See id., at 865.
Moreover, the Study indicates that part of the bootleg
distribution system consisted of "trading firms" that
served as wholesalers of mutual-fund securities in much
the same fashion as the principal underwriters. These
trading firms primarily purchased and sold shares to and
from other dealers, id., 11t 327, frequently offering them
at a price slightly lower than the discounted rate charged
to dealers in the primary distribution system. Investment Trust Study, pt.. II, at 327-328. Thus trading
firms not only helped supply the bootleg dealers whose
sales undercut those of the contract-qealers, they competed with the principal underwriters by offering a source
for lower cost shares that. inevitably discouraged partici~
pation in the primary distribution system. . See id., at
328 n. 85.
The bootleg n1arket was a complex phenomenon whose

. '·
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principal origins lay in the distribution system itself. In
view of this history, limitation of the industry's ability,
subject of course to SEC regulation, to reach these problems at their source would constitute an inappropriate
contraction of the remedial function of the statute. 80 Indeed, in view of the role of trading firms and interdealer
transactions in the maintemmce of the bootleg market,
the narrow interpretati6n of § 22 (f) urged by appellant
would seem to afford inadequate authority to deal with
the problem.
Together, §§ 22 (d) and 22 (f) protect the primary
distribution system for mutual-fund securities. Section
22 (d), by eliminating price competition in dealer sales,
inhibits the most disruptive factor in the pre-1940's
mutual market and thus assures the maintenance of a
viable sales system. Section 22 (f) compliments this
protection by authorizing the funds and the SEC to deal
more flexibly with other dttrimental trading practices by
imposing SEC-approved restrictions on transferability
and negotiability. Appellant's limiting interpretation of
§ 22 (f) compromises this flexible mandate, and cannot
be accepted.
We find support for our interpretation of § 22 (f)
in the views expressed by the SEC shortly after the
passage of the Act. Rule 26 (j)(2), proposed by NASD
to curb abuses identified in the Study and the congressional hearings, provided limitations on underwriter
Neither are we convinced of the neceS<>ity to limit negotiability
or transferability restrictions to those appearing on the face of the
certificate in order to assure their adequate disclosure to investors.
Section 24 of the Act requires that mutual funds submit for SEC
inspection copies of all sales literature that they send to prospective
investor&. 15 U. S. C. § 80a-24 (b) . The Commission is therefore
fully apprised as to the nature and sufficiency of the disclosure of
these restrictions and can, if necessary, require supplementation
of the information providecl :investors.
3 (l
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sales and redemptions to or from dealers who are not
parties to sales agreements. In commentip.g on this proposed rule, the SEC characterized it as a "restriction
on the transferability of securities," and specifically
averted to its po•ver to regulate such restrictions under
22 (f). National Association of Securities Dealers,
9 S. E. C. 38, 44-45 and n. 10 (1941). As indicated
above, see p. 2~upra, and sources there cited, this contemporaneous interpretation by the responsible agency
is entitled to considerable weight. We therefore conclude that the restrictions on transferability and negotiability contemplated by § 22 (f) include restrictions on
the distribution system for mutual-fund shares as well
as limitations on the face of the shares themselves. The
narrower interpretation of thic provision advanced by
appellant would disserve the broad remedial function of
this provision. 31
Neither do we agree with appellant's suggestion that § 22 (f)
does not authorize restrictions in contracts between underwriters
and dealers in which the fund is not a party. We note, preliminarily, that this position would not save Counts III, V, and VII
from dismissal, since they relate to restrictions on underwriter conduct that are imposed by the fund. Even under the most technical
reading of the statute these restrictions are "fund-imposed."
Moreover, it further appears from the complaint that the agreement challenged in Count II is required by the fund-underwriter
agreement challenged in Count III and thus also is "fund-imposed"
in any but the most literal sense. More importantly, however, we
think that appellant's position fails to recognize the relationship between the various participants in the distribution chain. As the
history of the Investment Company Act recognizE's, the relationship between the fund and its principal underwriter traditionally ha.~
been a close one. Sections 15 (b) and (c) reflect this fact, requiring,
in effect, that the funds establish a written contract with the underwriter that must be approved by a majority of the fund's disinterested directors and cannot remain in force for more than two
years. 15 U. S. C.§§ SOa-15 (b) and (c) . And NASD Rule 26 (c),
in effect since 1941, requires that principal underwriters enter into
37
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Appellant 1s additional contention that the SEC's exercise of regulatory authority has been insufficient to give
rise to an implied immunity for agreements conforming
with § 22 (f) misconceives the intended operation of the
statute. By its terms, § 22 (f) authorizes properly
disclosed restrictions unless they are inconsistent with
SEC rules or regulations. The provision thus authorizes
funds to impose transferability or negotiability restrictions subject to Commission disapproval. In view of the
evolution of this provision, there can be no doubt that
this is precisely what Congress intended.
Section 22 (f) as originally introduced would have
authorized the SEC to promulgate rules, regulations
or orders prohibiting restrietions on the redeemability
or transferability of mumal-fund shares. Congressional
consideration of that provision raised some question
whether existing restrictions on transferability and negotiability would remain valid unless specifically disapproved by the SEC. 38 The compromise provision, which
subsequently was enacted into law, eliminated this uncertainty, however, and manifests a more positive attitude
toward self-regulation.
Thus § 22 (f) specifically recognizes that mutual
funds can impose such restrictions on the distribution
system provided they are disclosed in the registration
statement and conform to any rules and regulations that
the SEC might adopt. In addition, § 22 (f) alters the·
focus of Commission scrutiny. Whereas the original
provision allowed the SEC to make rules that serve "the
public interest and . , , the protection of investors,'t
agreements with the dealers who distribute the fund's securities..
See National Association of Securities Dealers, 9 S. E. C. 38, 44, 48
(1941) . In view of these requirements, and the broad remedial
purpose of § 22 (f), we thmk that the underwriter-dealer agreements challenged in this complaint also must be regarded as fundimposed within the contemplation of the statute.
as See 1940 Senate Ht>arings, pt. 1 ~ at 293.
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S. 3580, § 22 (d) (2) , supra, § 22 (f) as enacted, limited
the Commission's rulemaking authority to the protection
of the "interests of the holders of all of the outstanding
securities of such investment company." 15 U. S. C.
§ 80a-22 (f) . Viewed in this historical context, the
statute reflects a clear congressional determination that,
subject to Commission ovetsight, mutual funds should
be allowed to retain the initiative in dealing with the
potentially adverse effects of disruptive trading practices.
The Commission repeatedly has recognized the role
of private agreements in the control of trading practices
in the mutual fund industry. For example, in First
Multifund of Amer-ica, Inc., Inv. Co. Act Rei. No. 6700
(1971), F. Sec. L. Rep. 1T 78,209, at 80,602, it looked to
restrictive agreements similar to those challenged in
this litigation to ascertain the capacity in which an
investment advisor acted in a particular transaction.
At no point did it intimate that those agreements ~ere
not legitimate. 39 Likewise, Commission reports repeatedly have acknowledged the significant role that private
agreements have played in restricting the growth of a
secondary market in mutual-fund shares.40 I
1

\

39 Commissioner Loomis, dissenting from an SEC determination
that an applicant lacked standing to seek an exemption from §§ 17
{a) (1) and 22 (d) of the Act, stated,
"I would conclude that applicant IS a dealer in its relationship with
the fund underwriter because to do otherwise would require us to
ignore or nullify the perfectly lawful requirement in the dealer
agreements that applicant act as a dealer. . . . [I] do not know
of anything unlawful about the generally accepted form of dealer
(tgreement used in the investment company industry." Mutual
Funds Advisory, I nc ., Inv. Co. Act. ReL No. 6932, at 7 (1972)
(dissenting opinion) .
While the majority disagreed with Commissioner Loomis' assessment
of the facts of the case, it did · not question his approval of the
mentioned dealer agreement.
4{) See 1963 Special Study, at 98 ; 1974 Staff Report, at 104, 105.
llll. 1, 106l 109,
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1lntil recently the Commission has allowed the industry to control the secondary market through contractual
restrictions duly filed and publicly disclosed. Even the
SEC's recently e:r.pressed intention to introduce an element of competition in brokered transactions reflects
measured cautiOn as to the possibly adv6rse impact of
a totally unregulated and restrained brokerage market
on the primary distribution system. See n. 31, supra.
The Commission's acceptance of fund-initiated restrictions for more than three decades hardly represents abdication of its regulatory responsibilities. Rather, we
think it manifests an informed administrative judgment
that the contractual restrictions employed by the funds
to protect their sharelwlders were appropriate means for
combatting the problem. The SEC's election not to initiate restrictive rules or regulations is precisely the kind
of administrative oversight of private practices that Congress contemplated when it enacted § 22 (f).
We conclude, therefore, that the vertical restrictions
sought to be enjoined in Counts II-VIII are among the
kinds of agreements authorized § 22 (f) of the Investment Company Act.

B
The agreements questwned by the United States restrict the terms under whiCh the appellee underwriters
and broker-dealers may trade in shares of mutual funds.
Such restrictions, a.ffecting resale price maintenance and
concerted refusals to deal, normally would constitute per
se violations of ~ 1 of the Sherman Act. See, e. g., KlM,
Inc. v. Broadt~~ay-Hale StMes, Inc. , 359 U. S. 207, 211-213
(1959); Fashion Onginatcrs' Guild of America, Inc. v.
Federal Trade Commission, 312 U. S. 457, 465-468
(1941). Here, however, Congress has made a judgment
that these restrictions on competition might be necessitated by the unique problems of the mutual fund in~
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dustry, and it has vested in the SEC final authority to
determine whether and to what extent they should be
tolerated "in the interests of the holders of all the outstanding securities" of mutual funds. 15 U. S. C. § SOa22 (f).

The SEC, the federal agency responsible for regulating
the conduct of the mutual-iund industry, urges that its
authority will be compromised seriously if these agreements are deemed actionable under the Sherman 4ct.41
We agree. There can be no reconciliatiop of its authority under § 22 (f) to permit these and similar restric-·
tive agreements with the Sherman Act's declaration that
they are illegal per se. In this instance the antitrust
laws must give way if the regulatory scheme established
by the Investment Company Act is to work. Silver v.
New York Stock Exchange, supra. We conclude, therefore, that such agreements are not actionaQle under the
Sherman Act, and that the District Court properly dismissed Counts II-VIII of the complaint.

v
It remains to be determined whether the District
Court properly dismissed Count I of appellant's complaint, which charged activities allegedly constituting a
hcrizontal conspiracy between the NASD and its members to "prevent the growth of a secondary dealer market
and a orokerage market in the purchase and sale of
mutual fund shares." App., at 9.
41

In its brief to this Court, the SEC maintains:

"It would nullify the effect of this grant of regulatory authority to the Commisston [under § 22 (f)] for this Court to
hold that a District Court may apply antitrust principles to conduct like that alleged in Counts II through VIII, when the expert
body designated and empowered by Congress to regulate ancl
supervise that r.onduct has not deemed it appropriate to prohibit
the conduct." Brief of the Seeunties and Exchange Commission as;
Amic«s Curiae, at 54.
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The precise nature of the allegations of the complaint
are obscured by subsequent concessions made by appellant to the District Court and reiterated here. It is
clear, however, that Count I alleges activities that are
neither required by § 22 (d) nor authorized under § 22
(f) . And since they cannot find antitrust shelter in
these provisions of the Investment Company Act, the
question presented is whether the SEC's exercise of
regulatory authority under this statute and the Maloney Act is sufficiently pervasive to confer implied immunity. We hold that it is, and accordingly affirm the
District Court's dismissal of this portion of the complaint.
Count I originally appeared to be a general attack on
the NASD's role in encouraging the restrictions on secondary market activities challenged in the remainder of
appellant's complaint. The acts charged in Count I
focused in large part on N ASD rules and on information
distributed by that association to its members. 42 SubseThe complaint averred that, in effectuating the conspiracy to
restrain the growth of a serondary market in mutual-fund shares,
the NASD, its members, and more particularly the other named
defendants,
" (a) established and maintained rules which inhibited the development of a secondary dealer market and a brokerage market in
mutual fund shares;
"(b) established and mAmtained rules which induced brokerj
dealers to enter into sales agreements with principal underwriters,
with knowledge that sales agreements contained restrictive provisions
which inhibited the development of a secondary dealer market and
brokerage market in mutual fund shares,
"(c) mduced member prmCJpal underwriters to inrlude restrictive
rrovisions in their sales agreements'
" (d) discouraged persons who made inquiry about the legality of
a brokerage market from participating in a brokerage market and
distributed misleading mformat10n to its members concermng the
legality of a brokerage market in mutual fund shares; and
" (e) suppressed market quotations for the secondary dealer
market." App., at 9.
42
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quently appellant advised the District Court that its
complaint was not to be read as a direct attack on NASD
rules, and it repeated that position before this Court. 43
Appellant now contends that its complaint should be
interpreted as a challenge to various unofficial NASD
interpretations and to appellees' extension of the rules in
a manner that inhibit a secondary market.
In view of the scope of the SEC's regulatory authority
over the activities of the NASD, appellant's decision to
withdraw from direct att~tck on the association's rules
was prudent. The SEC's supervisory authority over the
N ASD is extensive. Not only does the Maloney Act
require the SEC to determine whether an 9.ssociation
Appellant first indicated abandonment of its attack on the
NASD rules during oral argument of appellees' motion to dismiss.
See App., at 328-332. Notwithstanding clauses (a) and (b) of
paragraph 17 of the complaint, see n. 42, supra, appellant's counsel
stated that it did not intend to challenge any NASD rule, id., at 330.
Counsel ambiguously suggested, however, that the members' compliance with those rules had aided and abetted alleged the conspiracy,
id., at 332, and stated that informal and secret activities of the
association likewise had tended to inhibit growth of the secondary
market, id., at 330. Thereafter, in response to the District Court's
invitation to join in the litigation as amicus curiae, the SEC indicated its concern that the action might involve an attack on NASD
rules, a matter "over which the Commission is granted exclusive
jurisdiction by Section 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U. S. C. § 78o-3 et seq. (the Maloney Act)." Letter from Mr.
Lawrence E. Nerheim, General Counsel of the SEC to the District
Court. App. , at 327. Appellant thereafter infonned the court
that the issues it sought to raise did not represent "an attack upon
NASD Rules as such" but rather "aimed at an over-all course of
conduct engaged in by the NASD and its members going beyond the
NASD's rule-making authority.'' Letter from Mr. Bruce B. Wilson,
Acting Asst. Attorney General for the Antitrust Division to the
District Court. App. , at 327 . It maintains the samt> position in
this Court. See Brief for the United States, at 51 n. 47.
43

,.
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satisfies the strict statutory requirements of that Act
and thus qualifies to engage in supervised regulation of
the trading activities of its membership, 15 U. S. C.
§ 78o-3 (b), it requires registered associations thereafter
to submit for Commission approval any proposed rule
changes, id., § 78o-3 ( J). The Maloney Act additionally
authorizes the SEC to request changes in or supplementation of association rules, a power that recently has been
exercised with respect to some of the precise conduct
questioned in this litigation, see n. 31, supra. If such a
request is not c0mplied with, the SEC may order such
changes itself if necessary. !d., § 78o-3 (k) (2) .
The SEC, in its exercise of authority over association
rules and practices, is charged with protection of the
public interest as well as the interests of shareholders,
see, e. g., 15 U. S. C. §§ 78o-3 (a)(1), (b)(3), (c),.
and it repeatedly has indicated that it weighs competitive concerns in the exerci~:.e of its continued supervisory
responsibility. See, e. g., In re Nat. Assn. of Securities
Dealers, Inc., 18 S. E. C. 424, 236, 486-486-487 (1945);
Proposed Amendment to The Rules of Fair Practice of
Nat. Assn. of Securities Dealers, Inc., 9 S. E. C. 38, 43-46
(1941); see also 1974 Staff Report, at 105, 109. As the·
Court previously has recognized, United State{) v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 227 n. 60 (1940), the
investiture of such pervasive supervisory authority in
the SEC suggests that Congress intended to lift the ban
of the Sherman Act from association activities approved'
by the SEC.
We further conclude that appellant's attack on NASD'
interpretations of those rules cannot be maintained under
the Sherman Act, for w~ see no meaningful distinction
between the association's rules and the manner in which
it construes and implements them Each is equally a
subject of SEC oversight.
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Finally, we hold that appellant's additional challenges
to the alleged activities of the membership of the NASD
designed to encourage the kinds of restraints averred in
·
;'4 lOW'~~
Counts II-VIII likewise are
sr '· t by the regulatory authority vested in the SEC
by the Maloney and Inv6stment Company Acts. It
should be noted that appellant does not contend that
appellees' activities have had the purpose or effect of
restraining competition among the various funds, 44 Instead, appellant urges in Count I that appellees' alleged
conspiracy was designed to encourage the suppression of
intrafund secondary market activities, precisely the restriction that the SEC consistently has approved pursuant to § 22 (f) for nearly 35 years. This close relationship is fatal to appellant's complaint, as the Commission's regulatory approval of the restrictive agreements
challenged in Counts II-VIII cannot be reconciled with
appellant's attack on the ancillary activities averred in
Count I. This conclusion applieR with equal force
now that the SEC has determined to introduce a controlled measure of competition into the secondary market.
There can be little question that the broad regulatory
authority conferred upon the SEC by the Maloney and
Investment Company Acts enables it to monitor the
act:vities questioned in Count I, and the history of Commission regulations suggests no laxness in the exercise
of this authority. 45 To the extent that any of appellees'
44 Indeed, it appears that vigorous inter--brand competition exists
in the mutual-fund industry-between the load fuuds themselves,
between load and no-load funds, between open and closed-end compamet:, and between all of these mvestment form8 and other mvestments. See 1974 Staff Report, at 20 et seq.
45
As SEC Chairman Garrett observed in his letter submitting the1974 Staff Report for congressional consideration, "No issuer of
securities is subject to more detailed regulation than a mutual
fund." Letter .from Ray Garret,t, Jr., Chairman, Securities and
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ancillary activities frustrate the SEC's regulatory objectives it has ample authority to eliminate them.46
Here implied repeal of the antitrust laws is "necessary
to make the [regulatory scheme] work." Silver v. New
York Stock Exchange, supra. 1$ ul mcszsits · 1 t
at
1
* iM u~ne. In generally similar situations, we have implied immunity in particular and discrete instances to
assure that the federal agency entrusted with regulation
in the public interest could carry out that responsibility
free from the disruption of conflicting judgments that
might be voiced by courts exercising jurisdiction under
the antitrust laws. See Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World
Airlines, 409 U.S. 363 (1973); Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U. S. 296 (1963). In
this instance, maintenance of :tn antitrust action for activities so directly related to the SEC's responsibilities
poses a substantial danger that appellees would be subjected to duplicative and inconsistent standards. This is
hardly a result that Congress would have mandated. We
therefore hold that with respect to the activities challenged in Count I of the complaint, the Sherman Act
has been displaced by the pervasive regulatory scheme
established by the Maloney and Investment Company
Acts.
Affirmed.

w

MR. JusTICE DouGLAS took no ·part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Exchange Commission to the Honorable John Sparkman, Chairman
of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United
States Senate (Nov. 4, 1974), ~ontained in 1974 Staff Report, at v.
46 The Commission can, for example, require amendment of the·
NASD rules regulating the conduct of its membership, see 15
U. S. C. § 78o-3 (k) (2), or exercise the more general rulemaking·
power conferred by § 38 (a) of the Investment Company Act, 15·
U. S. C. § 80a-38 (a), to contain any of the challenged activities
that might in any way frustrat~ its regulation of the restrictions it
authorizes under§ 22 (f).
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UNITED STATES v. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
SECURITIES DEALERS, INC., ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

No. 73-1701. Argued March 17, 1975-Decided June 23, 1975
Section 22 (d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 provides
that "no dealer shall sell [mutual fund shares] to any person
except a dealer, a principal underwriter, or the issuer, except at
a current public offering price described in the prospectus." Section 22 (f) authorizes mutual funds to impose restrictions on
the negotiability and transferability of shares, provided they
conform with the fund's registration statement and do not contravene any rules and regulations that the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) may prescribe in the interests of the holders
of all of the outstanding securities. Section 2 (6) of that Act
defines a "broker" as a person engaged in the business of effecting
transactions in securities for the account of others, and § 2 (11)
defines a "dealer" as a person regularly engaged in the business·
of buying and selling securities for his own account. The Maloney
Act of 1938 (§ 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) sup-.
plements the SEC's regulation of over-the-counter markets by
providing a system of cooperative self-regulation through voluntary associations of brokers and dealers. The Government
brought this action against appellee National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD), certain mutual funds, mutual-fund
underwriters, and broker-dealers, alleging that appellees, in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, combined and agreed to restrict
the sale and fix the resale prices of mutual-fund shares in secondary market transactions between dealers, from an investor to a
dealer, and between investors through brokered transactions, and
sought to enjoin such agreements. Count I of the complaint
charged a horizontal combination and conspiracy among NASD's
members to prevent the growth of a secondary dealer market in
I

Page proof of syllabus as
approved.
-fi,ineup included.
U Lineup still to be
added. Plea~e send
lineup to Print Shop
when available and
a copy to me.
Another copy of page proof of
syllabus as approved to
showLineup, which has now
been added.
Additional changes
in syllabus.
HENRY PUTZEL, jr.
Deci~ions.

Reporter of

II

U. S. v. NATIONAL ASSN. SECURITIES DEALERS
Syllabus
the purchase and sale of mutual-fund shares, the Government
contending that such count was not to be read as direct attack
on NASD rules, but on NASD's interpretations and appellees'
extension of the rules so as to include a secondary market.
Counts II-VIII alleged various vertical restrictions on secondary
market activities. The District Court dismissed the complaint
on the grounds that §§ 22 (d) and (f), when read in conjunction
with the Maloney Act, afforded antitrust immunity from all of
the challenged practices. It further determined that, apart from
this statutory immunity, the pervasive regulatory scheme established by these statutes conferred an implied immunity from antitrust sanction. The court concluded that the § 22 (d) price
maintenance mandate for sales by "dealers" applied to transactions
in which a broker-dealer acts as statutory "broker" rather than
a statutory "dealer," and thus that § 22 (d) governs transactions
in which the broker-dealer acts as an agent for an investor as
well as those in which he acts as a principal selling shares for
his own account. Held:
1. Neither the language nor legislative history of § 22 (d)
justifies extending the section's price maintenance mandate beyond
its literal terms to encompass transactions by broker-dealers acting as statutory "brokers." Pp. 15-24.
(a) To construe § 22 (d) to cover all broker-dealer transactions would displace the antitrust laws by implication and also
would impingt' on the SEC's more flexible authority under § 22 (f).
Implied antitrust immunity can be justified only by a convincing
showing of clear repugnancy between the antitrust laws and the
regulatory sy~ .)m, and here no such showing has been made.
P. 23.
(b) Such an expansion of § 22 (d)'s coverage would serve
neither this Court's responsibility to reconcile the antitrust and
regulatory statutes where feasible nor the Court's obligation to
interpret the Investment Company Act in a manner most conducive to the effectuation of its goals. Pp. 23-24.
2. The vertical restrictions sought to be enjoined in Counts
II-VIII are among the kinds of agreements authorized by§ 22 (f),
and hence such restrictions are immune from liability under the
Sherman Act. Pp. 24-33.
(a) The restrictions on transferability and negotiability con·
templated by § 22 (f) include restrictions on the distribution
system for mutual-fund shares as well as limitations on the face
of the shares themselves. To interpret the section as covering
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only the latter would disserve the broad remedial function of
the section, which, as a complement to § 22 (d)'s protection against
disruptive price competition caused by dealers' "bootleg market"
trading of mutual-fund shares, authorizes the funds and the
SEC to deal more flexibly with other detrimental trading practices
by imposing SEC-approved restrictions on transferability and
negotiability. .P p. 25-29.
(b) To contend, as the Government does, that the SEC's
exercise of regulatory authority has been insufficient to give rise
to an implied immunity for agreements conforming with § 22 (f)
misconceives the statute's intended operation. By its terms
§ 22 (f) authorizes properly disclosed restrictions unless they are
inconsistent with SEC rules or regulations and thus authorizes
funds to impose transferability or negotiability restrictions subject
to SEC disapproval. Pp. 30-32
(c) The SEC's authority would be compromised if the agreements challenged in Counts II-VIII were deemed actionable under
the Sherman Act. There can be no reconciliation of the SEC's
authority under § 22 (f) to permit these and similar restrictive
agreements with the Sherman Act's declaration that they are
illegal per se. In this instance the antitrust laws must give way
if the regulatory scheme established by the Investment Company
Act is to work. Pp. 32-33.
3. The activities charged in Count I are neither required by
§ 22 (d) nor authorized under § 22 (f), and therefore cannot find
antitrust shelter therein. The SEC's exercise of regulatory
authority under the Maloney and Investment Company Acts is
sufficiently pervasive, however, to confer implied immunity from
antitrust liability for such activities. Pp. 33-38.
374 F. Supp. 95, affirmed.
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MR, JusTICE P oWELL delivered the opinion of the
Court,
This appeal requires the Court to determine the extent
to which the regulatory authority conferred upon the
Securities and Exchange Commission by the Maloney Act
and the Investment Company Act of 1940 displaces the
strong antitrust policy embodied in § 1 of the Sherman
Act. At issue is whether certain sales and distribution
practices employed in marketing securities of open-end
management companies, popularly referred to as "mutual
funds," are immune from antitrust liability. We con~
elude that they are, ar.d accordingly affirm the judgment
of the District Court,
I
An "investment company 11 invests in the securities of
other corporations and issues securities of its own}
1 The Investment Company Act of 1940 defines "investmeni; company" to include any issuer of secunt1es WhlCh
"(1) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or pro~
poses to engage primarily , in the businPsf\ of mvt·stmg, reinvet-tmr,.
or trading in securities ;
"(2) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of issuing
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Shares in an investment company thus represent propor..
tionate interests in its investment portfolio, and their
value fluctuates in relation to the changes in the value
of the securities it owns. The most common form of
investment company, the "open end" company or mutual
fund, is required by law to redeem its securities on demand
at a price approximating their proportionate share of the
fund's net asset value at the time of redemption.ll In
order to avoid liquidation through redemption, mutual
funds continuously issue and sell new shares. These
features-continuous and unlimited distribution and com.,
pulsory redemption-are, as the Court recently recog~
nized, 61 unique characteristic [s]" of this form of invest·
ment. United States v. Cartwright, 411 U. S. 546, 547
(1973).
The initial distribution of mutual-fund shares is con~
ducted by a principal underwriter, often an affiliate of
the fund, and by broker-dealers 8 who contract with that
face-amount certificates of the installment type, or has been
engaged in such busmess and has any such certificate outstandmg ; or·
"(3) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing,
reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or
propos<Js to acquire investment securities having a value exceed!ng
40 pel' centum of the value of such issuer's total assets (exclusive of
GovP.rnment securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis."'
15 U.S. C.§ 80a-3 (a).
This broad definition is qualified, however, by a series of specific·
exemptions. See id., §§ 80a-3 (b) and (c).
2 See 15 U.S. G § 80a-2 (a) (32); td., § SOa-22 (e).
Management investment companies whose securities lack this'
redeemability feature are defined as "closed-end" companies, i,d.,
§ 80a-5, and their sales and distribution pra.ctices are regulated
under § 23 of the Act. !d., § SOa-23. Section 22, the provision
under conaiderat.ion in this appeal, governs the sales and distribu.,
tion practices of "open-end" companies only.
8 In this opinion we will use the term "broker-dealer" to refer·
generally to persons ·registered under the Securities Exchange Act
Qj 1934, !5 U. S. C. § 78o et seq,., and authorized to effect !,l"Jttl&-
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underwriter to sell the securities to the public. The
sales price commonly consists of two components, a suru
calculated from the net asset value of the fund at the
time of purchase, and a "load," a sales charge represent~
ing a fixed percentage of the net asset value. The load
is divided between the principal underwriter and the
broker-dealers, compensating them for their sales efforts.4
The distribution-redemption system constitutes the
pdmary market in mutual-fund shares, the operation of
which is not questioned in this litigation. The parties
agree that § 22 (d) of the Investment Company Act
requires broker-dealers to maintain a uniform price in
sales in this primary market to all purchasers except the
fund, its underwriterR, and other dealers. And in view
of this express requirement no question exists that anti~
trust immunity must be afforded these sales. This case
focuses, rather, tm the potential secondary market in
mutual-fund shares.
Although a significant secondary market existed prior'
to enactment of the Investment Company Act, little
presently remains. The United States agrees that the
actions or induce the purchase or sale of securities pursuant to the
aut.horization of that Act. We also ~ill refer separately to "brokers"
and "dealers" as defined by the Investment Company Act, see 15
U. S. C. §§ 80a-2 (>') ( 6) and ( 11), to describe the capaCity in which
a broker-dealer acts in a particular transaction.
4 The Act defines "sales load" to be the difference between the·
public offering price and the portion of the sales proceeds that is
invested or held for investment purpose3 by the issuer. !d., § 80a2 (a) (35). Most mutual funds charge thts sales load in order to
encourage vigorous sales efforts on the part of underwriters and
broker-dealers. There are some funds that do not charge this additional sales fee. These "no load" fwtds generally sell directly to the
investor without relying on the promotional and sales efforts of
underwriters and broker-dealers. See SEC Report of the Division
of Investment Management Regulation, Mutual Fund Distribution
and § 22 (d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 112 (AuglliJ~
t974) (hereinafter 1974 Staff Report).
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Act was designed to restrict most of secondary market
trading, but nonetheless contenns that certain industry
practices have extended the statutory limitation beyond
its proper boundaries. The complaint in this action
alleges that the defendants, appellees herein, combined
and agreed to restrict the sale and fix the resale prices
of mutual-fund shares in seiJondary market transactions
between dealers, from an investor to a dealer, and be~
tween investors through brokered transactions. 5 Named
as defendants are the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD), 6 and certain mutual funds, 7 mutualfund underwriters,8 and securities broker-dealers.9
6 Two additional private antitrust actions premised on similar
theories were filed in the District Court and subsequently dismissed,
Haddad v. Crosby Corp. and Gross v. National Assn. of Securities
Dealers, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 95. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stayed those appeals to await the resolution of
this case, and the petition of or..e of the parties for certioran before
judgment was denied, Gross v. National Assn. of Securities Dealers,
Inc., 419 U.S. 843 (1974) .
Subsequent to the tiling of the United States' complaint some 50
private suits purporting to be class actions under Fed. RuJe Civ.
Proc. 23 were filed in various district courts around the country.
These cases were transferred to the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia by the Judicial Panel on MuJtidistrict
Litigation, In re Mutual Fund Sales Antitrust Litigation, Civil Action No. Misc. 103-73. See 374 F. Supp., at 97 n. 4. The District
Court deferred determination whether the actions could be maintained as class actions under Rule 23 and additionally postponed
discovery and other activity pending disposition of the motion to
dismiss m this cUBe. !d., at 114.
6 The National Association of Securities Dealers is registered under
§ 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C § 78o-3,
the so-called Mt<loney Act of 1938. The Maloney Act supplements the Securities and Exchange Commission's reguJation of the
over-the-counter markets by providing a oystem of cooperative HelfreguJation throngh voluntary associations of brokers and dealers.
The Act provides that associations may register with the CommiRsion
[Footnotes 7, 8, and 9 are on p . •?]
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The United States charges that these agreements vio"'
late § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1,10 and prays
that they be enjoined under § 4 of that Act. ld., § 4,
Count I charges a horizontal combination and con"'
spiracy among the members of appellee N ASD to pre"'
vent the growth of a secondary dealer market in the
purchase and sale of mutual-fund shares, See n, 421
pursuant to specified terms and conditions, and authorizes them to
promulgate rules designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative
practices; to promote equitable principles of trade; to safeguard
against unreasonable profits and charges; and generally to protect
invest,ors and the public interest I d., § 78o-3 (b) (8). The Act
also authorizes the SEC to exercise a significant oversight function:
over the rules and activities of the reg:isten>d associations. See, e g.,
id., §§ 78o-3 (b), (e), (h), (j), and (k) The NASD is presently
the only association registered under this Act.
7 The mutual funds named as defendants in this action are
Massachusetts Investors Growth Stock Fund, Inc., Fidelity Fund,
Inc., and Wellington Fund, Inc.
8 The defendant underwriters include the Crosby Corporation,
Vance Sanders & Co., and the Wellington Management Company..
9 Named as defendant broker-deruers are the following: Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Bache & Company, Inc.,
Reynolds Securities Corp., F. L duPont, Glore Forgan, Inc., E. F.
Hutton, Inc., Walston & Company, Inc., Dean Witter & Company,
In~., Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., and Hornblower &
Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, Inc.
10 Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the sev""
eral States, or with foreign nations, is decla.red to be illegal. .. ,
"Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any comb!~
nation or conspiracy declart>d by sections 1 to 7 of this title to be·
illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand'
dollars, or by imprisonment,not exceeding one year, or by both saidi.
;punishments,, in the discretion of the. cow:t/ '

•'.,
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infra. Counts II-VIII, by contrast, allege various ver"
tical restrictions on secondary market activities. In
Counts II, IV, and VI the United States charges that the
principal underwriters and broker-dealers entered into
agreements that compel the maintenance of the public
offering price in brokerage transactions of specified
mutual-fund shares, and that prohibit interdealer tran:r
actions by allowing each broker-dealer to sell and pur'Chase shares only to or from investors.u Count VIII
,alleges that the broker-dealers entered into other, similar
contracts and combinations with numerous principal
underwriters. Counts III, V, and VII allege violations
on the part of the principal underwriters and the funds
themselves. In Count.s III and VII the various defend~
ants are charged with entering into contracts requiring
the restrictive underwriter-dealer agreements challenged
The violations alleged in Count II are typical of those charged
in Counts IV and VI. In Count II, appellee Crosby, a principal
underwriter of appellee Fidelity Fund, Inc., is charged with entering
into contracts and combinations with appellee broker-dealers, the
substantial terms of which are that
"(a) each brokerjdealer must maintain the public offering price in
any brokerage transaction in which it participates involving the
purchase or saJe of shares of the Fidelity Fundi:!; and
"(b) each broker jdealer must sell shares of the Fidelity Funds only
'to investors or the fund and purchase such shares only from investors
or the fund." App. 10-11.
Count VI, in addition to charging restrictive agreements similar to
the above, alleged that appellee Wellington, a principal underwriter,
agreed to act only as an agent of the appropriate mutual fund in all
transactions with the broker-dealers. I d., at 15.
The alleged efect of the restrictive agreement charged in , (a)
was to inhibit the growth and development of a brokerage market
in mutual fund shares. The alleged effect of the restriction identi~
iied in , (b), by contrast, was to inhibit ini:erdealer transactions and
thus to restrict the growth and development of a secondary deale!'
market. Id.~ at 11.
11
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in Counts II and VI. Count V charges that the agreement between one fund and its underwriter restricted the
latter to serving as a principal for ita own account in all
transactions with the public, thereby prohibiting brokerage transactions in the fund's shares. App. 14.
After carefully examining the structure, purpose and
history of the Investment Company Act, 15 U. S. C,
§ 80a-1 et seq., and the Maloney Act, 15 U.S. C.§ 78o-3,
the District Court held that this statutory scheme
was "incompatible with the maintenance of [an] anti~
trust action," 347 F. Supp., at 109, quoting Silver v. New
York Stock Exchange, 373 U. S. 341, 358 (1963). The
court concluded that§§ 22 (d) and (f) of the Investment
Company Act, when read in conjunction with the Ma,..
loney Act, afford antitrust immunity for all of the praco
tices here challenged. The court further held that
apart from this explicit statutory immunity, the perQ
vasive regulatory scheme established by these statutes
confers an implied immunity from antitrust sanction in
the "narrow area of distribution and sale of mutual
fund shares." 374 F. Supp., at 114. The court accordingly dismissed the complaint, and the United States
appealed to this Court.12
'fhe position of the United States in this appeal can
be summarized briefly. Noting that implied repeals of
the antitrust laws are not favored, see, e. g., United States
v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 34:3
(1963), the United States urges that the antitrust immunity conferred by § 22 of the Investment Company
Act should not extend beyond its precise terms, none of
which, it maintains, requires or authorizes the practices
The Court noted probable jurisdiction on October 15, 1974.
419 U. S. 822. Accordingly, the recent amendments to the Expedit..
ing Act, 15 U. S. C. § 29, as amended by 88 Stat. 1709, do noj
4ect our iurisdictiOl.)..
12
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here challenged. The United States maintains, moreover,
that the District Court expanded the parameters of the
implied immunity doctrine beyond those recognized by
decisions of this Court. In response, appellees advance
all of the positions relied on by the District Court. They
are joined by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), which asserts as a'fYI,icus curia¥" that the reg~
ulatory authority conferred upon it by § 22 (f) of the
Investment Company Act displaces § 1 of the Sherman
Act. The SEC contends, therefore, that the District
Court properly dismissed Counts II-VIII but takes no
position with respect to Count I.
II
A
The Investment Company Act of 1940 originated in
congressional concern that the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U. S. C. § 77a et seq., and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U. S.C. § 78a et seq., were inadequate to protect
the purchasers of investment company securities. Thus,
in § 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 15
U. S. C. § 79z-4, Congress ditected the SEC to study
the structures, practices and problems of investment
companies with a view toward proposing further legislatior.. Four years of intensive scrutiny of the industry
culminated in the publication of the Investment Trust
Study and the recommendation of legislation to rectify
the problems and abuses it identified. After extensive
congressional consideration, the Investment Company
Act of 1940 was adopted.
The Act vests in the SEC broad regulatory authority
over the business practices of investment companies"18
18 For example, the Act requires companies to register with the
SEC, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-8, see also, id., § 80a-7. Companies also
must register all securities they issue, see Securities Exchange Act. of
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We are concerned on this appeal with § 22 of the Act,
id., § SOa- 22, which controls the sales and distribution of
mutual-fund shares. The questions presented require
us to determine whether § 22 (d) obligates appellees
to engage in the practices challenged in Counts II- VIII
and thus necessarily confers antitrust immunity for them.
If not, we must determine whether such practices
are authorized by § 22 (f) and, if so, whether they
are immune from antitrust s~:mction. Resolution of
these issues will be facilitated by examining the nature of
the problems and abuses to which § 22 is addressed, a
matter to which we now turn.

B
The most thorough description of the sales and distri~
bution practices of mutual funds prior to passage of the
Investment Company Act may be found in Part III of
the Investment Trust Study.14 That study, as Congress
1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77a; Investment Company Act, 15 U. S. C.
§ 80a-24 (a), and must submit for SEC inspection copies of the
sales literature they send to prospective investors. I d., § 80a-24 (b) .
The Investment Company Act requires the submission and periodic
updating of detailed financial reports and documentation and the
semiannual transmission of reports containing similar information
to the shareholders. !d., § 80a-29. It also imposes cont rols and
restrictions on t he internal management of investment companies:
establishing minimum capital r'lquirements, id., § 80a-14; limiting
permissible methods for selecting directors, id., § 80a,-l6 ; and establishing certain qualifications for persons seeking to affiliate with
t he companies, id ., § 80a-9. Finally, t he Act imposes a number of cont rols on t he internal practices of inves-cment companies.
For example, it requires a majority shareholder vote fo r certain
fundamental business decisions, id., § 30a-13, and limits certain
dividend distributions, id., § 80a-19. See generally, t he Mutual Fund
Industry : A Legal Survey, 44 Notre Dame Law. 732 (1969) .
14 SEC Report on Investment Trusts and Investment Companies,
H. R. Doc. No. 279, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1940) (The Investment
'Trust Study) . I n this opinion we will refer primarily t o Part Ill of

'73--1701-0PINION
10

U. S. v. NATIONAL ASSN. SECURITIES DEALERS

has recognized, see 15 U. S. C. § 80a-1, forms the initial
basis for any evaluation of the Act.
Prior to 1940 the basic framework for tpe primary di~
tribution of mutual-fund shares was similar to that exist~
ing today. The fund normally retained a prmcipal
underwriter to serve as a wholesaler of its shares. The
principal underwriter in turn contracted with a number
of broker-dealers to sell the fund's shares to the invest~
ing public. 15 The price of the shares was based on the
'fund's net asset value at the approximate time of sale,
and a sales commission or load was added to that price.
Although prior to 1940 the primary distribution system for mutual-fund shares was similar to the present.
one, a number of conditions then existed +,hat largely
disappeared following passage of the Act. The most
prominently discussed characteristic was the "two·,
price system," which encouraged an active secondary
market under conditivns that tolerated disruptive
and discriminatory trading practices. The two-price
system reflected the relationship between the com~
manly used method of computing the daily net asset
value of mutual-fund shares and the manner in which
the price for the following day was established. The net
the Study, and all citations will be to that part unless otherwise
·aesignated. For additional discussion of the operations of open -end
manngement investment companies, see 1974 Staff Report; SEC
Report of the Staff on the Pot,ential Economic Impact of a Repeal
o! § 22 (d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (November
1972); SEC Report on Public Policy Implications of Investment
Company Growth, H. R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966)
(hereinafter the 1966 SEC Report) ; SEC Report of the Special
Study of Securities Markets, c. XI, Open-End Investment Com ~
panies (Mutual Funds) , H. R. Doc. No. 95, pt. 4, 88th Cong., 1Rt.
Sess. (1963) (hereinafter 1963 Special Study).
:1 5 The 'broker-dealers operating within the primary distribution
system are denominated "contract dealers" in the Study and will ll!!<
:ilo identified in this opinion.
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asset value of mutual funds, which depends on the mar.,
ket quotations of the stocks in their investment port~
folios, fluctuates constantly. Most funds computed their
net asset valuE:s daily on the basis of the fund's portfolio
value at the close of exchange trading, and that figur~
established the sales price that would go into effect at. a
specified hour on the following day. During this interim
period two prices were known : the present day's trading
price based on the portfolio value established the previ~
ous day; and the following day's price, which was based
on the net asset value computed at the close of exchange
trading on the present day, One aware of both pnces
could engage in "riskless trading" during this interim
period. See Invesi;ment Trust Study, at 851-852,
The two-price system did not benefit the investing
public generally. Some of the mutual funds did not
explain the system thoroughly, and unsophisticated in"
vestors probably were unaware of its existence. See id.»
at 867. Even investors who knew of the two-price
system and understood its operation were rarely in a
position to exploit it fully. It was possible, however',
for a knowledgeable investor to purchase shares in a ris~
ing market at the current price with the advance infor~
mation that the next day's price would be higher. He
thus could be guaranteed an immediate appreciation in
the market value of hif:l investment/6 although this ad-·
vantage was obtained at the expense of the existing share~
The Study indicates that mutual funds bcreasingly began to
disclose more information about the existence and operation of the
two-price system. See Investment Trust Study, at 867-868. And
in some instances the funds encouraged broker-dealers to explain
to potential incoming investors the immediate appreciation in in·
vestment value that could be obtained from the pricing system m
the hope of encouraging the purchase of shares. !d., at 854. Se~
1940 Senate Hearings, pt. 1, at 188.
16
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holders, whose equity interests were diluted by a cor~
responding amount.17 The Joad fee that was charged
in the sale of mutual funds to the investing public made
it difficult for these investors to realize the "paper gain 11
obtained in such trading. Because the daily fluctuation
in net asset value rarely exceeded the load, public i~1
vestors generally were unsble to realize immediate profit,s
from the two-price system by engaging in rapid in-and""
out trading. But insiders, who often were able to pur~
chase shares without paying the load, did not operate
under this constraint. Thus insiders could, and some~
times did, purchase shares for immediate redemption at
the appreciated value. See n. 24, infra, and sources
cited therein,
The two-price system often afforded other advantages
to underwriters and broker-dealers. In a falling market
they could enhance profits by waiting to fill orders with
shares purchased from the fund at the next day's antici~
pated lower price. In a similar fashion, in a rising mar=
ket they could take a "long position" in mutual-fund
shares by establishing an inventory in order to satisfy
anticipated purchases with securities previously obtained
at a lower price. I d., at 854-855. In each case the
investment company would receive the lower of the two
prevailing prices for its shares, id., at 854, and the equity
interests of shareholders would suffer a corresponding
dilution.
As a result, an active secondary market in mutual~
fund shares existed. ld. , at 865-867. Principal under·
writers and contract broker-dealers often maintained
11 The existing shareholders' equity interests were diluted because
the incoming investors bought into the fund at less than the actual
value of the shares at the time of purchase. Moreover, SEC tef'ti·
mony indicated that this dilution could be substantial. In onr
instance the Commission calculated that the two-price •>}Hem m-·
stilted in a loss to existing shareholders of onP trust of som<' $133,000
in a single day. l d., at 139-14-0•
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inventory positions established by purchasing shares
through the primary distribution system and by buying from other dealers and retiring shareholders.~ 8 Ad·o
ditionally, a "bootleg market" sprang up, comprised
of broker-dealers having no contractual relationship with
the fund or its principal underwriter. These bootleg
dealers purchased shares at a discount from contract
dealers or bought them from retiring shareholders at a,
price slightly higher than the redemption price. Bootleg
dealers would then offer the shares at a price slightly
lower than that required in the primary distribution sys~
tern, thus "initiating a small scale price war between re"
tailers and tend [ing] generally to disrupt the established
offering price." I d., at 865.
Section 22 of the Investment Company Act of 1940
was enacted with these abuses in mind. Sections 22 (a)
and (c) were designed to "eliminat[e] or reduc[e] as
far as reasonably practicable any dilution of the value
of other outstanding securities , , , or any other result of
[the] purchase, redemption or sale [of mutual fund
securities] which is unfair to holders of such other outstanding securities," 15 U. S. C. § SOa-22 (a). They authorize the NASD and the SEC to regulate certain pricing and trading practices in order to effectuate that
goaP 9 Section 22 (b) authorizes registered securities
18 Contract dealers trading from an inventory position often coul.i
obtain an additional profit from the sales load. When the dealer
acted as an agent for the fund and traded from the primary distri ·
bution system, the dealer and the underwriter divided the load
charge in accordance with the sales agreement. But the dealer
could retain the full load when he filled the purchase order from an
inventory position in shares purchased from retiring sha.reholde!1'
or other dealers. /d., at 858-859.
19 Sections 22 (a) and (c) reflect the same basic relationship between
the SEC and the NASD that is established by the Maloney AC't.
See n. 6, supra. Section 22 (a) authorizes registered securities associ·
ations, in this case the NASD, to prescribe rule:-: for the regulation of
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associations and the SEC to prescribe the maximum
sales commissions or loads that, can be charged in con~
nection with a primary distribution; and § 22 (e) protects the right of redemption by restricting mutual funds 1
power to suspend redemption or postpone the date of
payment.
The issues presented in this litigation revolve around
subsections (d) and (f) of § 22. Bearing in mind the
history and purposes of the Investment Company Act,
we now consider the effect of these subsections on the
question of potential antitrust liability for the practices
here challenged.

III
Section 22 (d) prohibits mutual funds from selling
shares at other than the current public offering price to
any person except either to or through a principal underw
writer for distribution. It further commands that "no
these matters. 15 U. S. C. § 80a-22 (a). The industry thus is
afforded the initial opportunity to police its own practices. If, however, industry self-regulation proves insufficient, § 22 (c) authorizes
the Commission to make rules and regulations "covering the same
subject matter, and for the accompiishment of the same ends as are
presnribed in subsection (a)," and proclaims that the SEC rules and
regnlations supersede any inconsistent rules of the registered securities association. !d., § 80a-22 (c).
Shortly after en&ctment of the Investment Compai1Y Act the
NASD proposed, and the> SEC approved, a rule establishing twice·
daily pricing. See Proposed Amendment to the Rules of Fair
Practice of the NASD, Inc., 9 S. E. C. 38 (1941). Twice-daily
pricing reduced the time period m which persons could engage in
riskless trading and correspondingly decreased the potential for
dilution. The Commission subsequently provided full protection
against the dilutive effects of riskless tn1ding. In late 1968 it ext·r~
cised its authority under § 22 (c) to adopt Rule 22c-1, which requires all funds to establish "forward pricing." Forward pricing
eliminates the potential for riskless trading altogether. See Adoption
of Rule 22c-1, Inv. Co. Act Rei. No. 5519 (1968), CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep.. ,77,616; 17 CFR §270;22c-1.
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dealer shall sell [mutual fund shares] to any person except a dealer, a principal underwriter, or the issuer,
except at a current public offering price described m the
prospectus." 15 U. S. S. § 80a-22 (d). 20 By its terms 1
§ 22 (d) excepts in t.erdealer sales from its price main tenance requirement. Accordingly, this section cannot be
relied upon by appellees as justification for the restrictions imposed upon interdealer transactions. At issue,
rather, is the narrower question whether the § 22 (d)
price maintenance mandate for sales by "dealers" ap.
plies to transactions in which a broker-dealer acts
as a statutory "broker" rather than a statutory "dealer/'
The District Court concluded that it does, and thus that
§ 22 (d) governs transactions in which the broker-dealer
acts as an agent for an investor as well as those in which
he acts as a principal selling shares for his own account"

A
The District Court's decision reflects an expansive
view of § 22 (d). The Investment Company Act specifically defines "broker" and "dealer" 21 and uses the
This section provides in pertinent part:
"No registered investment company shall sell any redeemable
security issued by it to any person except either to or through a
principal underwriter for distribution or at a current public offering price described in the prospectus, and, if such class of security
is being currently offered to the public by or through an underwriter, no principal underwriter of such security and no dealer
shall sell any such security to any person except a dealer, a principal underwriter, or tht> issuer, except at a curr:mt public offering
price described in the prospectus." 15 U S. C. § SOa-22 (d),
21 The Investment Company Act defines a "dealer" to be:
"[A]ny person regularly engagrd in the busine~:; of buying und
selling securities for his own account, through a broker or otherwise,
but does not include a bank, insurance company, or investment company, or any person insofar as he is engaged in investing, reinvesting,
·or trading jn securities, or m owninj!: or holding ~curities, for h~
20
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terms distinctively throughout. 22 Appellees maintain 1
however, that the defintion of "dealer" is sufficiently
broad to require price maintenance in brokerage transac~
tions. In support of this position appellees assert that
the critical elements of the dealer definition are that
the term relates to a "person" rather tha.n to a trans~
action and that the persou must engage "regularly" in
the sale and purchase of securities to qualify as a dealer,
It is argued, therefore, that any person who purchases
and sells securities with sufficient regularity to qualify as
a statutory dealer is thereafter bound by all dealer re~
strictions, regardless of the nature of the particular
transaction in question. We do not find this argument
persuasive.
Appellees' reliance on the statutory reference to "person" in defining dealer adds little to the analysis, for the
Act defines "broker," "investment banker," "issuer/'
"underwriter," and others to be "persons" as well. See id.,
§§ 80a-2 (a) (6), (21), (22), & ( 40) . In each instance, thEe'
own account, either individually or in some fiduciary capacity, but
not as a part of a regular business." 15 U. S. C. § 80a-2 (a) (11).
A "broker," by contrast, is defined to be :
" [A] ny person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in
securities for the account of others, but does not include a bank or
ar,y person solely by reason of the fact that such person is an
underwriter for one or more investment companies." Id., § 80a-2
(a) (6).
22 Congress employed the term "broker" without reference to
"dealer" in various sections of the Act . See id., §§ 80a-3 (c) (2);
80a-10 (b) (1); 80a-17 (e) (1) and (2) . In other instances, the Act
refers to "dealer" without reference to "broker," see id., §§ 80a-2 (a)
(40) ; 80a- 22 (c) and (d) . And in some cases, includmg the very
definition of the term "dealer" itself, see n. 21, supra, the Act refers
to both "broker" and "dealer" in the same provision, see id., §§ 80a-t
(b) (2) ; 80a- 9 (a)(l) and (2); and 8Qa..30 (a) . Finally, the Act
in some cases refe rs to the more general term "broker-dealer ' :;<f'e
id., §§ 80a-22 (b)(l) and (2) .

,.
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critical distinction relates to their transactional capacity,
Moreover, we think that appellees reliance on the regularity requirement in the dealer definition places undue
emphasis on that element at the expense of the remamdet
of the provision. On the face of the statute the most
apparent distinction between a broker and a dealer IS that
the former effects transactions for the account of others
and the latter buys and sells securities for his own account,
We therefore cannot agree that the terms of the Act.
compel the conclusion that a broker-dealer acting in a
brokerage capacity would be bound by the § 22 (d)
dealer mandate. Indeed, the language of the Act. sug
gests the opposite result.
Even if we assume, arguendo, that the statutory defi~
nition is ambiguous, we fir.d nothing in the extensive
contemporaneous legislative history of the Investment•
Company Act to justify interpreting § 22 (d) to encompass brokered transactions. That history is sparse,28 and
6

The original Commission-sponsored bill considered in the initial
hearings before the Senate Banking and Commerce Subcommittee,
S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. ( 1940), contained no provision resembling this subsection. Section 22 (d) first emerged in a comprom.ise
proposal advanced after a period of intensive consultation between
the SEC and industry representatives that followed initial Senate
hearings, see 1940 Senate Hearings, pt. 4, at 1105-1107, and the
Commission subsequently has indicated that this provision was suggested by the industry. See Midamerica Mutual Fund, 41 S. E. C.
328, 331 (1963); 1966 Public Policy Study, at 219. Revised legis]a ..
tion reflecting this compromise was submitted, and further hearings
were conducted in the Senate and the House. Both bills were
reported favorably by their respective committees, S. Rep. No. 1715,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) ; H. R. Rep. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d
Sess. (1940), and the House bill, with minor amendments not rele~
vant to this appeal, was accepted by the Senate. 86 Cong. Rec.
10069-10071.
This history perhaps explains the dearth of discussion relatn::o-r
to § 22 (d) . The majority of the Senate hearings were completed
28

r
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suggests only that § 22 (d) was considered necessary td
curb abuses that had arisen in the sales of securities to
insiders as well. 24
The prohibition against insider trading would seem
adequately served by the first clau!:le of § 22 (d), which
prevents mutual funds from selling shares at other than
the public offering price to any person except a principal
underwriter or dealer. See n. ·20, supra. 2'5 The further
restriction on dealer sales bears little relation to insider
trading, however, and logically would be thought to serve
some other purpose. The obvious effect of the dealer
prohibition is to shield the primary distribution system
from th3 competitive impact of unrestricted dealer trading in the secondary ma.rkets, a concern that was reflected
before this provision was advanced, and both the Senate and House
hearings that followed provide ·relatively little illumination as to
the intended purpose or scope of this subsection.
24 Insider trading abuses were identified as a problem during the
Senate hearings that preceded submission of the compromise bill
containing'§ 22 (d), see 1940 Senate Hearings, pt. 2, at 526-5p7 ancl
660-661. At the close of the initial Senate hearings an industry
·representative suggested that the Act should contain a provision
·prohibiting sales at preferential terms to insiders and others. Id.,
at 105.7. The Commission and industry representatives thereafter
met to seek a compromise on the various differences that had
.been ider.tified in the Senate hearings, and the industry memoran.dum outlining the nature of the rP,1lltant agreement again indicated
that a provision should be added to the Act to prohibit msider
trading. See- Framework of Proposed InvestmPnt Company Bill
(Title I), Memorandum Embodying Suggestions Resultmg from Con.fnrence Between Securities and Exchange Commission and Repn•,sentatives of Investment Companies (M'ly 13, 1940), printed iq.
1940 House Hearingt<, at 99
25 The insider trading prohibition is complimented by § 22 (g)
1
whJCh precludes issuance of mutual fund shares for services or
j)roperty other tb~tn cash or securjties. 15 U. S. C. § 80a-22 (g),
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in the Study, see Investment Trust Study, at 865. The
SEC perceives this to be one of the purposes of this
provision, 26
But concluding that protection of the primary distribution system is a purpose of§ 22 (d) does littlA to resolve
the question whether Congress intended to require strict
price maintenance in all broker-deal~C'lr transactions with
the investing public. By its terms, § 22 (d) protects only
against the possibly disruptive ~ffects of secondary dealer
sales which, as statutorily defined, constituted the most
active secondary market existing prior to the Act's pas.
sage. Nothing in the contemporary history suggests that
Congress was equally concerned with possible disruption
from investor transactions in outstanding shares con~
ducted through statutory brokers.
Nor do we think that the history attending subsequent
congressional consideration of the Act provides adequate
support for appellees' contention that § 22 (d) requires
strict price maintenance in all broker -dealer transactions
in mutual-fund shares. To be sure, portions of the testi~
See Adoption of Rul~ N-22-JJ-1, Inv. Co. Act ReL No. 2798,
p. 1 (1958), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 176,625, p. 80,393; Investors
Diversified Services Inc., Inv. Co. Act Rel. No. 3015 (1960), CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ,76,690, p. 80,620; In re Sideris, Exch. Act Ret
:~o. 8816, p. 2 (1970); Mutual Funds Advisory, Inc., Inv. Co. Act
Ret. No. 6932, p. 4 (1972).
The SEC also has suggebted that preventing discrimination
among investors was one of the purposes of this provision. See,
e. g., In re Sideris, supra; Midamerica Mutual Fund, Inc., 41 8. E. C.
328, 331 (1963); A.doption of Rule N22-D-1, supra. But we do
not think that brokerage transaction~ mevitably would foste.r
the kind of investor discrimination sought to be remedied by this
statute. All investors would be equally free to seek to engage in
brokered transactions, and the possibility that the more sophist]
cated or fortuitous investor would profit from this market doeti
not , by itself, bring this category of transactions within thr purvjpw:
Qf §22 (d}.
26
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mony of SEC Chairman Cohen before the House
Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance in 1967 suggested that the price maintenance requirement of § 22
(d) encompassed l'lJl broker-dealers, irrespective of how
they obtained the traded shares, 27 und on other occasions
the Chairman referred to sales by brokers when discuss~
ing mutual fund transactions. 28 Appellees also can point
· to congressional characterizations of § 22 (d) that suggest
that some members of Congress understood the reach of
that provision to be as broad as the District Court
thought.211
Appellees maintain that this history indicates that
Congress always intended § 22 (d) to control broker as
well as dealer transactions, and that it re-enacted the
27 Responding to inquiries concerning the relationship of § 22 (d)
and the operation of state law, Chairman Cohen stated:
"The statute is unequivocal. No person, no matter where he gets
it, from the issuer, from another dealer, or even from a private per~
son, no broker-dealer may sell a share of a particular fund at a
price less than that fixed by the issuer!' 1967 House Hearings, pt.
2, at 711.
2Bfd., pt. 1, at 53.
211 Senator Sparkman, Chairman of the Senate Banking and CUr~
rency Committee which reported the 1970 amendments to the full
Senate, stated on the floor of the Senate that § 22 (d) "now makes
it a Federal rnme for anyone to sell mutual fund shares at a price
lower tb£n that fixed by the fund's distributor.'' 115 Cong. Rec. iol:~&
(1969) (emphasis added). Senator Magnuson reflected perhaps a
similar view, stating that, as a result of§ 22 (d) "mutual fund shares
are totally msulated from pnce compet1tion." 114 Cong Rec. 23057
(1968) (emphasis added).
The testimony of some witnesses suggests that they shared this
expansive view. See, e. g., Hearings on S. 1659 before the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess, pt. 2,
at 741 (1967) (hereinafter 1967 Senate Hearings) (testimony of
Mr. Funston, President of the New York Stock Exchange); id.,
pt 1, at 348, 356 (testimony of Profe::;sor Samnt>lson) ; ir/, p. Z,,
~t 1064 (testunony of ProfQssor Wallich).

·•
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amended § 22 with that purpose in mind. The District Court accepted this position, and it is not without•
some support in this historical record. 80 But impressive
evidence to the contrary is found in the position consist ·
ently maintained by the SEC. Responding to an inquiry
in 1941, the SEC General Counsel stated that § 22 (d)
did not bar brokerage transactions in mutual fund shares ~
"In my opinion the term 'dealer,' as used in Section 22 (d), refers to the c&.pacity in which a broker.~
dealer is acting in a particular transaction, It
follows, therefore, that if a broker-dealer in a ps,r~
ticular transaction is acting solely in the capacity
of agent for a selling investor; or for both a selling
investor and a purchasing investor, the sale may be
made at a price other than the current offering price
described in the prospectus,
g'On the other hand, if a broker-dealer is acting
for his own account in a transaction and as principal
sells a redeemable security to an investor, the public
offering price must be maintained, even though the
sale is made through another broker who acts as
agent for the seller, the investor, or both.
11
As Section 22 (d) itself states, the offering price
is not required to be maintained in the case of sales
80 We conclude, however, that the context of the post-enactment
history of § 22 (d) limits the force of the statements relied upon by
appellees. A broker-dealer can serve in either a broker or a dealer's·
capacity, and the distin~tion between the two functions is rathe1
technical and precise. The parties are in general agreement that
no significant number of brokered tr:msactions, as statutorily defined, existed prior or subsequent to passage of the Act. In view of
the care with which the statute defines these functions and the
absence of focus on these distinctions in the statements in thE' subsequent considemtion of§ 22 (d), we think that the broader character~
W,tlons of that sectiP:n must be viewed with some ske:t)tici.~m . .
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in which both the buyer and the seller are dealers
acting as principals in the transactions." Inv. Co,
Act. Rel. No 78, March 4, 1941, 11 Fed. Reg . 10~l92
(1946).
This substantially contemporaneous interpretation of the
Act has consistently been maintained in subsequent SEC
opinions, see Oxford, Co., Inc., 21 S. E. C. 681, 690
(1946); Mutual Funds Advisory, Inc., Inv. Co. Act. ReL
No. 6932, at 3 (1972). The same position was asserted in a
recent Staff Report, see 1974 Staff Report, at 105 n. 2, 107
n. 2, and 109 (1974), was relied on by the SEC in its sub~
sequent decision to encourage limited price competition
in brokered transactions, 31 and is advanced by it as amicus
curiae in this Court. This consistent and longstanding
interpretation by the agency charged with administration
of the Act, while not controlling, is entitled considerable weight. See, e. g., Saxbe v. B·ustos, 419 U. S. 65
(1974); Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401
81 Acting in accordl!llce with the recommendations of the Staff
Report, the SEC Chahman recently requested that the NASD
amend its Rules of Fair Practice to prohibit agreements between
underwriters and broker-dealers that preclude broker-dealers, acting
as agents, "from matching orders to buy and sell fund shares in a
secondary market at competitively determined prices and commis~
sion rates." Letter from Mr. Ray Garrett, Jr., Chairman of the
SEC to Mr. Gordon S. Macklin, President of the NASD, Novem~
ber 22, 1974, printed in addendum to brief of appellees Bache &
Co., et al, at 18. The Chairman further rrvealed tllfl SEC's mtention to exercise its regulatory authority under § 22 (f) to neutralize any adverse effects this market might have on the
fund's primary distribution systems. !d., at 19. A~ the Staff'
Report indicates, the Commission's exercise of regulatory authority
is premised on its view that § 22 (d) does not require strtct price
maintenance in brokered transactions. See 1974 Staff Report, at
104. If § 22 (d) did control these transactions as well as "dealer'~
sales, the Commission's ability to encourage controlled competitiol)
1n this market would he subject to question.

·'
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U, S, 617, 626-627 (1971); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U, S,
1, 16 (1965).

B

The substance 0f appellees' position is that the dealer
prohibition of § 22. (d) should be interpreted in generic
rather than statutory terms, The price maintenance re=
quirement of that section accordingly would encompas~
all broker-dealer transactions with the investing public
and would shelter them from antitrust sanction" But
such an expansion of § 22 (d) beyond its terms would
not only displace the antitrust laws by implication; it
also would impinge seriously on the SEC's more flexible
regulatory authority under§ 22 (f).112
Implied antitrust immunity is not favored, and can be
justified only by a convincing showing of clear repug~
nancy between the antitrust laws and the regulatory system. See, e. g., United States v. Philadelphia National
Bank, 374 U. S. 321, ~48 (1963); United States v.
Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 197-206 (\939). We think
no such showing has been made. Moreover, in addition to satisfying our responsibility to reconcile the
antitrust and regulatory statutes where feasible, Silver
v, New York Stock Exchange, 373 U. S. 341, 356-357
(1963), we must interpret the Investment Company Act
n The Departmen~ of Justice previously suggested a manner in
which its interpretation of § 22 (d) could be reconciled with the
Commission's exercise of regulatory authority over brokered trams~
actions. Addressing the question of possible repeal of § 22 (d), the
Justice Department suggested that rather than continue to wait
for congressional repeal, the Commission should eliminate the adverse
effects of price maintenance by freeing all transactions from the
'§ 22 (d) mandate through the exercise of its § 6 (c) power of exemption, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-6 (c). !d., at 70. This presumably would
leave the SEC free to regulate transactions through the exercise of
the powers conferred to it by other provisions of the Act. We need
not consider th.~ validity of the Justice Department's broad inter..
pretation of the SEC's power of exemption, for even assuming it
·j;0 bfr correct our analysis would not be affected.

~.
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in a manner most conductive to the effectuation of its
goals. We conclude that appellee's interpretation of § 22
(d) serves neither purpose, and cannot be justified by the
language or history of that section.
We therefore hold that the price maintenance mandate
of § 2.2 (d) cannot be stretched beyond its literal terms
to encompass transactions by broker-dealers acting as
statutory "brokers." Congress defined the limitations
for the mandatory price maintenance requirement of the
Investment Company Act. "We are not only bound by
those limitations but we are bound to construe them
strictly, since resale price maintenance is a privilege re~
strictive of a free economy." United States v. McKesson
& Robbins, 351 U. S. 305, 316 (1956). Accordingly, we
hold that the District Court erred in relying on § 22 (d)
in determining that the activities here questioned are
immune from antitrust liability.

IV
Our determination that the restrictions on the secondary market are not immunized by § 22 (d) does not end
the inquiry, for the District Court also found them
sheltered from antitrust liability by § 22 (f). Appellees,
joined by the SEC, defend this ruling and urge that it
requires dismissal of the challenge to the vertical restrictions sought to be enjoined in Counts II-VIIL
Section 22 (f) authorizf's mutual funds to impose
restrictions on the negotiability and transferability of their
shares, provided they conform with the fund's registration statement and do not contravene any rules
and regulations the Commission may prescribe in the
interests of the holders of all of the outstanding securities.38 Appellant does not contend that the vertical
38 Section 22 (f) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-22 (f), provides:
"No regil!'tered open-end company shall restrict the transferability
<Q:t' negotiahilit,y of any security of which it is the issuer except ir)l

.
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restrictions are not disclosed in the registration state~
ments of the funds in question. Nor does it assert that
the agreements imposing such restrictions violate Commission rules and regulations. Indeed, it could not do so,
because to date the SEC has prescribed no such standards. Instead appellant maintains that th~ contractual
restrictions do not come witl1in the meaning of the Act,
asserting that § 22 (f) does not authorize the imposition
of restraints on the distribution system rather than on the
shares themselves. Appellant thus apparently urges that
the only limitations contemplated by this section are
those that appear on the face of the certificate itself.
Appellant also urges that the SEC's unexercised power
to prescribe rules and regulations is insufficient to create
repugnancy between its regulatory authority and the
antitrust laws.
Our examination of the language and history of§ 22 (f)
persuades us, however, that the agreements challenged
in Counts II-VIII are among the kinds of restridions
Congress contemplated when it enacted that section. And
this conclusion necessarily leads to a determination that
they are immune from liability under the Sherman Act,
for we see no way to reconcile the Commission's power
to authorize these restrictions with the competing mandate of the antitrust laws.

A
Unlike§ 22 (d),§ 22 (f) originated in the Commissionsponsored bin considered in the Senate subcommittee
hearings that preceded 'introduction of the compromise
proposal later enacted into law. The Commission·conformity with the statements with respect thereto contained in
its registration statement nor in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe in the interests of
the holders of aU of the outstanding securities of such investment
company."

~-.
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sponsored provision authorized the SEC to promul"'
gate rules, regulations or orders prohibiting restrictions
on the transferability or negotiability of mutual fund
shares, S. 3580, § 22 (d) (2), 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) ;H
Commission testimony indicates that it considered this
authority necessary to allow regulatory control of indus~
try measures designed to deal with the disruptive effects
of "bootleg market" trading and with other detrimental
trading practices identified in the Investment Trust
Study.35
34

Section 22 (d) of the original bill, S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.

' (1940), provided, in pertinent part:

"The Commission is authorized, by rules and regulations or order
in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to prohib1t"(2) restrictions upon the transferability of negotiability of any
redeemable security of which any registered investment company is
the issuer .11
35 Testifying before the Senate Subcommittee, an SEC spokesman
stated:
"Now coming to subparagraph (2) of (d), it just says that the
'Commission shall have the right to make rules and regulations with
respect to any restrictions upon the transferability or negotiability
·of any redeemable security of which any registered investment
company is the issuer.
"There are some companies that have a provision in their certifi.
•c:>.tes to the effect that you cannot sell that certificate to anybody
else, and the only way you can sell it is to sell it back to t he com
pany. That is a technical problem. It presents a whole problem
which they call the bootleg market. What happens is that dealers
keep switching people from one company to another. In order to
prevent these switches:, some provisions require that you cannot
make these switches but must, sell the certificate back to the
.company.
"If the committee wants the provision, we shall recommend what,
on the basis 0f our experience up to the present time, it ought to be:
but we think subjects like that ought to be a matter of niles and:
regulations." 1940 Senate Hearings, pt. 1, M, 292-293.
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The Study indicates, moreover, that a number of funds
had begun to deal with these problems prior to passage
of the Act. And while their methods may have included
the imposition of restrictive legends on the face of the
certificate, see n. 35, supra, they were by no means con~
fined to such narrow limits. A number of funds imposed
controls on the activities of their principal underwriters,
see Investment Trust Study, at 868-869; and in some
instances the funds required the underwriters to impose
similar restrictions on the dealers, see id., at 869, or entered
into these restrictive agreements with the dealers themselves, id., at 870-871.
In view of the history of the Investment Company
Act, we find no jusLification for limiting the range of
possible transfer restrictions to those that appear on the
face of the certificate. The bootleg market was primarily a problem of the distribution system, and bootleg
dealers found a source of supply in the contract-dealers
as well as in retiring shareholders. See id., at 865.
Moreover, the Study indicates that part of the bootleg
distribution system consisted of "trading firms" that
served as wholesalers of mutual-fund securities in much
the same fashion as the principal underwriters. These
trading firms primarily purchased and sold shares to and
from other dealers, id., pt. II, at 327, frequently offering
them at a price slightly lower than the discounted rate
charged to dealers in the primary distribution system.
Id., at 327-328. Thus trading firms not only helped
supply the bootleg dealers whose sales undercut those of
the contract-dealers, they competed with the principal
underwriters by offering a source for lower cost shares
that inevitably discouraged participation in the primary
distribution system. See id., at 328 n. 85.
The bootleg market was a complex phenomenon whose

'.
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principal origins lay in the distribution system itself. In
view of this history, limitation of the industry's ability,
subject of course to SEC regulation, to reach these problems at their source would constitute an inappropriate
contraction of the remedial function of the statute. 86 Indeed, in view of the role of trading firms and interdealer
transactions in the maintenance of the bootleg market,
the narrow interpretation of § 22 (f) urged by appellant
would seem to afford inadequate authority to deal with
the problem.
Together, §§ 22 (d) and 22 (f) protect the primary
distribution system for mutual-fund securities. SectiOn
22 (d), by eliminating price competition in dealer sales,
inhibits the most disruptive factor in the pre-1940's
mutual market ami thus assures the maintenance of a
viable sales system. Section 22 (f) compliments this
protection by authorizing the funds and the SEC to deal
more flexibly with other detrimental trading practices by
imposing SEC-approved restrictions on transferability
and negotiability. Appellant's limiting interpretation of
§ 22 (f) compromises this flexible mandate, and cannot
be accepted.
We find support for our interpretation of § 22 (f)
jn the views expressed by the SEC shortly after the
passage of the Act. Rule 26 (j) (2), proposed by NASD
to curb abuses identified in the Study and the congressional hearings, provided limitations on underwriter
86 Neither are we convinced of the necessity to limit negotiability
or transferability restrictions to those appearing on the face of the
certificate in order to assure their adequate disclosure to investons.
Section 24 of the Act requires that mutual funds submit for SEC
inspection copies of all sales literature that they send to prospective
investors. 15 U. S. C. § 80a-24 (b). The Commission is thereforf\
fully apprised as to the nature and sufficiency of the disclosure of
these restrictions and can, if necessary, require supplementatim11
Qf the information provided investors.
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sales and redemptions to or from dealers who are not
parties to sales agreements. In commenting on this pro~
posed rule, the SEC characterized it as a "restriction
on the transferability of securities," and specifically
averted to its power to regulate such restrictions under
22 (f) . National ABsociation of Securities Dealer.~,
9 S. E. C. 38, 44-45 and n. 10 (1941). As indicated
above, see supra, at 22, and sources there cited, this con ..
temporaneous interpretation by the responsible agency
is entitled to considerable weight. We therefore conclude that the restrictions on transferability and negotl~
ability contemplated by § 22 (f) include restnctions on
the distribution system for mutual-fund shares as well
as limitations on the face of the shares themaelves. The
narrower interpretation of this provision advanced by
appellant would disserve the broad remedial function of
the statute. 37
Neither do we agree with appellant's suggestion that § 22 (f)
does not authorize restrictions in contracts between underwriters
:and dealers in which the fund is not a party. We note, preliminarily, that this position would not save Counts III, V, and VII
from dismissal, since they relate to restrictions on underwriter conduct that are imposed by the fund. Even under the most technical
reading of the statute these restrictions are "fund-imposed."
Moreover, it further appears from the complaint that the agreement challenged in Count II is required by the fund-underwriter
agreP-ment challenged in Count III and thus also is "fund-imposed"
in any but the most literal sense. More importantly, however, we
think that appellant's position fails to recognize the relationship between the vanous participants in the distribution chain: As the·
history of the Investment Company Act recognizes, the relationship between the fund and its prmcipal underwriter traditionally ha5
been a close one. Sections 15 (b) and (c) reflect this fact, requiring,.
in effect, that funds establish writt<'n contracts with the undPr·
writer that must be approved by a majority of the fund's dism.
terested directors and cannot remain in force for more than two
years. 15 U.S. C. §§ SOa-15 (b) and (c) . And NASD Rule 26 (c),.
in ~tfect since 1941, requires that princtpal underwriters entrr int•.111
87
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Appellant's additional contention that the SEC's exer..
cise of regulatory authority has been insufficient to give
rise to an implied immunity for agreements conforming
with § 22 (f) misconceives the intended operation of the
statute. By its terms, § 22 (f) authorizes properly
disclosed restrictions unless they are inconsistent with
SEC rules or regulations. The provision thus authorizes
funds to impose transferability or negotiability restrictions, subject to Commission disapproval. In v1ew of the
evolution of this provision, there can be no doubt that
this is precisely what Congress intended.
Section 22 (f) as originally introduced would have
authorized the SEC to promulgate rules, regulations
or orders prohibiting restrictions on the redeemability
or transferability of mutual-fund shares. Congressional
consideration of that provision raised some question
whether existing restrictions on transferability and nego=
tiability would remain valid unless specifically disapproved by the SEC. 38 The compromise provision, which
subsequently was enacted into law, eliminated this uncertainty, however, and manifested a more positive attitude
toward self-regulation.
Thus § 22 (f) specifically recognizes that mutual
funds can impose such restrictions on the distributiOn
system provided they are disclosed in the registration
statement and conform to any rules and regulations that
the SEC might adopt. In addition, § 22 (f) alters the
focus of Commission scrutiny. Whereas the original
provision allowed the SEC to make rules that serve "the
public interest and
the protection cf investors,' 7
0

o

0

agreements with the dealers who distribute the fund's securities..
See National Association of Securities Dealers, 9 S. E. C. 38, 44, 48
( 1941). In view of these requirements, and the broad remedial
purpose of § 22 (f), we think that the underwriter-dealer agree•
ments challenged in this complamt also must be regarded as fund~
imposed within the contemplation of the statute.
ss See 1940 Senatf:' Bearings, pt. 1, a.t 293.
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S. 3580, § 22 (d) (2), supra, § 22 (f) as enacted limits
the Commission's rulemaking authority to the protection
of the "interests of the holders of all of the outstanding
securities of such investment company." 15 U. S. C.
§ 80a-22 (f). Viewed in this historical context, the
statute reflects a clear congressional determination that,
subject to Commission ov~rsight, mutual funds should
be allowed to retain the initiative in dealing with the
potentially adverse effects of disruptive trading practices.
The Commission repeatedly has recognized the role
of private agreements in the control of trading practices
in the mutual fund industry. For example, in First
Multifund of America, Inc., Inv. Co. Act Rei. No. 6700
(1971), F. Sec. L. Rep. ~ 78,209, at 80,602, ii looked to
restrictive agreements simila!' to those challenged in
this litigation to ascertai{'rnvestment advisor's capacity
in a particular transaction. At no point did it intimate
that those agreements were not legitimate. 39 Likewise,
Commission reports repeatedly have acknowledged the
significant role that private agreements have played in
restricting the growth of a secondary market in mutual~
fund shares! 0 Until recently the Commission has al~
8 ~ Commissioner Loomis, dissenting from an SEC determination
that an applicant lacked standing to seek an exemption from §§ 17
(a) (1) and 22 (d) of the Act, stated,
"I would conclude that applicant is a dealer in its relationship with
the fund underwriter because to do otherwise would require us to
ignore or nullify the perfectly lawful requirement in the dealer
agreements that applicant act as a dealer. . . . [I] do not know
of anything unlawful about the generally accepted form of dealer
agreement used in the investment company industry." Mutual
Funds Advisory, Inc., Inv. Co. Act. !tel. No. 6932, at 7 (1972)
(dissenting opinion) .
While the majority disagreed with Commissioner Loomis' assessment
of the facts of the case, it did not question his approval of thementioned deal~r agreement.
"'·0 See 1963 Special Study, at 98; 1974 Staff Report, at 104-lOIL
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lowed the industry to control the secondary market through
contractual restrictiOns duly fil2d and publicly disclosed.
Even the SEC's recently expressed intention to introduce
an element of competitiOn in brokered transactions rP.~
fleets measured caution as to the possibly adverse impart,
of a totally unregulated and restrained brokerage market
on the primary distribution system. See n. 31, supra,
The Commission's acceptance of fund-initiated restric·'
tions for more than three decades hardly represents abdi~
cation of its _regulatory responsibilities. Rather, we
think it manifests an informed administrative judgment
that the contractual restrictions employed by the funds
to protect their shareholders were appropriate means for
combatting the proClems of the industry. The SEC's
election not to initiate restrictive rules or regulations is
precisely the kind of administrative oversight of private
practices that Congress contemplated when .it enactP-d
§ 22 (f).
We conclude, therefore, that the vertical restrictions
sought to be enjoined in Counts II-VIII are among the
kinds of agreements authorized § 22 (f) of the Invest~
ment Company Act,
B
The agreements questioned by the United States re~
strict the terms under which the appellee underwriters
and broker-dealers may trade in shares of mutual funds.
Such restrictions, affecting resale price maintenance and
concerted refusals to deal, normally would constitute per
se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act. See, e. g., K.lor,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211-213
(1959); Fashion Originators' G'uild of America, Inc,. Vo
Federal Tmde Commission, 312 U. S. 457, 465--468
(1941), Here, however, Congress has made a judgment
that these rPstrictions on competition might be necessi·"
tated by the unique problems o£ the mutual fund in·
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dustry, and has vested in the SEC final authority to
determine whether and to what extent they should be
tolerated "in the interests of the holders of all the out~
standing securities" of mutual funds. 15 U. S.C. § 80ar22 (f).
The SEC, the federal agency responsible for regulating
the conduct of the mutual-iund indu~try, urges that its
authority will be compromised seriously if these agreements are deemed actionable under the Sherman Act.41
We agree. There can be no reconciliation of its authority under § 22 (f) to permit these and similar restri(}c
tive agreements with the Sherman Act's declaration that
they are illegal per se. In this instance the antitrust
laws must give way if the regulatory scheme established
by the Investment Company Act is to work. Silver v"
New York Stock Exchange, supra. We conclude, there~
fore, that such agreements are not actionable under the
Sherman Act, and that the District Court properly dis=
missed Counts II-VIII.

v

It remains to be determined whether the District
Court properly dismissed Count I of appellant's complaint, which charged activities allegedly constituting a
horizontal conspiracy between the NASD and its members to "prevent t.he growth of a secondary dealer market
and 11 brokerage market in the purchase and sale of
:mutual fund shares." App. 9.
In its brief to this Court, the SEC maintains:
"It would nullify the effect of this grant of regulatory au~
thority to the Commission [under § 22 (f)] for this Court to
hold that a district court may apply antitrust principles to con-·
duct lil:e that alleged in Counts II through VIII, when the expert
body designated and empowered by Congress to regulate and
supervise that conduct has not deemed it appropriate to prohibit
the conduct." Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission as;
Amic?t.s C!uria.e, at 54•.
41

I.
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The precise nature of the a:llegations of the complaint
are obscured by subsequent concessions made by appel~
lant to the District Court and reiterated here. It is
clear, however, that Count I alleges activities that are
neither required by § 22 (d) nor authorized under § 22
(f). And since they cannot find antitrust shelter in
these provisions of the Jmrestment Company Act, the
question presented is whether the SEC's exercise of reg~
ulatory authority under this statute and the Maloney
Act is sufficiently pervasive to confer an implied im~
munity. We hold that it is, and accordingly affirm the
District Court's dismissa1 of this portion of the complaint
Count I originally appeared to be a general attack on
' the NASD's role in encouraging the restrictions on sec~
· ondary market activities challenged in the remainder of
· appellant's complaint. The acts charged in Count I
focused in large part on N ASD rules, and on information
distributed by that associ&.tion to its mem:bers.4 z Subse~
The complaint averred that, in effectuating the conspiracy to
restrain the growth of a secondary market in mutual-fund shares,
·the NASD, its members, and more particularly the other named
defendants,
"(a) established and maintained rules which inhibited the development of a secondary dealer market and a brokerage market in
·mutual fund shares;
'·(b) established 11nd maintained rules which induced brokerj
dealers to enter into sales agreements with principal underwriters,
with knowledge that sales agreements contained restrictive provision'!
which inhibited the development of a secondary dealer market and
"brokerage market in mutual fund shares ;
" (c) induced member principal underwriters to include restrictive
provisions in their sales agreements;
" (d) discouraged persons who made inquiry about the legality of
a brokerage market from p&rtidpating in a brokerage market and
distributed misleading information to Its members concerning the
legality of a brokerage market in mutual fund shares; and
" (e) suppressed mark~?.t quotations for the secondary dealer
market." App . 9.
42
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quently appellant advised the District Court that its
complaint was not to be read as a direct attack on NASD
rules, however, and it repeated that position before this
Court.48 Appellant now contends that its complaint
should be interpreted as a challenge to various unofficial
NASD interpretations and to appellees' exten::;ion of the
rules in a manner that inhibit a secondary market.
In view of the scope of the SEC's regulatory authority
over the activities of the NASD, appellant's decision to
withdraw from direct attack on the association's rules
was prudent. The SEC's supervisory authority over the
N ASD is extensive. Not only does the Maloney Act
require the SEC to determine whether an association
43 Appellant first indicated abandonment of its attack on the
NASD rules during oral argument of appelleeH' motion to dismiss. See App. 328-332. Notwithstandmg clauses (a) and (b) ot
paragraph 17 of the complamt, see n. 42, supra, appellant's counsel
stated that it did not intend to challenge a.ny NASD rule, app. 330
Counsel ambiguously suggested, however, that the members' com~
pliance with those rules had aided and abetted alleged the conspiracy,
id., at 332, and stated that informal and secret activities of the
association likewise had tended to inhibit growth of the secondary
market, id., at 330. Thereafter, in response to the District Court's
invitation to join in the litlgatwn as amicus curiae, the SEC ex·
pressed its concern that the action might mvolve an attack on NASD
rule;;, a matter "over wh1ch the Commission is granted exclusive
jurisdiction by Section 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U. S. C. § 78o-3 et seq. (the Maloney Act)." Letter from Mr.
Lawrence E. Nerheim, General Counsel of the SEC to the District
Court. App 323. Appellant thereafter informed the court that
the issues Jt Hought to rai<ie did not represPnt "an attack npon
NASD Rules as such" but ra.ther "aimed at an over-all course Qf
conduct engaged in by the NASD and its member!' going beyond the
NASD's rule-making authority." Letter from Mr. Bruce B. Wilson,
Acting Asst. Attorney General for the Antitrust Division to the
Du;tnct Court App :3'27 It m:lintains thP same po~1t10n illl
thls Cour.t~ Sre Brief for the United States, at 51 n. 4'Z~

'?3- 1701--0PINtON
36

t

U. S. v. NATIONAL ASSN. SECURITIES DEALERS

satisfies the strict statutory requirements of that Act
and thus qualifies to engage in supervised regulation of
the trading activities of its membership, 15 U. S. C,
§ 78o-3 (b), it requires registered associations thereafter
to submit for Commission approval any proposed rule
changes, id., § 78o-3 (j). The Maloney Act additionally
authorizes the SEC to request changes in or supplemen~
tation of association rules, a power that recently has been
exercised with respect to some of the precis~ conduct.
questioned in this litigation, see n. 31, supra. If such a
request is not complied with, the SEC may order such
changes itself. Id., § 78o-3 (k)(2).
The SEC, in its exercise of authority over association
rules and practices, is charged with protection of the
public interest as well as the interests of shareholders,
see, e. g., 15 U. S. C. §§ 78o-3 (a)(1), (b)(3), (c),
and it repeatedly has indicated that it weighs competitive concerns in the exercbe of its continued supervisory
responsibility. See, e. g., In re Nat. Assn. of Securities
Dealers, Inc., 18 S. E. C. 424, 236, 486-486-487 (1945);
Proposed Amendment to The Rules of Fair Practice of
Nat. Assn. of Se·curities Dealer3, Inc., 9 S. E. C. 38, 43-46
(1941); see also 1974 Staff Report, at 105, 109. As the
Cou!'t previously has recognized, United States v. Socony~
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 227 n. 60 (1940), the
investiture of such pervasive supervisory authority in
the SEC suggests that Congress intended to lift the ban
of the Sherman Act from association activities approved
by the SEC.
We further conclude that appellant's attack on NASD
interpretations of those rules cannot be maintained under
the Sherman Act, for we see no meaningful distinction
between the association's rules and the manner in which
it construes and implements them. Each is equally a.
.subject of SEC oversight,
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Finally, we hold that appellant's additional challenges
to the alleged activities of the membership of the
NASD designed to encourage the kinds of restraints
averred in Counts II-VIII likewise are precluded
by the regulatory authority vested in the SEC by
the Maloney and Investment Company Ac~. It
should be noted that appellant does not contend that
appellees' activities have had the purpose or effect of
restraining competition among the various funds. 44 Instead, appellant urges in Count I that appellees' alleged
conspiracy was designed to encourage the suppression of'
intrafund secondary market activities, precisely the restriction that the SEC consistently has approved pursuant to § 22 (f) for nearly 35 years. This close rela-.
tionship is fatal to appellant's ccmplaint, as the Commission's regulatory approval of the restrictive agreements
challenged in Counts II-VIII cannot be reconciled with
appellant's attack on the ancillary activities averred in
Count I. And this conclusion applies with equal force·
now that the SEC has determined to introduce a controlled measure of competition into the secondary market.
There can be little question that the broad regulatory
authority conferred upon the SEC by the Maloney and
Investment Company Acts enables it to monitor the
act:vities questioned in Count I, and the history of Com~
mission regulations suggests no laxness in the exercise
of this authority. 45 To the extent that any of appellees'
44 Indeed, it appears that vigorous inter-brand competition exists
in the mutual-fund industry-between the load funds themselves,
between load and no-load funds, between open and closed-end com·
panies, and between all of these investment forms and other investments. See 1974 Staff Report, at 20 et seq.
45 As SEC Chairman Garrett observed in his letter submitting the·
1974 Staff Report for congressional consideration, "No issuer of
securities is subject to more detailed regulation than a mutual
{und." Letter' .from Ray Garrett,. Jr.,. Chairman, Securities andt
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ancillary activities frustrate the SEC's regulatory objectives it has ample authority to eliminate them.4 6
Here implied repeal of the antitrust laws is "necessary
to make the [regulatory scheme] work." Silver v. New
York Stock Exchange, .supra. In generally similar situations, we have implied immunity in particular and discrete instances to assure that the federal agency entrusted
with regulation in the public interest could carry out that
responsibility free from the disruption of conflicting judgments that might be voiced by courts exercising jurisdiction under the antitrust laws. See Hughes To ol Co. v.
Trans World Airlines, 409 U.S. 363 (19·73) ; Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U. S. 296
( 1963) . In this instance, maintenance of an antitrust
action for activities so directly related to the SEC's re ·
sponsibilities poses a substantial danger that appellees
would be subjected to duplicative and inconsistent standards. This is hardly a result that Congress would have
mandated. We therefore hold that with respect to the
activities challenged in Count I of the complaint, the
Sherman Act has been displaced by the pervasive regulatory scheme established by the Maloney and Investment Company Acts.
Affirmed.

Exchange Commission to the Honorable J ohn Sparkman, Chairman
of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United
States Senate (Nov. 4, 1974), contained in 1974 S ~aff Report, at v.
«The Commission can,. for example, require amendment of the
NASD rules regulating the conduct of its membership, see 15
U. S. C. § 78o-3 (k) (2), or exercise the more general rulemaking
power conferred by § 38 (a) of the 'Investment Comp::my Act, 15
U. S. C. § 80a-38 (a), to contain any of the challenged activities
that might in any way frustrate its regulation of the restrictions it
~1.\thorizes under § 22 (f).

·.
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NOTE: Where lt ts feasible, a ayllabus (headnote) wtll be released, as Is being done In connection with this case, at the time
the opinion Is Issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for
the convenience of the reader. See United Statea v. Detroit Lumber
Oo., 200 U.S. 321, 337.
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UNITED STATES v. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
SECURITIES DF.ALERS, INC., ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

No. 73-1701. Argued March 17, 1975-Decided June 26, 1975
Section 22 (d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 provides
that "no dealer shall sell [mutual fund shares] to any person
except a dealer, a principal underwriter, or the issuer, except at
a current public offering price described in the prospectus." Section 22 (f) authorizes mutual funds to impose restrictions on
the negotiability and transferability of shares, provided they
conform with the fund's registration statement and do not contravene any rul<'s and regulations that the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) may prescribe in the interests of the holders
of all of the outstanding securities. Section 2 (6) of that Act
defines a "broker" as a person engaged in the business of effecting
transactions in securities for the account of others, and § 2 ( 11)
defines a "dealer" as a person regularly engaged in the business
of buying and selling securities for his own account. The Maloney
Act of 1938 (§ 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) supplements the SEC's regulation of over-the-counter markets by
providing a system of cooperative self-regulation through voluntary associations of brokers and dealers. The Government
brought this action against appellee National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD), certain mutual funds, mutual-fund
underwriters, and broker-dealers, alleging that appellees, in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, combined and agreed to restrict
the sale and fix the resale prices of mutual-fund shares in secondary market transactions between dealers, from an investor to a
dealer, and between investors through brokered transactions, and
sought to enjoin such agreements. Count I of the complaint
charged a honzontal combination and conspiracy among NASD's
members to prevent the growth of a secondary dealer market in
I
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the purchase and sale of mutual-fund shares, the Government
contending that such count was r:ot to be read as direct attack
on NASD rules, but on NASD's interpretations and appellees'
extension of tho rules so as to include a secondary market.
Counts II-VIII alleged various vertical restrictions on secondary
market activities. The District Court dismissed the complaint
on the grounds that §§ 22 (d) and (f), when read in conjunction
with the Maloney Act, afforded antitrust immunity from all of
the challenged practices. lt further determined. that, apart from
this statutory immunity, the pervasive regulatory scheme established by these statutes conferred an implied immunity from antitrust sanction. The court concluded that the § 22 (d) price
maintenance mandate for sales by "dealers" applied to transactions
in which a broker-dealer acts as statutor~r "broker" rather than
a r;:tatutory "dealer,'! and thus that § 22 (d) governs transactions
in which the broker-dealer acts as an agent for ::m investor as
well as those in which he acts as a principal selling shares for
his own account. Held:
1. Neither the language nor legislative history of § 22 (d)
justifies extending the section's price maintenance mandate beyond
its literal terms to encompass transactions by broker-dealers acting as statutory "brokers." Pp. 15-24.
(a) To construe § 22 (d) to cover all broker-dealer transactions would displace the antitrust laws by implication and also
would impinge on thr SEC's more flexible authority under § 22 (f).
Implied antitrust immunity can be justified only by a convincing
showing of clear repugnancy between the antitrust laws and the
regulatory system, and here no such showing has been made.
P. 23.
(b) Such an expansion of § 22 (d)'s coverage would serve
neither this Coures respomibility to reconcile the antitrust and
regulatory statutes where feasible nor the Court's obligation to
interpret the Investment Company Act in a manner most conducive to the effectuation of its goals. Pp. 23-24.
2. The vertical re~;trictions sought to be enjoined in Counts
II-VIII are among tlw kinds of agreements authorized by§ 22 (f),
and hence such restrictions are immune from liability under the
Sherman Art. Pp. 24-33.
(a) The restrictions on transferability and negotiability contemplated by § 22 (f) include rest rictions on the distribution
system for mutual-fund shares as well as limitations on the face
·of the shares themselves. To interpret the section as cove~ing
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only the latter would disserve the broad remedial function of
the section, which, as a complement to § 22 (d)'s protection against
disruptive price competition caused by dealers' "bootleg market''
trading of mutual-fund shnrt>s, authorizes the funds and the
SEC to deal more fit>xibly with othrr detrimental trading practices
by imposing SEC-approved restrictions on transferability and
negotiability. Pp. 25-29.
(b) To contend, as the Government does, that the SEC's
exercise of regulatory authority has been insufficient to give rise
to an implied immunity for agreements conforming with § 22 (f)
misconcrivcs the statute's intended operation. By its terms
§ 22 (f) authorizes properly disclosed restrictions unless they are
inconsistent with SEC rules or regulations and thus authorizes
funds to impose transferability or negotiability restrictions subject
to SEC disapproval. Pp. 30-32
(c) The SEC's authority would be compromised if the agreements challenged in Counts II-VIII were deemed actionable under
the Sherman Act. There can be no reconciliation of the SEC's
authority under § 22 (f) to permit these and similar restrictive
agreements with the Sherman Act's declaration that they are
illegal per se. In this instance the antitrust laws must give way
if the regulatory scheme t>stablished by the, Investment Company
Act is to work. Pp. 32-33.
3. The activities charged in Count I are neither required by
§ 22 (d) nor authorized under § 22 (f), and therefore cannot find
antitrust shelter therein. The SEC's exercise of regulatory
authority under the Maloney and Investment Company Acts is
sufficiently pervasive, however, to confer implied immunity from
antitrust liability for such activities. Pp. 33-38.
374 F . Supp. 95, affirmed.
PowELL, .T., deliwr<'d the opinion of the Court, in which BuRGER,
C. J., and STEWART, BLAcKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined·.
WHITE, .T., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DouGLAS, BRENNANr
and MARSHALL, JJ ., JO.ll'ted:..

NOTICE : This opinion Is subject to formal revision before publlcatloll.
In the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the lteporter of D~cislons, Supreme Court of the
Unite(! States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other
formal errors, In order that corrections may be made before the preliminary prln t goes to press.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opmwn of the
Court.
This appeal requires the Court to determine the extent
to which the regulatory authority conferred upon the
Securities and Exchange Commission by the Maloney Act
and the Investment Company Act of 1940 displaces the
strong antitrust policy embodied in § 1 of the Sherman
Act. At issue is whether certain sales and distribution
practices employed in marketing securities of open-end
management companies, popularly referred to as "mutual
funds," are immune from antitrust liability. We conclude that they are, and accordingly affirm the judgment
of the District Court.
I
An "investment company" invests in the securities of
other corporations and issues securities of its own. 1
1 The Investment Company Act of 1940 defines "investment company" to include any issuer of securities which
"(1) is or holds itself out as bemg engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in thr busine::;s of investing, reinvesting,
<lr trading in securities;
"(2) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of issuing
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Shares in an investment company thus represent propor~
tionate interests m its investment portfolio, and their
value fluctuates in relation to the ch:tnges in the value
of the securitie~ it owns. The most common form of
investment company, the "open end" company or mutual
fund, is required by law to redeem its secur.ities on demand
at a price approximating their proportionate share of the
fund's net asset value at the time of redemption. 2 In
order to avoid liquidation through redemption, mutual
funds continuously issue and sell new shares. These
features-continuous and unlimited distribution and compulsory redemption-are, as the Court recently recognized, "unique characteristic [s]" of this form of investment. United States v. Cartwright, 411 U. S. 546, 547
(1973).
The initial distribution of mutual-fund shares is conducted by a principal underwriter, often an affiliate of
the fund, and by broker-dealers 3 who contract with that
face-amount certificates of the installment type, or has been
engagrd m such busine1<s and has any such certificate outstandmg; or
"(3) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing,
reinvesting, owning, haWing, or trading in securities, and owns or
proposes to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding
40 per centum of the value of such issuer's total assets (exclusive of
Government securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis."
15 U. S. C. § 80a-3 (a) .
Tlus broad definition is qualified, however, by a series of specific
exemptions. See id., §§ SOa-3 (b) and (c)
'! See 15 U S. C.§ SOa-2 (a) (32), id., § SOa-22 (c) .
Management investment compames whose securities lack this
redeemability feature are defined as "closed-end" companies, id.,
§ 80a- 1), nnd the1r ~ale~ and distributiOn pract1crs are regulated
under § 23 of the Act. Id., § 80a-23. Section 22, the provision
under consideration in this appeal, governs the sales and distributiOn practices of "open-end'' compames only.
B In this opimon we will usc the term "broker-dealer" to refef'
generally to persons registered under the Securities Exchange Aot
of 19a4, 15 U. S. C. 78o et seq, and authorized to effect trans.
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underwriter to sell the securities to the public. The
sales price commonly consists of two components, a sum
calculated from the net asset value of the fund at the
time of purchase, and a "load," a sales charge representing a fixed percentage of the net asset value. The load
is divided between the principal underwriter and the
broker-dealers, compensating them for their sales efforts.'
The distribution-redemption system constitutes the
primary market in mutual-fund shares, the operation of
which is not questioned in this litigation. The parties
agree that § 22 (d) of the Investment Company Act
requires broker-dealers to maintain a uniform price in
sales in this primary market to all purchasers except the
fund, its underwriters, and other dealers. And in view
of this express requirement no question exists that antitrust immunity must be afforded these sales. This case
focuses, rather, on thB potential secondary market in
mutual-fund shares.
Although a significant secondary market existed prior
to enactment of the Investment Company Act, little
presently remains. The United States agrees that the
actwns or induce the purchase or sale of securities pursuant to the
authorization of that Act. ·we also will refer separately to "brokers"
and "dealers" as defined by the Investment Company Act, see 15
U.S. C. §§ 80a-2 (a) (6) and (11), to describe the capacity in which
a broker-dealer acts in a particular transaction.
4 The Act defines "sales load" to be the difference between the
public offering price and the portion of the sales proceeds that is
invested or held for investment purposes by the issuer. I d., § 80a2 (a) (35). Most mutual funds rhnrgr this sales load in order to
encourage vigorous sales efforts on the part of underwriters and
broker-dealers. There are some funds that do not charge tlus additional sales fee. These "no load" funds generally sell directly to the
mvestor without relying on the promotional and sales efforts of
underwriters and brciker-dmlrrs. See SEC Report of the Division
of lnvcstmeut Management Regul:ttion, Mutual Fund Distribution
and § 22 (d) of ·the 1nvestment Company Act of 1940, 112 (August
1974) (hereinafter HJ74 Staff Report) .
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Act 'vas designed to restrict most of secondary market
tradmg, but nonetheless contends that certain industry
practices have extended the statutory limitation beyond
its proper boundaries. The com1)laint in this action
alleges that the defendants, appellees herein, combined
and agreed to restrict the sale and fix the resale prices
of mutual-fund shares in secondary market transactions
between dealers, from an investor to a dealer, and between investors through brokered transactions.;' Named
as defendants are the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD), 6 and certain mutual funds/ mutualfund underwriters, 8 and securities broker-dealers. 0
6 Two additional private antitrust actions premised on similar
theories were filed in the Cistrict Court and subsequently dismissed,
Haddad v. Crosby Corp. and Gross v. National Assn. of Securities
Dealers, Inc., 374 F. Su11p. 95. The Court of Appeals for the Distnct of Columbia stayed those appeals to await the resolution of
th1s case, and the petition of one of the partie~ for certiorari before
judgment was denied, G1·oss v. National Assn. of Securities Dealers,
Inc., 419 U. S. 843 (1974) .
Subsequent to the filing of the United States' compl:lint some 50
private suits purporting to be class actions under Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 23 were filed in various district courts around the country.
These cases were transferred to the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
LitJgatJOn, In l'e Mutual Fund Sales Antitrust Litigation, Civil Action No. Misc. 103-73. See 374 F. Supp., at 97 n. 4. The District
Court deferred determination whether the actions could be maintamed as class actions under Rule 23 and additionally postponed
discovery and other activity pending disposition of the motion to
ch sm J~s Ill this rase. l d., at 114
'• The National AssociatiOn of Securities Dealers is rrgistered under
§ 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 19.'34, 15 U. S. C. § 78o-3,
the so-called Maloney Act of 1938. Tlw Maloney Act supp[e ..
rnents the Securitief5 and Exchange Commission's regulation of the
over-the-counter marketR by providmg a system of cooperative selfr" ''nl oiinn t hrOUJrh vnh h•· ,. '''"~ i r+ •nJW of hrnkrrs }llHi nr·l]Pr<>

•• c..... '" U'' '"' " .. ~~\WJ'Itmns
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The United States charges that these agreements violate § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1,10 and prays
that they be enjoined under § 4 of that Act. /d., § 4.
Count I charges a horizontal combination and conspiracy among the members of appellee N ASD to prevent the growth of a secondary dealer market in the
purchase and suk of mutual-fund shares. See n. 42,
pursuant to specified terms and conditions, and authorizes them to
promulgate rules designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative
practices; to promote equitable principles of trade; to safeguard
against unreasonable profits and charges; and generally to protect
inve.:;tors and the public interest. !d., § 78o-3 (b) (8). The Act
also authorizes the SEC to exercise a significant oversight function
over the rules and activities of thE: registered associations. See, e. g.,
id., §§ 78o-3 (b), (e), (h), (J), and (k). The NASD is presently
the only association registered under this Act.
7 The mutual funds na,ned as defendants in this action are
Massachusetts Investors Growth Stock Fund, Inc., Fidelity Fund,
Inc., and Wellington Fund, Inc.
8 The defendant underwriters include the Crosby Corporation,
Vance Sanders & Co., and the Wellington Management Company.
9 Named as defendant broker-dealers are the following: Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Bache & Company, Inc.,
Reynolds Securities Corp., F. I. duPont, Glore Forgan, Inc., E. F.
Hutton, Inc., Walston & Company, Inc., Dean Witter & Company,
Inc., Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., and Hornblower &
Weeks-Hemphill, NoyPs, Inc.
to Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. . . •
"Every person who shall make any c0ntract or engage in any combination or conspiracy declared by sections 1 to 7 of this title to be·
illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said!
punishments, in the discretion of the court.."
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infra. Counts II-VIII, by contrast, allege various vertical restrictions on secondary market activities. In
Counts II, IV, and VI the United States charges that the
principal underwriters and broker-dealers entered into
agreements that compel the maintenance of the public
offering price in brokerage transactions of specified
mutual-fund shares, and that prohibit interdealer transactions by allowing each broker-dealer to sell and purchase shares only to or from investors. 11 Count VIII
alleges that the broker-dealers entered into other, similar
contracts and combinations with numerous principal
underwriters. Counts III, V, and VII allege violations
on the part of the principal underwriters and the funds
themselves. In Cou11ts III and VII the various defendants are charged with entering into contracts requiring
the restrictive underwriter-dealer agreements challenged
:u The violations alleged in Count II are typical of those charged
in Counts IV and VI. In Count II, appellee Crosby, a principal
underwriter of appellee Fidelity Fund, Inc., is charged with entering
into contracts and combmations with appellee broker-dealers, the
substantial terms of whic!1 are that
"(a) each brokerjdealer must maintain the public offering price in
any brokerage transaction in which it participates involving the
purchase or sale of shares of the F1dehty Funds; and
"(b) each brokerfrlealer must sell shares of the Fidelity Funds only
to investors or the fund and purchase such shares only from investors
or the fund." App. 10-11.
Count VI, in addition to charging restnctive agreements similar to
the above, alleged that appellee Wellington, a principal underwriter,
agreed to act only as an agent of t11e appropriate mutual fund in all
transactions with the broker-dealers. ld., at 15.
The alleged effect of the restnctive agreement charged in ~ (a)
was to inhibit the growth and drvelopmrnt of a brokerage market
in mutual fund shares. The alleged effect of the restriction identi.,.
fied in ~ (b), by contrast, was to inh1bit interdraler transactions and
tlms to restrict the growth and development of a secondary dealer
market. Td", at 11
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in Counts II and VI. Count V charges that the agreement between one fund and its underwriter restricted the
latter to serving as a principal for its own account in all
transactions with the public, thereby prohibiting brokerage transactions in the fund's shares. App. 14.
After carefully examining the structure, purpose and
history of the Investment Company Act, 15 U. S. C.
§ 80a-1 et seq., and the Maloney Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78o-3,
the District Court held that this statutory scheme
was "incompatible with the maintenance of [an] antitrust action," 347 F. Supp., at 109, quoting Silver v. New
York Stock Exchange, 373 U. S. 341, 358 (1963). The
court concluded that§§ 22 (d) and (f) of the Investment
Company Act, when read in conjunction with the Maloney Act, afford antitrust immunity for all of the practices here challenged. The court further held that
apart from this explidt statutory immunity, the pervasive regulatory scheme established by these statutes
confers an implied immunity from antitrust sanction in
the "narrow area of distribution and sale of mutual
fund shares." 374 F. Supp., at 114. The court accordingly dismissed the complaint, and the United States
appealed to this Court.12
The position of the United States in this appeal can
be summarized briefly. Noting that implied repeals of
the antitrust laws are not favored, see, e. g., United States
v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 348
(1963), the United States urges that the antitrust immunity conferred by § 22 of the Investment Company
Act should not extend beyond its precise terms, none- of
which, it maintains, requires or authorizes the practices
12 The Court noted probable jurisdiction on October 15, 1974,
419 U. S. 822. Accordingly, the recent amendments to the Expediting Act, 15 U. S. C. § 29, as amended by 88 Stat. 1709, do not
affect our jurisdiction.
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here challenged. The United States maintains, moreover,
that the District Court expanded the parameters of the
implied immunity doctrine beyond those recognized by
decisions of this Court. In response, appellees advance
all of the positions relied on by the District Court. They
are joined by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) , which asserts as amicus curiae that the regulatory authority conferred upon it by § 22 (f) of the
Investment Company Act displaces § 1 of the Sherman
Act. The SEC contends, therefore, that the District
Court properly dismissed Counts II-VIII but takes no
position with respect to Count I.
II
A

The Investment Company Act of 1940 originated in
congressional concern that the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U. S. C. § 77a et seq., and the Securities Exchang~ Act of
1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78a et seq., were inadequate to protect
the purchasers of investment company securities. Thus,
in § 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 15
U. S. C. § 79z-4, Congress directed the SEC to study
the structures, practices and problems of investment
companies with a view toward proposing further legislation. Four years of intensive scrutiny of the industry
culminated in the public::ttion of the Investment Trust
Study and the recommendation of legislation to rectify
the problems and abuses it identified. After extensive
congressional consideration, the Investment Company
Act of 1940 was adopted.
The Act vests in the SEC broad regulatory authority
over the business practices of investment companies.18
15 For example, the Act requires companies to register with the
SEC, 15 U. S. C. § SOa-8, see also, id., § 80a-7. Companies also
must register all securities they issue, see Securities Exchange Act of
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We are concerned on this appeal with § 22 of the Act,
id., § SOa-22, which controls the sales and distribution of
mutual-fund shares. The questions presented require
us to determine whether § 22 (d) obligates appellees
to engage in the practices challenged in Counts II-VIII
and thus necessarily confers antitrust immunity for them.
If not, we must determine whether such practices
are authorized by § 22 (f) and, if so, whether they
are immune from antitrust sanction. Resolution of
these issues will be facilitated by examining the nature of
the problems and abuses to which § 22 is addressed, a
matter to which we now turn.

B
The most thorough description of the sales and distribution practices of mutual funds prior to passage of the
Investment Company Art may be found in Part III of
the Investment Trust Study.14 That study, as Congress
1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77a; Investment Company Act, 15 U. S. C.
§ 80a-24 (a), and must submit for SEC inspection copies of the
sales literature they send to prospective investors. I d., § 80a-24 (b).
The Investment Company Act requires the submission and periodic
updating of detailed financial reports and documentation and the
semiannual transmission of reports containing similar information
to the shareholders. /d ., § 80a-29. It also imposes controls and
restrictions on the internal management of investment companies:
establishing minimum capital requirements, id., § 80a-14; limiting
permissible methods for selecting directors, id., § 80a-16; and establi::;hing certain qualifications for persons seeking to affiliate with
thE' companiPs, id., § 80a-9. Fmally, the Act imposes a number of controls on the internal practices of investment companies.
For example, it requires a majority shareholder vote for certain
fundamental business decisions, id., § 30a-13, and limits certain
dividend distributions, id., § 80a-19. See generally, the Mutual Fund
Industry: A Legal Survey, 44 Notre Dame Law. 732 (1969).
14 SEC Report on Investment Trusts and Investment Companies,
H. R. Doc. No. 279, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1940) (The Investment
Trust Study) . In this opinion we will refer primarily to Part III of
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has recognize~, see 15 U. S. C. § 80a-1, forms the initial
basis for any evaluation of the Act.
Prior to 1940 the basic framework for the primary distribution of mutual-fund shares was similar to that existing today. The fund normally retained a principal
underwriter to serve as a wholesaler of its shares. The
principal underwriter in turn contracted with a number
of broker-dealers to sell tho fund's shares to the investing public. 15 The price of the shares was based on the
fund's net asset value at the approximate time of sale,
and a sales commission or load was added to that price.
Although prior to 1940 the primary distribution system for mutual-fund shares was similar to the present
one, a number of conditions then existed that largely
disappeared following passage of the Act. The most
prominently discussed characteristic was the "twoprice system," which encouraged an active secondary
market under conditions that tolerated disruptive
and discriminatory trading practices. The two-price
system reflected the relationship between the commonly used method of computing the daily net asset
value of mutual-fund shares and the manner in which
the price for the following day was established. The net
the Study, and all citations w111 be to that part unless otherwise
designated. For aciditional discussion of the operations of open-end
management investment companies, see 1974 Staff Report; SEC
Report of the Staff on the Potential Economic Impact of a Repeal
of § 22 (d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (November
1972); SEC Report on Public Policy Implications of Investment
Company Growth, H. R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966)
(hereinafter the 1966 SEC Report); SEC Report of the Special
Study of Securities Markets, c. XI, Open-End Investment Companies (Mutual Funds), H. R. Doc. No. 95, pt. 4, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1963) (hereinafter 1963 Special Study).
15 The broker-dealers oprrn ting within the primary distribution
system are denominated "contract dealers" in the Study and will be·
so identified in this opimon
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asset value of mutual funds, which depends on the mar·
ket quotations of the stocks in their investment portfolios, fluctuates constantly. Most funds computed their
net asset values daily on the basis of the fund's portfolio
value at the close of exchange trading, and that figure
established the sales price that would go into effect at a
specified hour on the following day. During this interim
period two prices were known: the present day's trading
price based on the portfolio value established the previous day; and the following day's price, which was based
on the net asset value computed at the close of exchange
trading on the present day. One aware of both prices
could engage in "riskless trading" during this interim
period. See Investment Trust Study, at 851-852.
The two-price system did not benefit the investing
public generally. Some of the mutual funds did not
explain the system thoroughly, and unsophisticated investors probably were unaware of its 6xistence. See id.,
at 867. Even investors who knew of the two-price
system and understood its operation were rarely in a
position to exploit it fully. It was possible, however,
for a knowledgeable investor to purchase shares in a rising market at the current price with the advance information that the next day's price would be higher. He
thus could be guaranteed an immediate appreciation in
the market value of his investment/6 although this advantage was obtained at the expense of the existing share1 6 The Study indicates that mutual funds increasingly began to
disclose more information about the existence and operation of the
two-price system. See Investment Trust Study, at 867-868. And
in some instances the funds encouraged broker-dealers to explain
to potential incoming investors the immrdiate appreciation in investment value that could be obtained from the pricing system in
the hope of encouraging the purchase of shares. I d., at 854. See
1940 Senate Hearings, pt. 1, at 138.
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holders, whose equity interests were diluted by a corresponding amount. 17 The load fee that was charged
in the sale of mutual funds to the investing public made
it difficult for these investors to realize the "paper gain"
obtained in such trading. Because the daily fluctuation
in net asset value rarely exceeded the load, public investors generally were una~le to realize immediate profits
from the two-price system by engaging in rapid in-andout trading. But insiders, who often were able to purchase shares without paying the load, did not operate
under this constraint. Thus insiders could, and sometimes did, purchase shares for immediate redemption at
the appreciated value. See n. 24, infra, and sources
cited therein.
The two-price system often afforded other advantages
to underwriters and broker-dealers. In a falling market
they could enhance profits by waiting to fill orders with
shares purchased from the fund at the next day's anticipated lower price. In a similar fashion, in a rising market they could take a "long position" in mutual-fund
shares by establishing an inventory in order to satisfy
anticipated purchases w1th securities previously obtained
at a lower price. I d., at 854-855. In each case the
investment company would receive the lower of the two
prevailmg prices for its shares, id., at 854, and the equity
interests of shareholders would suffer a corresponding
dilution.
As a result, an active secondary market in mutualfund shares existed. !d., at 865-867. Principal underwriters and contract broker-dealers often maintained
17 The existing shareholders' eqmty !nterests were diluted because
the incoming investors bought mto the fund at less than the actual
value of the shares at tlw tune of purcha~. Moreover, SEC testimony indicated that this dilution could be substantial. In one
instancr the Commis;;ion calrulatcd that the two-price system re!'lUlted in a loss to existmg shareholders of one trust of some $133,000
in a single day. !d., at 139-140.
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inventory positions established by purchasing shares
through the primary distribution system and by buying from other dealers and retiring shareholders." 8 Additionally, a "bootleg market" sprang up, comprised
of broker-dealers having no contractual relationship with
the fund or its principal underwriter. These bootleg
dealers purchased shares at a discount from contract
dealers or bought them from retiring shareholders at a
price slightly higher than the redemption price. Bootleg
dealers would then offer the shares at a price slightly
lower than that required in the primary distribution system, thus "initiating a small scale price war between retailers and tend[ing] generally to disrupt the established
offering price." I d., at 865.
Section 22 of the Investment Company Act of 1940
was enacted with these abuses in mind. Sections 22 (a)
and (c) were designed ~o "elimina t [e] or red uc [ e] as
far as reasonably practicable any dilution of the value
of other outstanding securities , . . or any other result of
[the] purchase, redemption or sale [of mutual fund
securities] which is unfair to holders of such other outstanding securities," 15 U.S. C. § 80a-22 (a). They authorize the N ASD and the SEC to regulate certain pricing and trading practices in order to effectuate that
goal. 19 Section 22 (b) authorizes registered securities
18 Contract dealers tradmg from an mventory position often could
obtain an additional profit from the sales load. When the dealer
acted as an agent for the fund and traded from the primary distribution system, the dealer and ihe underwriter divided the load
charge in accordance with the sales agreement . But the dealer
could retain the full load when he fillPd the purchase order from an
inventory position in shares purclvtsed from retiring shareholders
or other dealers. !d., at 858-859.
w SectiOns 22 (a) and (c) refiect the same basie relationship between
the SEC and the NASD that 1s \'~tahli ~ lwd by the Maloney Act.
Eke n. 6, supra. Sectwn :J2 (a) anthonze ~ rPgibterecl securities a::;~<ori-·
ations, in thi'> ca::;e the NASD , to prPscnbe rules for the regulation of
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associations and the SEC to prescribe the maximum
sales commissions or loads that can be charged in connection with a primary distribution; and ~ 22 (e) protects the right of redemption by restricting mutual funds'
power to suspend redemption or postpone the date of
payment.
The issues presented in this litigation revolve around
subsections (d) and (f) of § 22. Bearing in mind the
history and purposes of the Investment Company Act,
we now consider the effect of these subsections on the
question of potential antitrust liability for the practices
here challenged.

III
Section 22 (d) prohibits mutual funds from selling
shares at other than the current public offering price to
any person except either to or through a principal underwriter for distribution. It further commands that "no
these matters. 15 U. S. C. § 80a-22 (:1). The mdustry thus is
afforded the initial opportunity to police its own practices. If, however, industry self-regulation proves insufficient, § 22 (c) authorizes
the Commission to make rules and regulations "cowring the same
subject matter, and for the accomplishment of the ~ame ends as are
prescribed in subsection (a)," and proclaims that the SEC rules and
regulations supersede any incon~istent rules of the regi~tered secunt,es associatiOn. Id., § SOa-22 (c).
Shortly after enactment of the Investment Company Act the
NASD propo5ed, and the SEC approved, a rule establishing twicedaily pricing. See Proposed Amendment to the Rules of Fair
Practice of the NASD, Inc., 9 S. E. C. 38 (1941) . Twice-daily
pncing reduced the time penod in which persons could engage in
nskless trading and correspondingly drrrcascd the potential for
dilution. The CommiAsJon subsequently prm·idcd full protcctwn
against the diluhve effects of ri:-:klcss tradmg . In late 1968 it cxercJsed its authority under § 22 (c) to bdopt Rule 22c-1, which requires all funds to establish "forward priring ," Forwnrd priring
eliminates the potential for risldcss trading :1ltogether. Sec Adoptwn
of Rule 22c-1, Inv. Co. Art Rcl. No. 5519 (1968), CCII Fed. Sec . L
Rep. fi77,616; 17 CFR §270,22c-l.
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dealer shall sell [mutual fund shares] to any person except a dealer, a principal underwriter, or the issuer,
except at a. current public offering price described in the
prospectus." 15 U. S. S. § 80a-22 (d). 20 By its terms,
§ 22 (d) excepts interdealer sales from its price maintenance requirement. Accordingly, this section cannot be
relied upon by appellees as justification for the restrictions imposed upon interdealer transactions. At issue,
rather, is the narrower question whether the § 22 (d)
price maintenance mandate for sales by "dealers" applies to transactions in which a broker-dealer acts
as a statutory "broker" rather than a statutory "dealer."
The District Court concluded that it does, and thus that
§ 22 (d) governs transactions in which the broker-dealer
acts as an agent for an investor as well as those in which
he acts as a principal selling shares for his own account.
A
The District Court's decision reflects an expansive
view of § 22 (d). The Investment Company Act specifically defines "broker" and "dealer" 21 and uses the
20 Tins section provides m pertinent part:
"No registered investment company shall sell any redeemable
security issued by it to any person except either to or through a
principal underwnter for distribution or at a current public offermg price described in the pro8pectus, and, if such class of security
is bemg currently offered to the public by or through an underwriter, no principal underwriter of such security and no dealer
shall sell any such secunty to any person except a dealer, a princip~l underwriter, or the issuer, except at a current public offering
price described in the prospectus." 15 U. S. C. § 80a-22 (d).
21 The Investment Company Act detines a "dealer" to be :
"[A]ny per:.;on regHlarl~· rngagrcl m the business of buying and
sellmg securities for his own account, through a broker or otherwise,
but does not include a bank, msuranre company, or investment company, or any person insofar as he is engaged in investing, reinvesting,
or trading in :;ccuriti<'s, or in owning or holding 8ecurities, for his
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terms distinctively throughout. 22 Appellees maintain 1
however, that the defintion of "dealer" is sufficiently
broad to require price maintenance in brokerage transactions. In support of this position appellees assert that
the critical elements of the dealer definition are that
the term relates to a "person" rather than to a transaction and that the person must engage "regularly" in
the sale and purchase of securities to qualify as a dealer.
It is argued, therefore, that any person who purchase~
and sells securities with sufficient regularity to qualify as
a statutory dealer is thereafter bound by all dealer restrictions, regardless of the nature of the particular
transaction in question. We do not :find this argument
persuasive.
Appellees' reliance on the statutory reference to "person" in defining dealer adds little to the analysis, for the
Act defines "broker," "investment banker," "issuer,"
"underwriter," and others to be "pel'sons" as well. See id.;
§§ SOa-2 (a) ( 6), (21), (22), & ( 40). In each instance, the
own account, either individually or in some fiduciary capacity, but
hot as a part of a regular business." 15 U S. C. § SOa-2 (a) (11).
A "broker," by contrast, is defined to be·:
"[A]ny person engaged in the l.msine~s of effecting transactions in
securities for the account of others, but does not include a bank or
any persoii solely by feaSou of the fact that such person is an
underwriter for one br more investment companies." !d., § SOa-2
(a)(6) .
22 Congress employed the term "broker" without reference to
"dealer" in various sections of the Act~ See id., §§ SOa-3 (c) (2);
80a-10 (b) (1); SOa-17 (e) (l) and (2) , In other instances, the Act
refers to "deaier" without reference to "broker," see id., §§ SOa-2 (a)
(40); SOa-22 (c) and (d). And in some cases, including the very
definition of the term "dealer" itself, sec n. 21, supra, the Act refers
td both "bfoker" and "dealer'' in the same provision, see id., §§ 80a-i
(b) (2); 80a-9 (a) (1) and (2) , and SOa-30 (a). Finally, the Act
in some cases refers to the more general term "broker-dealer," see
id.; §§ 80a-22 (b) (1) and (2).
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critical distinction relates to their transactional capacity.
Moreover, we think that appellees reliance on the regularity requirement in the dealer definition places undue
emphasis on that element at the expense of the remainder
of the provision. On the face of the statute the most
apparent distinction between a broker and a dealer is that
the former effects transactions for the account of others·
and the latter buys and sells securities for his own account.
We therefore cannot agree that the terms of the Act
compel the conclusion that a broker-dealer acting in a
brokerage capacity would be bound by the § 22 (d)'
dealer mandate. Indeed, the language of the Act sugge~ts the opposite result.
Even if we assume, arguendo, that the statutory definition is ambiguous, we find nothing in the extensive·
contemporaneous legislative history of the Investment
Company Act to justify interpreting § 22 (d) to encompass brokered transactions. That history is sparse, 23 and
28 The original Commission-sponsored bill considered in the initial
hearings before the Senate Banking and Commerce Subcommittee,
S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940), contained no provision resemhling this subsection. Section 22 (d) first emerged in a compromise
proposal advanced after a period of intensive consultation between
the SEC and industry representatives that followed initial Senate
hearings, see Hl40 Senate Hearings, pt. 4, at 1105-1107, and the
C::Jmmission subsequently has indicated that this provision was suggested by the industry. See Midamerica Mutual Fund, 41 S. E. C.
328, 331 (1963); 1966 Public Policy Study, at 219. Revised legislation reflecting this compromise was submitted, and further hearings
were conducted in the Senate and the House. Both bills were
reported favorably by their respective committees, S. Rep. No. 1775,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940); H. R. Rep. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d
Sess. (1940), and the House bill, with minor amendments not relevant to this appeal, was accepted by the Senate. 86 Cong. Rec.
10069-10071.
This history perhaps explains the dearth of discussion relating
to § 22 (d). 'l'he majority of the Senate hearings were completed'.

I

,'•

,,
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suggests only that § 22 (d) was considered necessary to
curb abuses that had arisen in the sales of securities to
insiders as wcll,2 4
The prohibition against insider trading would seem
adequately served by the first clause of § 22 (d), which
prevents mutual funds from selling shares at other than
the public offering price to any person except a principal
underwriter or dealer. See n. 20, supra. 2 ~ The further
restriction on dealer sales bears little relation to insider
trading, however, and logically would be thought to serve
some other purpose. The obvious effect of the dealer
prohibition is to shield the primary distribution system
from the competitive impact of unrestricted dealer trading in the secondary markets, a concern that was reflected
before this provision was advanced, and both the Senate and House
hearings that followed provide relatively little illumination as to
the intended purpose or scope of this subsection.
24 Insider trading abuses were identified as a problem during the
Senate hearings that preceded submission of the compromise bill
containing§ 22 (d), see 1940 Senate Hearings, pt. 2, at 526-5p7 and
660-661. At the close of the initial Senate hearings an industry
representative suggested that the Act should contain a provision
prohibiting sales at preferential ternlS to insiders and others. Id.,
at 1057. The Commission and industry representatives thereafter
met to seek a compromise on the various differences that had
been identified in the Senate hearings, and the industry memorandum outlining the nature of the resultant agreement again indicated
that a provision should be added to the Act to prohibit insider
trading. See Framework of Proposed Investment Company Bill
(Title I), Memorandum Embodying Suggestions Resulting from Conference Between Securities and Exchange Commission and Representatives of Investment Companies (May 13, 1940), printed in
1940 House Hearings, at 99.
25 The insider trading prohibition is complimented by § 22 (g),
whJCh precludes issuance of mutual fund shares for services or
property other than cash or securities 15 U. S. C. § 80a-22 (g).
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in the Study, see Investment Trust Study, at 865. The
SEC perceives this to be one of the purposes of this
provision. 26
But concluding that protection of the primary distribution system is a purpose of § 22 (d) does little to resolve
the question whether Congress intended to require strict
price maintenance in all broker-dealer transactions with
the investing public. By its terms, § 22 (d) protects only
against the possibly disruptive effects of secondary dealer
sales which, as statutorily defined, constituted the most
active secondary market existing prior to the Act's passage. Nothing in the contemporary history suggests that
Congress was equally concerned with possible disruption
from investor transactions in outstanding shares conducted through statutory brokers.
Nor do we think that the history attending subsequent
congressional consideration of the Act provides adequate
support for appellees' contention that § 22 (d) requires
strict price maintenance in all broker-dealer transactions
in mutual-fund shares. To be sure, portions of the testi26 See Adoption of Rule N-22-D-1, Inv. Co. Act Rei. No. 2798,
p. 1 (1958), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 76,625, p. 80,393; Investors
Diversified Services Inc., Inv. Co. Act. Rrl. No. 3015 (1960), CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 176,699, p. 80,620; In re Sideris, Exch. Act Rei.
No. 8816, p. 2 (1970); Mutual Funds Advisory, Inc., Inv. Co. Act
Rei. No. 6932, p. 4 (1972).
The SEC also has suggested that preventing discrimination
among investors was one of the purposes of this provision. See,
e. (].,In re Sideris, supra,· Midamerica Mutual Fund, Inc., 41 S. E. C.
328, 331 (1963); Adoption of Rule N22-D-1, supra. But we do
not think that brokeragf' transactions inevitably would foster
the kind of investor discrimination sought to be remedied by this
statute. All investors would be equally free to seek to engage in
brokercd transactions, and the possibility that the more sophisticated or fortuitous investor would profit from this market does
not, by itself, bring this catrgory of transactions within the purview
of§ 22 (d).
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mony of SEC Chairman Cohen before the House
Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance in 1967 suggested that the price maintenance requirement of § 22
(d) encompassed all broker-dealers, irrespective of how
they obtained the traded shares, 27 and on other occasions
the Chairman referred to sales by brokers when discussing mutual fund transactions. 28 Appellees also can point
to congressional characterizations of § 22 (d) that suggest
that some members of Congress understood the reach of
that provision to be as broad as the District Court
thought. 29
Appellees maintain that this history indicates that
Congress always intended § 22 (d) to control broker as
well as dealer transactions, and that it re-enacted the
Responding to inquiries concerning the relationship of § 22 (d)
and the operation of state law, Chairman Cohen stated:
"The statute is unequivocal. No person, no matter where he gets
it, from the issuer, from another dealer, or even from a private person, no broker-dealer may sell a share of a particular fund at a
price less than that fixed by the issuer." 1967 House Hearings, pt.
2, at 711.
28 !d., pt. 1, at 53.
2
~ Senator Sparkman, Chairman of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee which reported the 1970 amendments to the full
E'enate, stated on the floor of the Senate that § 22 (d) "now makes
it a Federal crime for anyone to sell mutual fund shares a.t a price
lower than that fixed by the fund's distributor." 115 Cong. Rec. 838
(1969) (emphasis added). Senator Magnuson reflected perhaps a
similar view, stating that, as a result of§ 22 (d) "mutual fund shares
are totally insulated from price competition." 114 Cong. Rec. 23057
(1968) (emphasis added).
The testimony of some witnesses suggests that they shared this
expansive view. See, e. g., Hearings on S. 1659 before the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2,
at 741 (1967) (hereinafter 1967 Senate Hearings) (testimony of
Mr. Funston, President of the New York Stock Exchange); id.,
pt. 1, at 348, 356 (testimony of Professor Samuelson); id., p. 2,
.at 1064 (testimony of Professor Wallich).
27
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amended § 22 with that purpose in mind. The District Court accepted this position, and it is not without
some support in this historical record. 30 But impressive
evidence to the contrary is found in the position consistently maintained by the SEC. Responding to an inquiry
in 1941, the SEC General Counsel stated that § 22 (d)
did not bar brokerage transactions in mutual fund shares:
"In my opinion the term 'dealer,' as used in Section 22 (d), refers to the capacity in which a brokerdealer is acting in a particular transaction. It
follows, therefore, that if a broker-dealer in a particular transaction is acting solely in the capacity
of agent for a selling investor, or for both a selling
investor and a purchasing investor, the sale may be
made at a price other than the current offering price
described in the prospectus.
"On the other hand, if a broker-dealer is acting
for his own account in a transaction and as principal
sells a redeemable security to an investor, the public
offering price must be maintained, even though the
sale is made through another broker who acts as
agent for the seller, the investor, or both.
"As Section 22 (d) itself states, the offering price
is not required to be maintained in the case of sales
80

We conclude, however, that the context of the post-enactment
history of § 22 (d) limits the force of the statements relied upon by
appellees. A broker-dealer can serve in either a broker or a dealer's
capacity, and the distinction between the two functions is rather
technical and precise. The parties are in general agreement that
no significant number of brokered transactions, as statutorily defined, existed prior or subsequent to pm·sage of the Act. In view of
the care with which the statute drfines these functions and the
absence of focus on thesr distinction::; in the statements in the subsequent consideration of§ 22 (d), we think that the broader character~
izations of that sect~on must be viewed with some skepticism.
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in which both the buyer and the seller are dealers
acting as principals in the transactions." Inv. Co.
Act. Rei. No. 78, March 4, 1941, 11 Fed. Reg. 10992
( 1946).
This substantially contemporaneous interpretation of the
Act has consjstently been maintained in subsequent SEC
opinions, see Oxford, Co., Inc., 21 S. E. C. 681, 690
(1946); Mutual Funds Advisory, Inc., Inv. Co. Act. Rei.
No. 6932, at 3 ( 1972). The same position was asserted in a
recent Staff Report, see 1974 Staff Report, at 105 n. 2, 107
n. 2, and 109 (1974), was relied on by the SEC in its subsequent decision to encourage limited price competition
in brokered transactions, 31 and is advanced by it as amicus
curiae in this Court. This consistent and longstanding
interpretation by the agency charged with administration
of the Act, while not controlling, is entitled considerable weight. See, e. g., Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U. S. 65
(1974); Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401
Actmg m accordance with the recommendations of the Staff
Report, the SEC Chairman recently requested that the NASD
amend its Rules of Fair Practice to prohibit agreements between
underwriters and broker-dealrrs that preclude broker-dealers, acting
as agents, "from matching orders to buy and sell fund shares in a
&econdary market at comprtitively determmed prices and commission rates." Letter from Mr. Ray Garrett, Jr., Chairman of the
SEC to Mr. Gordon S. Mack!in, President of the NASD, November 22, 1974, printed in addendum to brief of appellees Bache &
Co., et al, at 18. The Chairman further rrvraled thE' SEC's intention to exerct.;e It~ regulatory authonty under § 22 (f) to neutralize any ad' crse effects this market might have on the
fund's prunarv dif'trihution sy~tem:-<. !d., at 19. As the Staff
Report indicates, the Commission's exercise of regulatory authority
iR premised on its view that § 22 (d) does not require strict price
maintenance in brokered transactions. See 1974 Staff Report, at
104. If § 22 (d) did r:ontrol these transactions as well as "dealer"
sales, the Commission's abihty to encotu·,tge controlled competition
in this market would bn snbject to question.
81
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U. S. 617, 626-627 (1971); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S.
1, 16 (1965).
B
The substance of appellees' position is that the dealer
prohibition of § 22 (d) should be interpreted in generic
rather than statutory terms. The price maintenance requirement of that section accordingly would encompass
all broker-dealer transactions with the investing public
and would shelter them from antitrust sanction. But
such an expansion of § 22 (d) beyond its terms would
not only displace the antitrust laws by implication; it
also would impinge seriously on the SEC's more flexible
regulatory authority under§ 22 (£). 32
Implied antitrust immunity is not favored, and can be
justified only by a convincing showing of clear repugnancy between the antitrust laws and the regulatory system. See, e. g., United States v. Philadelphia National
Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 348 (1963); United States v.
Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 197-206 (19·39). We think
no such showing has been made. Moreover, in addition to satisfying our responsibility to reconcile the
antitrust and regulatory statutes where feasible, Silver
v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U. S. 341, 356-357
(1963), we must interpret the Investment Company Act
82 The Department of Justice previously suggested a manner in
which its interpretation of § 22 (d) could be reconciled with the
Commission's exercise of regulatory authority over brokered transactions. Addressing the questiOn of possible repeal of § 22 (d), the
Justice Department suggested that rather than continue to wait
for congressional repeal, the Commission should eliminate the adverse
effects of price maintenance by freeing all transactions from the
§ 22 (d) mandate through the exercise of its§ 6 (c) power of exemption, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-6 (c). !d., at 70. This presumably would
leave the SEC free to regulate transactions through the exercise of
the powers conferred to it by other provisions of the Act. We need
not consider the validity of the Justice Department's broad interpretation of the SEC's power of exemption, for even assuming it
to be correct our analysis would not be affected.
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in a manner most conductive to the effectuation of its
goals. We conclude that appellee's interpretation of § 22
(d) serves neither purpose, and cannot be justified by the
language or history of that section.
We therefore hold that the price maintenance mandate
of § 22 (d) cannot be stretched beyond its literal terms
to encompass transactions by broker-dealers acting as
statutory "brokers." Congress defined the limitations
for the mandatory price maintenance requirement of the
Investment Company Act. "We are not only bound by
those limitations but we arc bound to construe them
strictly, since resale price maintenance is a privilege restrictive of a free economy." United States v. McKesson
& Robbins, 351 U. S. 305, 316 (1956). Accordingly, we
hold that the District Court erred in relying on § 22 (d)
in det ermining that the act ivities here questioned are
immune from antitrust liability.

IV
Our determination that the restrictions on the secondary market are not immunized by § 22 (d) does not end
the inquiry, for the District, Court also found them
sheltered from antitrust liability by § 22 (f). Appellees,
joie.ed by the SEC, defend this ruling and urge that it
requires dismissal of the challenge t o the vertical restrictions sought to be enJOined in Counts II- VIII.
Section 22 (f) authorizes mutual funds to impose
restrictions on the negotiability and transferability of their
shares, provided they conform with the fund's registration statement and do not contravene any rules
and regulations the f'ommission may prescribe in the
interests of the holders of all of the outstanding securities.33 Appellant docs not contend that the vertical
33 Section 22 (f) of the Act, 15 U S. C. § 80a-22 (f) , provides :
'No registered open-end comJYWY shall restrict the t ransferability
or negotiability of any ~ecurity of which it is the issuer except in
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restrictions are not disclosed in the registration statements of the funds in question. Nor does it assert that
the agreemen · · imposing such restrictions violate Commission rules and regulations. Indeed, it could not do so,
because to date the SEC has prescribed no such standards. Instead appellant maintains that the contractual
restrictions do not come within the meaning of the Act,
asserting that § 22 (f) does not authorize the imposition
of restraints on the distribution system rather than on the
shares themselves. Appellant thus apparently urges that
the only limitations contemplated by this section are
those that appear on the face of the certificate itself.
Appellant also urges that the SEC's unexercised power
to prescribe rules and regulations is insufficient to create
repugnancy between its regulatory authority and the
antitrust laws.
Our examination of the language and history of§ 22 (f)
persuades us, however, that the agreements challenged
in Counts II-VIII are among the kinds of restrictions
Congress contemplated when it enacted that section. And
this conclusion necessarily leads to a determination that
they are immune from liability under the Sherman Act,
for we see no way to reconcile the Commission's power
to authorize these restrictions with the competing mandate of the antitrust laws.

A
Unlike § 22 (d), § 22 (f) originated in the Commissionsponsored bill considered in the Senate subcommittee
hearings that preceded introduction of the compromise
proposal later enacted into law. The Commissionconformity with the statements with respect thereto contained in
its registration statement nor in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe in the interests of
the holders of all of the outstanding securities of such investment
company!'
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sponsored provision authorized the SEC to promulgate rules, regulations or orders prohibiting restrictions
on the transferability or negotiability of mutual fund
shares, S. 3580, § 22 (d) (2), 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).34
Commission testimony indicates that it considered this
authority necessary to allow regulatory control of industry measures designed to deal with the disruptive effects
of "bootleg market" trading and with other detrimental
trading practices identified in the Investment Trust
Study. 35
Section 22 (d) of the original bill, S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess,
(1940), provided, in pertinent part:
"The Commission is authorized, by rules and regulations or order
in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to prohibit34

"(2) restrictions upon the transferability of negotiability of any
redeemable security of which any registered investment company is
the issuer."
85 Testifying before the Senate Subcommittee, an SEC spokesman
stated:
"Now coming to subparagraph (2) of (d), it just says that the
Commission shall have the right to make rules and regulations with
respect to any restrictions upon the transferability or negotiability
of any redeemable security of which any registered investment
company is the issuer.
"There are some companies that have a provision in their certificates to the effect that you cannot sell that certificate to anybody
else, and the only way you can sell it is to sell it back to the company. That is a technical problem. It presents a whole problem
which they call the bootleg market. What happens is that dealers
keep switching people from one company to another. In order to
prevent these switches, some provisions require that you cannot
make these switches but must sell the certificate back to the
company.
"If the committee wants the provision, we shall recommend what,
on the basis of our experience up to the present time, it ought to be;
but we think subjects like that ought to be a matter of rules and
regulations." 1940 Senate Hearings, pt. 1, at 292-293.
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The Study indicates, moreover, that a number of funds
had begun to deal with these problems prior to passage
of the Act. And while their methods may have included
the imposition of restrictive legends on the face of the
certificate, see n. 35, supra, they were by no means confined to such narrow limits. A number of funds imposed
controls on the activities of their principal underwriters,
see Investment Trust Study, at 868-869; and in some
instances the funds required the underwriters to impose
similar restrictions on the dealers, see id., at 869, or entered
into these restrictive agreements with the dealers themselves, id., at 870-871.
In view of the history of the Investment Company
Act, we find no justification for limiting the range of
possible transfer restrictions to those that appear on the
face of the certificate. The bootleg market was primarily a problem of the distribution system, and bootleg
dealers found a source of supply in the contract-dealers
as well as in retiring shareholders. See id., at 865.
Moreover, the Study indicates that part of the bootleg
distribution system consisted of "trading firms" that
served as wholesalers of mutual-fund securities in much
the same fashion as the principal underwriters. These
trading firms primarily purchased and sold shares to and
from other dealers, id., pt II, at 327, frequently offering
them at a price slightly lower than the discounted rate
charged to dealers in the primary distribution system.
Id., at 327-328. Thus trading firms not only helped
supply the bootleg dealers whose sales undercut those of
the contract-dealers, they competed with the principal
underwriters by offering a source for lower cost shares
that inevitably discouraged participation in the primary
distribution system. See id., at 328 n. 85.
The bootleg market was a complex phenomenon whose

73-1701--0PINION
28

U. S. v. NATIONAL ASSN. SECURITIES DEALERS

principal origins lay in the distributio~ system itself. In
view of this history, limitation of the industry's ability,
subject of course to SEC regulation, to reach these problems at their source would constitute an inappropriate
contraction of the remedial function of the statute. 30 Indeed, in view of the role of trading firms and interdealer
transactions in the maintcuance of the bootleg market,
the narrow interpretation of § 22 (f) urged by appellant
would seem to afford inadequate authority to deal with
the problem.
Together, §§ 22 (d) and 22 (f) protect the primary
distribution system for mutual-fund securities. Section
22 (d), by eliminating price competition in dealer sales,
inhibits the most disruptive factor in the pre-1940's
mutual market a.nd thus assu!'es the maintenance of a
viable sales system. Section 22 (f) compliments this
protection by authorizing the funds and the SEC to deal
more flexibly with other detrimental trading practices by
imposing SEC-approved restrictions on transferability
and negotiability. Appellant's limiting interpretation of
§ 22 (f) compromises this flexible mandate, and cannot
be accepted.
We find support for our interpretation of § 22 (f)
in the views expressed by the SEC shortly after the
p2.ssage of the Act. Rule 26 (j) (2), proposed by NASD
to curb abuses identified in the Study and the congressional hearings, provided limitations on underwriter
86 Neither are we convu1ccd of the necessity to limit negotiability
or transferability restrictions to those appearing on the face of the
certificate in order to assure their adequate disclosure to investors.
Section 24 of the Act requires that mutual funds submit for SEC
inspection copies of all sales literature that they send to prospective
investors. 15 U. S. C. § 80a-24 (b) The Commission is therefore
fully apprised as to the nature and sufficiency of the disclosure of
these restrictions and can, 1f necessary, require supplementation
of the information provided inveKtors.

73-1701-0PINION
U. S. v. NATIONAL ASSN. SECURITIES DEALERS

2g

sales and redemptions to or from dealers who are not
parties to sales agreements. In commenting on this proposed rule, the SEC characterized it as a "restriction
on the transferability of securities," and specifically
averted to its power to regulate such restrictions under'
22 (f). National Association of Securities Dealers,
9 S. E. C. 38, 44-45 and n. 10 (1941). As indicated
above, see supra, at 22, and sources there cited, this contemporaneous interpretation by the responsible agency
is entitled to considerable weight. We therefore conclude that the restrictions on transferability and negotiability contemplated by § 22 (f) include restrictions on
the distribution system for mutual-fund shares as well
as limitations on the face of the shares themselves. The
narrower interpretation of this provision advanced by
appellant would disserve the broad remedial function of
the statute. 37
87 Neither do we agree With appellant's Ruggestion that § 22 (f)
does not authorize restrictions in contracts between underwriters·
and dealers in which the fund is not a p!Lrty. We note, preliminarily, that this position would not save Counts III, V, and VII
from dismissal, since they relate to restrictions on underwriter conduct that are imposed by the fund. Even under the most technical
reading of the statute these restrictions are "fund-imposed."
1\1oreover, it further appears from the complaint that the agreement challenged in Count II is required by the fund-underwriter
agreement challenged iu Count III and thus also is "fund-imposed"
in any but the most literal sense. More importantly, however, we
thmk that appellant's position fails to recognize the relationship between the various participants in the distribution chain. As the
history of the Investment Company Act recognizes, the relationship between the fund and its principal underwriter traditionally ha,s
been a close one. Sections 15 (b) and (c) reflect this fact, requiring,
m effect, that funds rstablish written contracts with the underwriter that must be approved by a majority of the fund's disinterested directors and cannot remain in force for more than two·
years. 15 U.S. C. §§ 80n.-15 (b) and (c). And NASD Rule 26 (c) ,.
in effect since 1941, requires that principal underwriters enter intQ!

';
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Appellant's additional contention that the SEC's exercise of regulatory authority has been insufficient to give
rise to an implied immunity for agreements conforming
with § 22 (f) misconceives the intended operation of the
statute. Hy its terms. § 22 (f) authorizes properly
disclosed n ,trictions unless they are inconsistent with
SEC rules or regulations. The provision thus authorizes
funds to impose transferability or negotiability restrictions. subject to Commission disapproval. In view of the
evolution of this provision, there can be no doubt that
this is precisely what Congress intended.
Section 22 (f) as originally introduced would have
authorized the SEC to promulgate rules, regulations
or orders prohibiting restrictions on the redeemability
or transferability of mutual-fund shares. Congressional
consideration of that provision raised some question
whether existing restrictions on transferability and negotiability would remain valid unless specifically disapproved by the SEC. 38 The compromise provision, which
subsequently was enacted into law, eliminated this uncertainty, however, and manifested a more positive attitude
toward self-regulation.
Thus § 22 (f) specifically recognizes that mutual
funds can impose such restrictions on the distribution
system provided they are disclosed in the rPgistration
statement and conform to any rules and regulations that
the SEC might adopt. In addition, § 22 (f) alters the
focus of Commission scrutiny. Whereas the original
provision allowed the SEC to make rules that serve "the
public interest and . . . the protection of investors,"
agreements with the dealers who chstribute the fund's securities.
See National Association of Securities Dealers, 9 S. E. C. 38, 44, 48
(1941) In view of these requirements, and the broad remedial
purpose of § 22 (f) , we think that the underwriter-dealer agreements challenged m this complaint also must be regarded as fundimpo~ed within the contempbt10n of the statute.
B' Ser 1940 Senat<.' Hearings, pt. 1 'lt 293.
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S. 3.5~0, § 22 (d) (2), supra, § 22 (f) as enacted limits
the C , mission's rulemaking authority to the protection
of the ''interests of the holders of all of the outstanding
securities of such investment company." 15 U. S. C.
§ 80a-22 (f). Viewed in this historical context, the
statute reflects a clear congressional determination that,
subject to Commission oversight, mutual funds should
be allowed to retain the initiative in dealing with the
potentially adverse effects of disruptive trading practices.
The Commission repeatedly has recognized the role
of private agreements in the control of trading practices
in the mutual fund industry. For example, in First
Multifund of America, I nc. 1 Inv. Co. Act Rei. No. 6700
(1971), F. Sec. L. Rep. 1178,209, at 80,602, it looked to
restrictive agreemei1ts similar to those challenged in this
litigation to ascertain an investment advisor's capacity
in a particular transaction. At no point did it intimate
that those agreements were not legitimate. 39 Likewise,
Commission reports repeatedly have acknowledged the
significant role that private agreements have played in
restricting the growth of a secondary market in mutualfund shares. 40 Until recently the Commission has al89 Commissioner Loomis, disRenting from an SEC determination
that an applicant lacked standing to seek an exemption from §§ 17
(a) (1) and 22 (d) of the Act, stated,
"I would conclude that applicant is a dealer in its relationship with
the fund underwriter because to do otherwise would require us to
Ignore or nullify the perfectly lawful requirement in the dealer
agreements that applicant act as a dealer. . . . rrJ do not know
of anything unlawful about the generally accepted form of dealer
agreement used m the investment company industry." Mutual
Funds Advisory, Inc., Inv. Co. Act. Rei. No. 6932, at 7 (1972)
(dissenting opinion)
While the majority disagrerd with Commissioner Loomis' assessment
of the facts of the case, it did not question his approval of the·
mentiOned dealrr agreement.
111
Hre 1963 Spreial Study, at 98; 1974 Staff Report, at 104-106...
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lowed the industry to control the secondary market through
contractual restrictions duly filed and publicly disclosed.
Even the SEC's recently expressed intention to introduce
an element of competition in brokered transactions reflects measured caution as to the possibly adverse impact
of a totally unregulated and restrained brokerage market
on the primary distribution system. See n. 31, supra.
The Commission's acceptance of fund-initiated restrictions for more than three decades hardly represents abdication of its regulatory responsibilities. Rather, we
think it manifests an informed administrative judgment
that the contractual restrictions employed by the funds
to protect their shareholders were appropriate means for
combatting the problems of the industry. The SEC's
election not to initiate restrictive rules or regulations is
precisely the kind of administrative oversight of privat~
practices that Congress contemplated when it enacted
§ 22 (f).
We conciude, therefore, that the vertical restrictions
sought to be enjoined in ,Counts II-VIII arc among the
kinds of agreements authorized § 22 (f) of the Investment Company Act.
B
The agreements questioned by the United States restrict the terms under which the, appellee underwriters
and broker-dealers may trade in shares of mutual funds.
Such restrictions, affecting resale price maintenance and
concerted refusal~ to deal, normally would constitute per
se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act. See, e. g., Klor,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211-213
(1959); Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v.
Federal Trade Commission, 312 U. S. 457, 465-468
(1941). Here, however, Congress has made a judgment
that these restrictions on competition might be necessita ted by the unique problems of the mutual fund in ..
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dustry, and has vested in the SEC final authority to
determine whether and to what extent they should be
tolerated "in the interests of the holders of all the outstanding securities" of mutual funds. 15 U. S. C. § 80a22 (f).
The SEC, the federal agency responsible for regulating
the conduct of the mutual-fund industry, urges that its
authority will be compromised seriously if these agreements are deemed actionable under the Sherman Act. 41
We agree. There can be no reconciliation of its authority under § 22 (f) to permit these and similar restrictive agreements with the Sherman Act's declaration that
they are illegal per se. In this instance the antitrust
laws must give way i.f the regulatory scheme established
by the Investment Company Act is to work. Silver v.
New York Stock Exchange, supra. We conclude, therefore, that such agreements are not actionable under the
Sherman Act, and that the District Court properly dismissed Counts II-VIII.

v

It remains to be determined whether the District
Court properly dismissed Count I of appellant's complaint, which charged activities allegedly constituting a
horizontal conspiracy between the NASD and its members to "prevent the growth of a secondary dealer market
and a brokerage market in the purchase and sale of
mutual fund shares." App. 9.
41

In its brief to this Court, the SEC maintains:
"It would nullify the effect of this grant of regulatory authority to the Commission [under § 22 (f)] for this Court to
hold that a di::itrict court may apply antitrust principles to conduct like that alleged in Counts II through VIII, when the expert
body designated and empowered by Congress to regulate and
supervise that conduct has not deemed it appropriate to prohibit
the conduct ." Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission as
Amtcus Curiae, at 54.
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The precise nature of tho allegations of the complaint
are obscured by subsequent concessions made by appellant to the District Court and reiterated here. It is
clear, however, that C'ount 1 alleges activities that are
neither required by § 22 (d) nor authorized under § 22'
(f). And since they cannot find antitrust shelter in
these provisions of the Investment Company Act, the
question presented is whether the SEC's exercise of regulatory authority under this statute and the Maloney
Act is sufficiently pervasive to confer an implied immunity. We hold that it is, and accordingly affirm the
District Court's dismissal of this portion of the complaint.
Count I originally appeared to be a general attack on
the N ASD's role in encouraging the restrictions on secondary market activities challenged in the remainder of
appellant's complaint. The acts charged in Count I
focused in large part on NASD rules. and on information
distributed by that association to its members.u Subse42

The complamt averred that, in effectuating the conspiracy to
restrain the growth of a secondary market in mutual-fund shares,
the NASD, its members, and more particularly the other named
defendants,
"(a} established and maintained rules whJCh inhibited the developmeut of a secondary dealer market and a brokerage market in
mutual fund shares,
''(b) established and m~intainPd rules wh1ch induced broker/
dealers to enter mto sales agreements w1th principal underwriters,
with knowledge that sales agreements contained restrictive provisions
winch inhibited the development of a secondary dealer market and
brokerage market in mutual fund shares,
" (c) induced member principal underwntcrs to include restrictive
provi~ions in their sales agreements ,
" (d) discourr.ged per~ons who made inqmry about the legality of
a brokrrage market from pariic1patmg m a brokerage market and
distributed mJslcadmg information to 1ts members concerning the
]pgahty of a brokerage market in mutual fund shares; and
"(c) suppre.sed market quotatiOns for the secondary dealer
markr>t " App. 9.
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quently appellant advised the District Court that its
complaint was not to be read as a direct attack on NASD
rules, however, and it repeated that position before this
Court. 43 Appellant now contends that its complaint
should be interpreted as a challenge to various unofficial
NASD interpretations and to appellees' extension of the
rules in a manner that inhibit a secondary market.
In view of the scope of the SEC's regulatory authority
over the activities of the NASD, appellant's decision to
withdraw from direct attack on the association's rules
was prudent. The SEC's supervisory authority over the
NASD is extensive. Not only does the Maloney Act
require the SEC to determine whether an association
48

Appellant first indicated abandonment of its attack on the
NASD rules during oral argument of appellees' motion to dismiss. See App. 328--332. Notwithstanding clauses (a) and (b) of
paragraph 17 of the complaint, see n. 42, s'upra, appellant's counsel
stated that it did not intend to challenge any NASD rule, app. 330.
Counsel ambiguously suggested, however, that the members' compliance with those rules had aided and abetted alleged the conspiracy,
id.1 at 332, and stated that informal and secret activities of the
association likewise had tended to inhibit growth of the secondary
market, id., at 330. Thereafter, in response to the District Court's
invitation to join in the litigation as amicus curiae, the SEC expressed its concem that the action might involve an attack on NASD
rules, a matter "over which the Commission is granted exclusive
jurisdiction by Section 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U. S. C. § 78o-3 et seq. (the Maloney Act)." Letter from Mr.
Lawrence E. Nerheim, General Counsel of the SEC to the District
Court. App. 323. Appellant thereafter informed the court that
the issues it sought to raise did not represent "an attack upon
NASD Rules as such" but rather "aimed at an over-all course of
conduct engaged in by the NASD and its members going beyond the
NASD's rule-making authority." Letter from Mr. Bruce B. Wilson,
Acting Asst. Attorney General for the Antitrust Division to the
District Co,lrt. App. 327. It maintains the same position in
this Court. See Brief for the United States, at 51 n. 47 .

.

I
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satisfies the strict statutory requirements of that Act
and thus qualifies to eiJgage in supervised regulation of
the trading activities of its membership, 15 U. S. C.
§ 78o-3 (b), it requires registered associations thereafter
to submit fo~ Commission approval any proposed rule
changes, id., § 78o-3 (j). The Maloney Act additionally
authorizes the SEC to request changes in or supplementation of association rules, a power that recently has been
exercised with respect to some of the precise conduct
questioned in this litigation, see n. 31, supra. If such a
request is not complied with, the SEC may order such
changes itself. I d. , § 78o-3 (k) (2).
The SEC, in its exercise of authority over association
rules and practices, is charged with protection of the
public interest as well as the interests of shareholders,
see, e. g., 15 U. S. C. §§ 78o-3 (a)( 1), (b)(3), (c),
and it repeatedly has indicated that it weighs competitive concerns in the exercise of its continued supervisory
responsibility. See, e. g., In re Nat. Assn. of Securities
Dealers, Inc., 18 S. E. C. 424, 236, 486-486-487 (1945);
Proposed Amendment to Th e Rules of Fair Practice of
Nat. Assn. of Securities Dealers, Inc., 9 S. E. C. 38, 43-46
(1941); see also 1974 Staff Report, at 105, 109·. As the
Court previously has recognized, United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 227 n. 60 (1940), the
investiture of such pervasive supervisory authority in
the SEC suggests that Congress intended to lift the ban
of the Sherman Act from association activities approved
by the SEC.
We further conclude that appellant's attack on NASD
interpretations of those rules cannot be maintained under
the Sherman Act, for we see no meaningful distinction
between the association's rules and the manner in which
It construes and implements them. Each is equally a
subject of SEC oversight.
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Finally, we hold that appellant's additional challenges
to the alleged activities of the membership of the
N ASD designed to encourage the kinds of restraints
averred in Counts II-VIII likewise are precluded
by the regulatory authority vested in the SEC by
the Maloney and Investment Company Acts. It
should be noted that appellant does not contend that
appellees' activities have had the purpose or effect of
restraining competition among the various funds:u Instead, appellant urges in Count I that appellees' alleged
conspiracy was designed to encourage the suppression of
intrafund secondary market activities, precisely the restriction that the SEC consistently has approved pursuant to § 22 (f) for nearly 35 years. This close relationship is fatal to appellant's complaint, as the Commission's regulatory approval of the restrictive agreements
challenged in Counts II-VIII cannot be reconciled with
appellant's attack on the ancillary activities averred in
Count I. And this conclusion applies with equal force
now that the SEC has determined to introduce a controlled measure of competition into the secondary market.
There can be little question that the broad regulatory
authority conferred upon the SEC by the Maloney and
Investment Company Acts enables it to monitor the
activities questioned in Count I, and the history of Commission regulations suggests no laxness in the exercise
of this authority. 15 To the extent that any of appellees'
44 Indeed, it appears that vigorous mter-brand competition exists
in the mutual-fund industry-between the load funds themselves,
between load and no-load funds, between open and closed-end companies, and between all of thesC' mvestment forms and other investments See 1974 Staff Report, at 20 et seq.
45 As SEC Chairman Garrett observed m his letter submitting the
1974 Staff Report for rongresswnal consideration, "No issuer of
securities is snbject to more detailed rC'gulation than a mutual
fund" Letter from Ray Garrett, Jr ., Chairman, Securities and
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ancillary activities frustrate the SEC's regulatory objectives it has ample authority to eliminate them. 46
Here implied repeal of the antitrust laws is "necessary
to make the [regulatory scheme] work." Silver v. New
York Stock Exchange, supra. In generally similar situations, we have implied immunity in particular and discrete instances to assure that the federal agency entrusted
with regulation in the public interest could carry out that
responsibility free from the disruption of conflicting judgments that might be voiced by courts exercising jurisdiction under the antitrust laws. See Hughes Tool Co. v.
Trans World Airlines, 409 U.S. 363 (1973); Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U. S. 296
(1963). In this instance, maintenance of an antitrust
action for activities so directly related to the SEC's responsibilities poses a substantial danger that appellees
would be subjected to duplicative and inconsistent standards. This is hardly a result that Congress would have
mandated. We therefore hold that with respect to the
activities challenged in Count I of the complaint, the
Sherman Act has been displaced by the pervasive regulatory scheme established by the Maloney and Investment Company Acts.
Affirmed.

'

Exchange Commission to the Honorable John Sparkman, Chairman
of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United
States Senate (Nov. 4, 1974), contained in 1974 Staff Report, at v.
46 The Commission can, for example, require amendment of the
NASD rules regulating the conduct of its membership, see 15
U S. C. § 78o-3 (k) (2), or exercise the more general rulemaking
power conferred by § 38 (a) of the Investment Company Act, 15
U. S C. § 80a-38 (a), to contain any of the challenged activities
that might in ally way frustrate its regulation of the restrictions it
authonzes under§ 22 (f).

